ClamAV is an open source (GPLv2) anti-virus toolkit.
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clamav/libclamav/phishcheck.c

1683 lines
55 KiB

/*
* Detect phishing, based on URL spoofing detection.
*
* Copyright (C) 2013-2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2007-2013 Sourcefire, Inc.
*
* Authors: Török Edvin
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
* MA 02110-1301, USA.
*/
#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include "clamav-config.h"
#endif
#ifdef CL_THREAD_SAFE
#ifndef _REENTRANT
#define _REENTRANT
#endif
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "clamav.h"
#include "others.h"
#include "htmlnorm.h"
#include "phishcheck.h"
#include "phish_domaincheck_db.h"
#include "phish_allow_list.h"
#include "regex_list.h"
#include "iana_tld.h"
#include "iana_cctld.h"
#include "scanners.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include "mpool.h"
#define DOMAIN_REAL 1
#define DOMAIN_DISPLAY 0
#define PHISHY_USERNAME_IN_URL 1
#define PHISHY_NUMERIC_IP 2
#define REAL_IS_MAILTO 4
/* this is just a flag, so that the displayed url will be parsed as mailto too, for example
* <a href='mailto:somebody@yahoo.com'>to:somebody@yahoo.com</a>*/
#define DOMAIN_LISTED 8
#define PHISHY_CLOAKED_NULL 16
/*
* Phishing design documentation
* -----------------------------
TODO: update this doc whenever behaviour changes
phishingCheck() determines if @displayedLink is a legit representation of @realLink.
Steps:
1. if _realLink_ == _displayLink_ => CLEAN
2. url cleanup (normalization)
- whitespace elimination
strip all spaces, and leading and trailing garbage.
When matching we have to keep in account whether we stripped any spaces or not.
See str_fixup_spaces.
- html entity conversion
- handle hex-encoded characters
- convert hostname to lowercase
- normalize \ to /
3. Matched the urls against an _allow_list_:
a _realLink_, _displayedLink_ pair is matched against the _allow_list_.
the _allow_list_ is a list of pairs of realLink, displayedLink. Any of the elements of those pairs can be a _regex_.
if url *is found* in _allow_list_ --> *CLEAN*
4. URL is looked up in the _domain_list_
The _domain_list_ is a list of pairs of realLink, displayedLink (any of which can be regex).
This is the list of domains we do phishing detection for (such as ebay,paypal,chase,....)
We can't decide to stop processing here or not, so we just set a flag.
Note(*!*): the flags are modified by the the domain list checker. If domain is found, then the flags associated with it filter the default compile-time flags.
5. _Hostname_ is extracted from the _displayed URL_.
It is checked against the _allow_list_, and _domain_list_.
6. Now we know if we want to stop processing.
If we are only scanning domains in the _domain_list_ (default behaviour), and the url/domain
isn't found in it, we return (and mark url as not_list/clean).
If we scan all domains, then the domain list isn't even checked.
7. URL cloak check.
check for %00, and hex-encoded IPs in URL.
8. Skip empty displayedURLs
9. SSL mismatch detection.
Checks if realLink is http, but displayedLink is https or viceversa.
(by default the SSL detection is done for hrefs only, not for imgs)
10. Hostname of real URL is extracted.
12. Numeric IP detection.
If url is a numeric IP, then -> phish.
Maybe we should do DNS lookup?
13. isURL(displayedLink).
Checks if displayedLink is really a url.
if not -> clean
14. Hostnames of real, displayedLink are compared. If equal -> clean
15. Extract domain names, and compare. If equal -> clean
16. Do DNS lookups/reverse lookups. Disabled now (too much load/too many lookups). *
For the AllowList(.wdb)/DomainList(.pdb) format see regex_list.c (search for Flags)
*
*/
/* Constant strings and tables */
static char empty_string[] = "";
static const char dotnet[] = ".net";
static const char adonet[] = "ado.net";
static const char aspnet[] = "asp.net";
/* ; is replaced by ' ' so omit it here*/
static const char lt[] = "&lt";
static const char gt[] = "&gt";
static const char src_text[] = "src";
static const char href_text[] = "href";
static const char mailto[] = "mailto:";
static const char mailto_proto[] = "mailto://";
static const char https[] = "https:";
static const char http[] = "http:";
static const char ftp[] = "ftp:";
static const size_t href_text_len = sizeof(href_text);
static const size_t src_text_len = sizeof(src_text);
static const size_t dotnet_len = sizeof(dotnet) - 1;
static const size_t adonet_len = sizeof(adonet) - 1;
static const size_t aspnet_len = sizeof(aspnet) - 1;
static const size_t lt_len = sizeof(lt) - 1;
static const size_t gt_len = sizeof(gt) - 1;
static const size_t mailto_len = sizeof(mailto) - 1;
static const size_t mailto_proto_len = sizeof(mailto_proto) - 1;
static const size_t https_len = sizeof(https) - 1;
static const size_t http_len = sizeof(http) - 1;
static const size_t ftp_len = sizeof(ftp) - 1;
/* for urls, including mailto: urls, and (broken) http:www... style urls*/
/* refer to: http://www.w3.org/Addressing/URL/5_URI_BNF.html
* Modifications: don't allow empty domains/subdomains, such as www..com <- that is no url
* So the 'safe' char class has been split up
* */
/* character classes */
#define URI_digit "0-9"
#define URI_IP_digits "[" URI_digit "]{1,3}"
#define URI_path_start "[/?:]?"
#define URI_numeric_path URI_IP_digits "(\\." URI_IP_digits "){3}" URI_path_start
#define URI_numeric_URI "(http|https|ftp:(//)?)?" URI_numeric_path
#define URI_numeric_fragmentaddress URI_numeric_URI
/*Warning: take care when modifying this regex, it has been tweaked, and tuned, just don't break it please.
* there is fragmentaddress1, and 2 to work around the ISO limitation of 509 bytes max length for string constants*/
static const char numeric_url_regex[] = "^ *" URI_numeric_fragmentaddress " *$";
/* generated by contrib/phishing/generate_tables.c */
static const short int hextable[256] = {
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x1, 0x2, 0x3, 0x4, 0x5, 0x6, 0x7, 0x8, 0x9, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd, 0xe, 0xf, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd, 0xe, 0xf, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0};
/* Prototypes*/
static void string_init_c(struct string* dest, char* data);
static int string_assign_concatenated(struct string* dest, const char* prefix, const char* begin, const char* end);
static void string_assign_null(struct string* dest);
static char* rfind(char* start, char c, size_t len);
static char hex2int(const unsigned char* src);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
static enum phish_status phishingCheck(cli_ctx* ctx, struct url_check* urls);
static const char* phishing_ret_toString(enum phish_status phishing_verdict);
static void url_check_init(struct url_check* urls)
{
string_init_c(&urls->realLink, NULL);
string_init_c(&urls->displayLink, NULL);
string_init_c(&urls->pre_fixup.pre_displayLink, NULL);
}
/* string reference counting implementation,
* so that: we don't have to keep in mind who allocated what, and when needs to be freed,
* and thus we won't leak memory*/
static void string_free(struct string* str)
{
for (;;) {
str->refcount--;
if (!str->refcount) {
if (str->ref) /* don't free, this is a portion of another string */
str = str->ref; /* try to free that one*/
else {
if (str->data)
free(str->data);
break;
}
} else
break;
}
}
/* always use the string_assign when assigning to a string, this makes sure the old one's reference count is incremented*/
static void string_assign(struct string* dest, struct string* src)
{
string_free(dest);
src->refcount++;
dest->data = src->data;
dest->refcount = 1;
dest->ref = src;
}
/* data will be freed when string freed */
/* it doesn't free old string, use only for initialization
* Doesn't allow NULL pointers, they are replaced by pointer to empty string
* */
static void string_init_c(struct string* dest, char* data)
{
dest->refcount = data ? 1 : 0;
dest->data = data ? data : empty_string;
dest->ref = NULL;
}
/* assigns to @dest the string made from concatenating @prefix with the string between @begin and @end */
static int string_assign_concatenated(struct string* dest, const char* prefix, const char* begin, const char* end)
{
const size_t prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
char* ret = cli_malloc(prefix_len + end - begin + 1);
if (!ret) {
Spelling Adjustments (#30) * spelling: accessed * spelling: alignment * spelling: amalgamated * spelling: answers * spelling: another * spelling: acquisition * spelling: apitid * spelling: ascii * spelling: appending * spelling: appropriate * spelling: arbitrary * spelling: architecture * spelling: asynchronous * spelling: attachments * spelling: argument * spelling: authenticode * spelling: because * spelling: boundary * spelling: brackets * spelling: bytecode * spelling: calculation * spelling: cannot * spelling: changes * spelling: check * spelling: children * spelling: codegen * spelling: commands * spelling: container * spelling: concatenated * spelling: conditions * spelling: continuous * spelling: conversions * spelling: corresponding * spelling: corrupted * spelling: coverity * spelling: crafting * spelling: daemon * spelling: definition * spelling: delivered * spelling: delivery * spelling: delimit * spelling: dependencies * spelling: dependency * spelling: detection * spelling: determine * spelling: disconnects * spelling: distributed * spelling: documentation * spelling: downgraded * spelling: downloading * spelling: endianness * spelling: entities * spelling: especially * spelling: empty * spelling: expected * spelling: explicitly * spelling: existent * spelling: finished * spelling: flexibility * spelling: flexible * spelling: freshclam * spelling: functions * spelling: guarantee * spelling: hardened * spelling: headaches * spelling: heighten * spelling: improper * spelling: increment * spelling: indefinitely * spelling: independent * spelling: inaccessible * spelling: infrastructure Conflicts: docs/html/node68.html * spelling: initializing * spelling: inited * spelling: instream * spelling: installed * spelling: initialization * spelling: initialize * spelling: interface * spelling: intrinsics * spelling: interpreter * spelling: introduced * spelling: invalid * spelling: latency * spelling: lawyers * spelling: libclamav * spelling: likelihood * spelling: loop * spelling: maximum * spelling: million * spelling: milliseconds * spelling: minimum * spelling: minzhuan * spelling: multipart * spelling: misled * spelling: modifiers * spelling: notifying * spelling: objects * spelling: occurred * spelling: occurs * spelling: occurrences * spelling: optimization * spelling: original * spelling: originated * spelling: output * spelling: overridden * spelling: parenthesis * spelling: partition * spelling: performance * spelling: permission * spelling: phishing * spelling: portions * spelling: positives * spelling: preceded * spelling: properties * spelling: protocol * spelling: protos * spelling: quarantine * spelling: recursive * spelling: referring * spelling: reorder * spelling: reset * spelling: resources * spelling: resume * spelling: retrieval * spelling: rewrite * spelling: sanity * spelling: scheduled * spelling: search * spelling: section * spelling: separator * spelling: separated * spelling: specify * spelling: special * spelling: statement * spelling: streams * spelling: succession * spelling: suggests * spelling: superfluous * spelling: suspicious * spelling: synonym * spelling: temporarily * spelling: testfiles * spelling: transverse * spelling: turkish * spelling: typos * spelling: unable * spelling: unexpected * spelling: unexpectedly * spelling: unfinished * spelling: unfortunately * spelling: uninitialized * spelling: unlocking * spelling: unnecessary * spelling: unpack * spelling: unrecognized * spelling: unsupported * spelling: usable * spelling: wherever * spelling: wishlist * spelling: white * spelling: infrastructure * spelling: directories * spelling: overridden * spelling: permission * spelling: yesterday * spelling: initialization * spelling: intrinsics * space adjustment for spelling changes * minor modifications by klin
8 years ago
cli_errmsg("Phishcheck: Unable to allocate memory for string_assign_concatenated\n");
return CL_EMEM;
}
strncpy(ret, prefix, prefix_len);
strncpy(ret + prefix_len, begin, end - begin);
ret[prefix_len + end - begin] = '\0';
string_free(dest);
string_init_c(dest, ret);
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
/* make a copy of the string between start -> end*/
static int string_assign_dup(struct string* dest, const char* start, const char* end)
{
char* ret = cli_malloc(end - start + 1);
if (!ret) {
cli_errmsg("Phishcheck: Unable to allocate memory for string_assign_dup\n");
return CL_EMEM;
}
strncpy(ret, start, end - start);
ret[end - start] = '\0';
string_free(dest);
string_init_c(dest, ret);
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
static void string_assign_null(struct string* dest)
{
if (dest) {
string_free(dest);
dest->data = empty_string;
dest->refcount = -1; /* don't free it! */
dest->ref = NULL;
}
}
/* this string uses portion of another string*/
static void string_assign_ref(struct string* dest, struct string* ref, char* data)
{
string_free(dest);
ref->refcount++;
dest->data = data;
dest->refcount = 1;
dest->ref = ref;
}
static void free_if_needed(struct url_check* url)
{
string_free(&url->realLink);
string_free(&url->displayLink);
string_free(&url->pre_fixup.pre_displayLink);
}
static int build_regex(regex_t* preg, const char* regex, int nosub)
{
int rc;
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck: Compiling regex: %s\n", regex);
rc = cli_regcomp(preg, regex, REG_EXTENDED | REG_ICASE | (nosub ? REG_NOSUB : 0));
if (rc) {
size_t buflen = cli_regerror(rc, preg, NULL, 0);
char* errbuf = cli_malloc(buflen);
if (errbuf) {
cli_regerror(rc, preg, errbuf, buflen);
cli_errmsg("Phishcheck: Error in compiling regex:%s\nDisabling phishing checks\n", errbuf);
free(errbuf);
} else
cli_errmsg("Phishcheck: Error in compiling regex, disabling phishing checks. Additionally an Out-of-memory error was encountered while generating a detailed error message\n");
return 1;
}
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
/* allocates memory */
static int get_host(const char* URL, int isReal, int* phishy, const char** hstart, const char** hend)
{
int rc, ismailto = 0;
const char* start;
const char* end = NULL;
if (!URL) {
*hstart = *hend = NULL;
return 0;
}
start = strstr(URL, "://");
if (!start) {
if (!strncmp(URL, mailto, mailto_len)) {
start = URL + mailto_len;
ismailto = 1;
} else if (!isReal && *phishy & REAL_IS_MAILTO) {
/* it is not required to use mailto: in the displayed url, they might use to:, or whatever */
end = URL + strlen(URL) + 1;
start = URL + strcspn(URL, ": ") + 1;
if (start == end)
start = URL;
ismailto = 1;
} else {
start = URL; /*URL without protocol*/
if (isReal)
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck: Real URL without protocol: %s\n", URL);
else
ismailto = 2; /*no-protocol, might be mailto, @ is no problem*/
}
} else
start += 3; /* :// */
if (!ismailto || !isReal) {
const char *realhost, *tld;
do {
end = start + strcspn(start, ":/?");
realhost = strchr(start, '@');
if (realhost == NULL || (start != end && realhost > end)) {
/*don't check beyond end of hostname*/
break;
}
tld = strrchr(realhost, '.');
rc = tld ? !!in_tld_set(tld, strlen(tld)) : 0;
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
if (rc)
*phishy |= PHISHY_USERNAME_IN_URL; /* if the url contains a username that is there just to fool people,
like http://banksite@example.com/ */
start = realhost + 1; /*skip the username*/
} while (realhost); /*skip over multiple @ characters, text following last @ character is the real host*/
} else if (ismailto && isReal)
*phishy |= REAL_IS_MAILTO;
if (!end) {
end = start + strcspn(start, ":/?"); /*especially important for mailto:somebody@yahoo.com?subject=...*/
if (!end)
end = start + strlen(start);
}
*hstart = start;
*hend = end;
return 0;
}
/*
* memrchr isn't standard, so I use this
*/
static char*
rfind(char* start, char c, size_t len)
{
char* p;
if (start == NULL)
return NULL;
for (p = start + len; (p >= start) && (*p != c); p--)
;
return (p < start) ? NULL : p;
}
static void get_domain(struct string* dest, struct string* host)
{
char* domain;
char* tld = strrchr(host->data, '.');
if (!tld) {
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck: Encountered a host without a tld? (%s)\n", host->data);
string_assign(dest, host);
return;
}
if (in_cctld_set(tld + 1, strlen(tld + 1))) {
const char* countrycode = tld + 1;
tld = rfind(host->data, '.', tld - host->data - 1);
if (!tld) {
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck: Weird, a name with only 2 levels (%s)\n",
host->data);
string_assign(dest, host);
return;
}
if (!in_tld_set(tld + 1, countrycode - tld - 2)) {
string_assign_ref(dest, host, tld + 1);
return; /*it was a name like: subdomain.domain.uk, return domain.uk*/
}
}
/*we need to strip one more level, this is the actual domain*/
domain = rfind(host->data, '.', tld - host->data - 1);
if (!domain) {
string_assign(dest, host);
return; /* it was like sourceforge.net?*/
}
string_assign_ref(dest, host, domain + 1);
}
static int isNumeric(const char* host)
{
int len = strlen(host);
int a, b, c, d, n = 0;
/* 1.2.3.4 -> 7*/
/* 127.127.127.127 -> 15*/
if (len < 7 || len > 15)
return 0;
sscanf(host, "%d.%d.%d.%d%n", &a, &b, &c, &d, &n);
if (n == len)
if (a >= 0 && a <= 256 && b >= 0 && b <= 256 && c >= 0 && c <= 256 && d >= 0 && d <= 256)
return 1;
return 0;
}
static int isSSL(const char* URL)
{
return URL ? !strncmp(https, URL, https_len) : 0;
}
/* deletes @what from the string @begin.
* @what_len: length of @what, excluding the terminating \0 */
static void
str_hex_to_char(char** begin, const char** end)
{
char *firsthex, *sbegin_;
char* sbegin = *begin;
const char* str_end = *end;
if (str_end <= &sbegin[1])
return;
/* convert leading %xx*/
if (sbegin[0] == '%') {
sbegin[2] = hex2int((unsigned char*)sbegin + 1);
sbegin += 2;
}
*begin = sbegin++;
do {
sbegin_ = sbegin;
firsthex = NULL;
while (sbegin + 3 <= str_end) {
if (sbegin + 3 <= str_end && sbegin[0] == '%') {
const char* src = sbegin + 3;
if (isxdigit(sbegin[1]) && isxdigit(sbegin[2])) {
*sbegin = hex2int((unsigned char*)sbegin + 1);
if (*sbegin == '%' && !firsthex)
firsthex = sbegin;
/* move string */
memmove(sbegin + 1, src, str_end - src + 1);
str_end -= 2;
}
}
sbegin++;
}
sbegin = sbegin_;
} while (firsthex);
*end = str_end;
}
/*
* deletes @what from the string @begin.
* @what_len: length of @what, excluding the terminating \0
*/
static void
str_strip(char** begin, const char** end, const char* what, size_t what_len)
{
char* sbegin = *begin;
const char* str_end = *end;
const char* str_end_what;
size_t cmp_len = what_len;
if (begin == NULL || str_end <= sbegin)
return;
/*if(str_end < (sbegin + what_len))
return;*/
if (strlen(sbegin) < what_len)
return;
/* strip leading @what */
while (cmp_len && !strncmp(sbegin, what, cmp_len)) {
sbegin += what_len;
if (cmp_len > what_len)
cmp_len -= what_len;
else
cmp_len = 0;
}
/* strip trailing @what */
if (what_len <= (size_t)(str_end - sbegin)) {
str_end_what = str_end - what_len + 1;
while ((str_end_what > sbegin) &&
(strncmp(str_end_what, what, what_len) == 0)) {
str_end -= what_len;
str_end_what -= what_len;
}
}
*begin = sbegin++;
while (sbegin + what_len <= str_end) {
while (sbegin + what_len <= str_end && !strncmp(sbegin, what, what_len)) {
const char* src = sbegin + what_len;
/* move string */
memmove(sbegin, src, str_end - src + 1);
str_end -= what_len;
}
sbegin++;
}
*end = str_end;
}
/* replace every occurrence of @c in @str with @r*/
static void str_replace(char* str, const char* end, char c, char r)
{
for (; str <= end; str++) {
if (*str == c)
*str = r;
}
}
static void str_make_lowercase(char* str, size_t len)
{
for (; len; str++, len--) {
*str = tolower(*str);
}
}
#define fix32(x) ((x) < 32 ? 32 : (x))
static void clear_msb(char* begin)
{
for (; *begin; begin++)
*begin = fix32((*begin) & 0x7f);
}
/*
* Particularly yahoo puts links like this in mails:
* http:/ /www.example.com
* So first step: delete space between / /
*
* Next there could be possible links like this:
* <a href="phishlink">w w w . e b a y . c o m</a>
* Here we need to strip spaces to get this picked up.
*
* Next there are links like:
* <a href="www.yahoo.com">Check out yahoo.com</a>
* Here we add a ., so we get: check.out.yahoo.com (it won't trigger)
*
* Old Rule for adding .: if substring from right contains dot, then add dot,
* otherwise strip space
* New Rule: strip all spaces
* strip leading and trailing garbage
*
*/
static void
str_fixup_spaces(char** begin, const char** end)
{
char* sbegin = *begin;
const char* send = *end;
if (!sbegin || !send || send < sbegin)
return;
/* strip spaces */
str_strip(&sbegin, &send, " ", 1);
/* strip leading/trailing garbage */
while (!isalnum(sbegin[0] & 0xff) && sbegin <= send) sbegin++;
while (!isalnum(send[0] & 0xff) && send >= sbegin) send--;
/* keep terminating slash character*/
if (send[1] == '/') send++;
*begin = sbegin;
*end = send;
}
/* allocates memory */
static int
cleanupURL(struct string* URL, struct string* pre_URL, int isReal)
{
char* begin = URL->data;
const char* end;
size_t len;
clear_msb(begin);
/*if(begin == NULL)
return;*/
/*TODO: handle hex-encoded IPs*/
while (isspace(*begin))
begin++;
len = strlen(begin);
if (len == 0) {
string_assign_null(URL);
string_assign_null(pre_URL);
return 0;
}
end = begin + len - 1;
/*cli_dbgmsg("%d %d\n", end-begin, len);*/
if (begin >= end) {
string_assign_null(URL);
string_assign_null(pre_URL);
return 0;
}
while (isspace(*end))
end--;
/* From mailscanner, my comments enclosed in {} */
if (!strncmp(begin, dotnet, dotnet_len) || !strncmp(begin, adonet, adonet_len) || !strncmp(begin, aspnet, aspnet_len)) {
string_assign_null(URL);
string_assign_null(pre_URL);
} else {
size_t host_len;
char* host_begin;
int rc;
str_replace(begin, end, '\\', '/');
/* find beginning of hostname, because:
* - we want to keep only protocol, host, and
* strip path & query parameter(s)
* - we want to make hostname lowercase*/
host_begin = strchr(begin, ':');
while (host_begin && (host_begin < end) && (host_begin[1] == '/')) host_begin++;
if (!host_begin)
host_begin = begin;
else
host_begin++;
host_len = strcspn(host_begin, ":/?");
if (host_begin + host_len > end + 1) {
/* prevent hostname extending beyond end, it can happen
* if we have spaces at the end, we don't want those part of
* the hostname */
host_len = end - host_begin + 1;
} else {
/* cut the URL after the hostname */
/* @end points to last character we want to be part of the URL */
end = host_begin + host_len - 1;
}
host_begin[host_len] = '\0';
/* convert hostname to lowercase, but only hostname! */
str_make_lowercase(host_begin, host_len);
/* some broken MUAs put > in the href, and then
* we get a false positive, so remove them */
str_replace(begin, end, '<', ' ');
str_replace(begin, end, '>', ' ');
str_replace(begin, end, '\"', ' ');
str_replace(begin, end, ';', ' ');
str_strip(&begin, &end, lt, lt_len);
str_strip(&begin, &end, gt, gt_len);
/* convert %xx to real value */
str_hex_to_char(&begin, &end);
if (isReal) {
/* htmlnorm converts \n to space, so we have to strip spaces */
str_strip(&begin, &end, " ", 1);
} else {
/* trim space */
while ((begin <= end) && (begin[0] == ' ')) begin++;
while ((begin <= end) && (end[0] == ' ')) end--;
}
if ((rc = string_assign_dup(isReal ? URL : pre_URL, begin, end + 1))) {
string_assign_null(URL);
return rc;
}
if (!isReal) {
str_fixup_spaces(&begin, &end);
if ((rc = string_assign_dup(URL, begin, end + 1))) {
return rc;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/* -------end runtime disable---------*/
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
cl_error_t phishingScan(cli_ctx* ctx, tag_arguments_t* hrefs)
{
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
cl_error_t status = CL_CLEAN;
/* TODO: get_host and then apply regex, etc. */
int i;
struct phishcheck* pchk = (struct phishcheck*)ctx->engine->phishcheck;
/* check for status of allow list fatal error, etc. */
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if (!pchk || pchk->is_disabled) {
goto done;
}
if (!ctx->found_possibly_unwanted && !SCAN_ALLMATCHES)
*ctx->virname = NULL;
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
for (i = 0; i < hrefs->count; i++) {
struct url_check urls;
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
enum phish_status phishing_verdict;
urls.flags = strncmp((char*)hrefs->tag[i], href_text, href_text_len) ? (CL_PHISH_ALL_CHECKS & ~CHECK_SSL) : CL_PHISH_ALL_CHECKS;
urls.link_type = 0;
if (!strncmp((char*)hrefs->tag[i], src_text, src_text_len)) {
if (!(urls.flags & CHECK_IMG_URL))
continue;
urls.link_type |= LINKTYPE_IMAGE;
}
urls.always_check_flags = 0;
if (SCAN_HEURISTIC_PHISHING_SSL_MISMATCH) {
urls.always_check_flags |= CHECK_SSL;
}
if (SCAN_HEURISTIC_PHISHING_CLOAK) {
urls.always_check_flags |= CHECK_CLOAKING;
}
string_init_c(&urls.realLink, (char*)hrefs->value[i]);
string_init_c(&urls.displayLink, (char*)hrefs->contents[i]);
string_init_c(&urls.pre_fixup.pre_displayLink, NULL);
urls.realLink.refcount = -1;
urls.displayLink.refcount = -1; /*don't free these, caller will free*/
if (strcmp((char*)hrefs->tag[i], "href")) {
char* url;
url = urls.realLink.data;
urls.realLink.data = urls.displayLink.data;
urls.displayLink.data = url;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = phishingCheck(ctx, &urls);
free_if_needed(&urls);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if (pchk->is_disabled) {
return CL_CLEAN;
}
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck: Phishing scan result: %s\n", phishing_ret_toString(phishing_verdict));
switch (phishing_verdict) /*TODO: support flags from ctx->options,*/
{
case CL_PHISH_CLEAN:
continue;
case CL_PHISH_NUMERIC_IP:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Phishing.Email.Cloaked.NumericIP");
break;
case CL_PHISH_CLOAKED_NULL:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Phishing.Email.Cloaked.Null"); /*fakesite%01%00@fake.example.com*/
break;
case CL_PHISH_SSL_SPOOF:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Phishing.Email.SSL-Spoof");
break;
case CL_PHISH_CLOAKED_UIU:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Phishing.Email.Cloaked.Username"); /*http://banksite@fake.example.com*/
break;
case CL_PHISH_HASH0:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Safebrowsing.Suspected-malware_safebrowsing.clamav.net");
break;
case CL_PHISH_HASH1:
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Phishing.URL.Blocked");
break;
case CL_PHISH_HASH2:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Safebrowsing.Suspected-phishing_safebrowsing.clamav.net");
break;
case CL_PHISH_NOMATCH:
default:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
status = cli_append_possibly_unwanted(ctx, "Heuristics.Phishing.Email.SpoofedDomain");
break;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if (CL_CLEAN != status && !SCAN_ALLMATCHES) {
goto done;
}
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
done:
return status;
}
static char hex2int(const unsigned char* src)
{
return (src[0] == '0' && src[1] == '0') ? 0x1 : /* don't convert %00 to \0, use 0x1
* this value is also used by cloak check*/
hextable[src[0]] << 4 | hextable[src[1]];
}
static void free_regex(regex_t* p)
{
if (p) {
cli_regfree(p);
}
}
cl_error_t phishing_init(struct cl_engine* engine)
{
struct phishcheck* pchk;
if (!engine->phishcheck) {
pchk = engine->phishcheck = MPOOL_MALLOC(engine->mempool, sizeof(struct phishcheck));
if (!pchk) {
cli_errmsg("Phishcheck: Unable to allocate memory for initialization\n");
return CL_EMEM;
}
pchk->is_disabled = 1;
} else {
pchk = engine->phishcheck;
if (!pchk)
return CL_ENULLARG;
if (!pchk->is_disabled) {
/* already initialized */
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
}
cli_dbgmsg("Initializing phishcheck module\n");
if (build_regex(&pchk->preg_numeric, numeric_url_regex, 1)) {
MPOOL_FREE(engine->mempool, pchk);
engine->phishcheck = NULL;
return CL_EFORMAT;
}
pchk->is_disabled = 0;
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck module initialized\n");
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
void phishing_done(struct cl_engine* engine)
{
struct phishcheck* pchk = engine->phishcheck;
cli_dbgmsg("Cleaning up phishcheck\n");
if (pchk && !pchk->is_disabled) {
free_regex(&pchk->preg_numeric);
}
allow_list_done(engine);
domain_list_done(engine);
if (pchk) {
cli_dbgmsg("Freeing phishcheck struct\n");
MPOOL_FREE(engine->mempool, pchk);
}
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck cleaned up\n");
}
/*ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz*/
static const uint8_t URI_alpha[256] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
/*!"$%&'()*,-0123456789@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz*/
static const uint8_t URI_xalpha_nodot[256] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
/*!"#$%&'()*+,-0123456789@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz*/
static const uint8_t URI_xpalpha_nodot[256] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
static inline int validate_uri_xalphas_nodot(const char* start, const char* end)
{
const unsigned char* p;
for (p = (const unsigned char*)start; p < (const unsigned char*)end; p++) {
if (!URI_xalpha_nodot[*p])
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static inline int validate_uri_xpalphas_nodot(const char* start, const char* end)
{
const unsigned char* p;
for (p = (const unsigned char*)start; p < (const unsigned char*)end; p++) {
if (!URI_xpalpha_nodot[*p])
return 0;
}
/* must have at least on char */
return p > (const unsigned char*)start;
}
static inline int validate_uri_ialpha(const char* start, const char* end)
{
const unsigned char* p = (const unsigned char*)start;
if (start >= end || !URI_alpha[*p])
return 0;
return validate_uri_xalphas_nodot(start + 1, end);
}
/*
* Only those URLs are identified as URLs for which phishing detection can be performed.
*/
static int isURL(char* URL, int accept_anyproto)
{
char *last_tld_end = NULL, *q;
const char *start = NULL, *p, *end;
int has_proto = 0;
if (!URL)
return 0;
while (*URL == ' ') URL++;
switch (URL[0]) {
case 'h':
if (strncmp(URL, https, https_len) == 0)
start = URL + https_len - 1;
else if (strncmp(URL, http, http_len) == 0)
start = URL + http_len - 1;
break;
case 'f':
if (strncmp(URL, ftp, ftp_len) == 0)
start = URL + ftp_len - 1;
break;
case 'm':
if (strncmp(URL, mailto_proto, mailto_proto_len) == 0)
start = URL + mailto_proto_len - 1;
break;
}
if (start && start[1] == '/' && start[2] == '/') {
/* has a valid protocol, it is a URL */
return 1;
}
start = accept_anyproto ? strchr(URL, ':') : start;
if (start) {
/* validate URI scheme */
if (validate_uri_ialpha(URL, start)) {
/* skip :// */
if (start[1] == '/') {
start += 2;
if (*start == '/')
start++;
} else
start++;
has_proto = 1;
} else
start = URL; /* scheme invalid */
} else
start = URL;
p = start;
end = strchr(p, '/');
if (!end)
end = p + strlen(p);
if (!has_proto && (q = memchr(p, '@', end - p))) {
/* don't phishcheck if displayed URL is email, but do phishcheck if
* foo.TLD@host is used */
const char* q2 = q - 1;
while (q2 > p && *q2 != '.') q2--;
if (q2 == p || !in_tld_set(q2 + 1, q - q2 - 1))
return 0;
}
do {
q = strchr(p, '.');
if (q > end)
break;
if (q) {
if (!validate_uri_xpalphas_nodot(p, q))
return 0;
if (accept_anyproto && in_tld_set(p, q - p))
last_tld_end = q;
p = q + 1;
}
} while (q);
if (p == start) /* must have at least one dot in the URL */
return 0;
if (end < p)
end = p;
while (*end == ' ' && end > p) --end;
if (in_tld_set(p, end - p))
return 1;
if (!accept_anyproto)
return 0;
if (last_tld_end) {
*last_tld_end = '\0';
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Check if this is a real URL, which basically means to check if it has a known URL scheme (http,https,ftp).
* This prevents false positives with outbind:// and blocked:: links.
*/
#if 0
static int isRealURL(const struct phishcheck* pchk,const char* URL)
{
return URL ? !cli_regexec(&pchk->preg_realurl,URL,0,NULL,0) : 0;
}
#endif
static int isNumericURL(const struct phishcheck* pchk, const char* URL)
{
return URL ? !cli_regexec(&pchk->preg_numeric, URL, 0, NULL, 0) : 0;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
/**
* @brief Cleans up @urls
*
* If URLs are identical after cleanup it will return CL_PHISH_CLEAN.
*
* @param urls
* @return enum phish_status
*/
static enum phish_status cleanupURLs(struct url_check* urls)
{
if (urls->flags & CLEANUP_URL) {
cleanupURL(&urls->realLink, NULL, 1);
cleanupURL(&urls->displayLink, &urls->pre_fixup.pre_displayLink, 0);
if (!urls->displayLink.data || !urls->realLink.data)
return CL_PHISH_NODECISION;
if (!strcmp(urls->realLink.data, urls->displayLink.data))
return CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
}
return CL_PHISH_NODECISION;
}
static int url_get_host(struct url_check* url, struct url_check* host_url, int isReal, int* phishy)
{
const char *start, *end;
struct string* host = isReal ? &host_url->realLink : &host_url->displayLink;
const char* URL = isReal ? url->realLink.data : url->displayLink.data;
int rc;
if ((rc = get_host(URL, isReal, phishy, &start, &end))) {
return rc;
}
if (!start || !end) {
string_assign_null(host);
} else if ((rc = string_assign_concatenated(host, ".", start, end))) {
return rc;
}
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck:host:%s\n", host->data);
if (!host->data || (isReal && (host->data[0] == '\0' || strstr(host->data, ".."))) || *phishy & REAL_IS_MAILTO || strchr(host->data, ' ')) {
/* no host,
* link without domain, such as: href="/isapi.dll?...
* mailto:
* spaces in hostname
* double dots
*/
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck:skipping invalid host\n");
return CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
}
if (isNumeric(host->data)) {
*phishy |= PHISHY_NUMERIC_IP;
}
if (!isReal) {
url->pre_fixup.host_start = start - URL;
url->pre_fixup.host_end = end - URL;
url->pre_fixup.pre_displayLink.data[url->pre_fixup.host_end] = '\0';
}
return CL_PHISH_NODECISION;
}
static void url_get_domain(struct url_check* url, struct url_check* domains)
{
get_domain(&domains->realLink, &url->realLink);
get_domain(&domains->displayLink, &url->displayLink);
domains->flags = url->flags;
}
static enum phish_status phishy_map(int phishy, enum phish_status fallback)
{
if (phishy & PHISHY_USERNAME_IN_URL)
return CL_PHISH_CLOAKED_UIU;
else if (phishy & PHISHY_NUMERIC_IP)
return CL_PHISH_NUMERIC_IP;
else
return fallback;
}
static cl_error_t allow_list_check(const struct cl_engine* engine, struct url_check* urls, int hostOnly)
{
return allow_list_match(engine, urls->realLink.data, urls->displayLink.data, hostOnly);
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
static cl_error_t hash_match(const struct regex_matcher* rlist,
const char* host,
size_t hlen,
const char* path,
size_t plen,
int* prefix_matched,
enum phish_status* phishing_verdict)
{
const char* virname;
#if 0
char s[1024];
strncpy(s, host, hlen);
strncpy(s+hlen, path, plen);
s[hlen+plen] = '\0';
cli_dbgmsg("hash lookup for: %s\n",s);
#endif
UNUSEDPARAM(prefix_matched);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if ((NULL == host) || (NULL == path) || (NULL == phishing_verdict)) {
return CL_ENULLARG;
}
*phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_NODECISION;
if (rlist->sha256_hashes.bm_patterns) {
const char hexchars[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
unsigned char h[65];
unsigned char sha256_dig[32];
unsigned i;
void* sha256;
sha256 = cl_hash_init("sha256");
if (!(sha256))
return CL_EMEM;
cl_update_hash(sha256, (void*)host, hlen);
cl_update_hash(sha256, (void*)path, plen);
cl_finish_hash(sha256, sha256_dig);
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
h[2 * i] = hexchars[sha256_dig[i] >> 4];
h[2 * i + 1] = hexchars[sha256_dig[i] & 0xf];
}
h[64] = '\0';
cli_dbgmsg("Looking up hash %s for %s(%u)%s(%u)\n", h, host, (unsigned)hlen, path, (unsigned)plen);
#if 0
if (prefix_matched) {
if (cli_bm_scanbuff(sha256_dig, 4, &virname, NULL, &rlist->hostkey_prefix,0,NULL,NULL,NULL) == CL_VIRUS) {
cli_dbgmsg("prefix matched\n");
*prefix_matched = 1;
} else
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
#endif
if (cli_bm_scanbuff(sha256_dig, 32, &virname, NULL, &rlist->sha256_hashes, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL) == CL_VIRUS) {
cli_dbgmsg("This hash matched: %s\n", h);
switch (*virname) {
case 'W':
cli_dbgmsg("Hash is allowed, skipping\n");
break;
case '1':
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
*phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_HASH1;
Fix several coverity warnings 290424 Missing break in switch - In hash_match: Missing break statement between cases in switch statement 290414 Resource leak - In cli_scanishield_msi: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leak in a fail case 288197 Resource leak - In decrypt_any: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leak in a fail case 290426 Resource leak - In cli_magic_scan: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file prefix when running with --save-temps 192923 Resource leak - In cli_scanrar: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file descriptor if a virus was found in a RAR file comment 225146 Resource leak - In cli_scanegg: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file descriptor if unable to write a comment file to disk 290425 Resource leak - In scan_common: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leaks in various fail cases. Also changes cli_scanrar to write out the file comment only if --leave-temps is specified and scan the buffer (like what is done in cli_scanegg) instead of writing the file out, scanning that, and then deleting the file if --leave-temps is not specified. The unit tests stopped working when correcting an issue with a switch statement that determined what type of signature had matched on a Google SafeBrowsing GDB rule. Looking into the unit tests, it looks like the code had always assumed that the test cases would be detected by a malware test rule in unit_tests/input/daily.gdb, but now some of the tests get matched on the phishing test rule. I updated the test logic to be more clear, and added tests for both cases now. Fix some memory leaks in libclamav/scanners.c
6 years ago
break;
case '2':
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
*phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_HASH2;
Fix several coverity warnings 290424 Missing break in switch - In hash_match: Missing break statement between cases in switch statement 290414 Resource leak - In cli_scanishield_msi: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leak in a fail case 288197 Resource leak - In decrypt_any: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leak in a fail case 290426 Resource leak - In cli_magic_scan: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file prefix when running with --save-temps 192923 Resource leak - In cli_scanrar: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file descriptor if a virus was found in a RAR file comment 225146 Resource leak - In cli_scanegg: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file descriptor if unable to write a comment file to disk 290425 Resource leak - In scan_common: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leaks in various fail cases. Also changes cli_scanrar to write out the file comment only if --leave-temps is specified and scan the buffer (like what is done in cli_scanegg) instead of writing the file out, scanning that, and then deleting the file if --leave-temps is not specified. The unit tests stopped working when correcting an issue with a switch statement that determined what type of signature had matched on a Google SafeBrowsing GDB rule. Looking into the unit tests, it looks like the code had always assumed that the test cases would be detected by a malware test rule in unit_tests/input/daily.gdb, but now some of the tests get matched on the phishing test rule. I updated the test logic to be more clear, and added tests for both cases now. Fix some memory leaks in libclamav/scanners.c
6 years ago
break;
default:
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
*phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_HASH0;
Fix several coverity warnings 290424 Missing break in switch - In hash_match: Missing break statement between cases in switch statement 290414 Resource leak - In cli_scanishield_msi: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leak in a fail case 288197 Resource leak - In decrypt_any: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leak in a fail case 290426 Resource leak - In cli_magic_scan: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file prefix when running with --save-temps 192923 Resource leak - In cli_scanrar: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file descriptor if a virus was found in a RAR file comment 225146 Resource leak - In cli_scanegg: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Leaked a file descriptor if unable to write a comment file to disk 290425 Resource leak - In scan_common: Leak of memory or pointers to system resources. Memory leaks in various fail cases. Also changes cli_scanrar to write out the file comment only if --leave-temps is specified and scan the buffer (like what is done in cli_scanegg) instead of writing the file out, scanning that, and then deleting the file if --leave-temps is not specified. The unit tests stopped working when correcting an issue with a switch statement that determined what type of signature had matched on a Google SafeBrowsing GDB rule. Looking into the unit tests, it looks like the code had always assumed that the test cases would be detected by a malware test rule in unit_tests/input/daily.gdb, but now some of the tests get matched on the phishing test rule. I updated the test logic to be more clear, and added tests for both cases now. Fix some memory leaks in libclamav/scanners.c
6 years ago
break;
}
}
}
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
#define URL_MAX_LEN 1024
#define COMPONENTS 4
enum phish_status cli_url_canon(const char* inurl, size_t len, char* urlbuff, size_t dest_len, char** host, size_t* hostlen, const char** path, size_t* pathlen)
{
char *url, *p, *last;
char *host_begin, *path_begin;
const char* urlend = urlbuff + len;
size_t host_len, path_len;
dest_len -= 3;
strncpy(urlbuff, inurl, dest_len);
urlbuff[dest_len] = urlbuff[dest_len + 1] = urlbuff[dest_len + 2] = '\0';
url = urlbuff;
/* canonicalize only real URLs, with a protocol */
host_begin = strchr(url, ':');
if (!host_begin)
return CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
++host_begin;
/* ignore username in URL */
while ((host_begin < urlend) && *host_begin == '/') ++host_begin;
host_len = strcspn(host_begin, ":/?");
p = memchr(host_begin, '@', host_len);
if (p)
host_begin = p + 1;
url = host_begin;
/* repeatedly % unescape characters */
str_hex_to_char(&url, &urlend);
host_begin = url;
len = urlend - url;
/* skip to beginning of hostname */
while ((host_begin < urlend) && *host_begin == '/') ++host_begin;
while (*host_begin == '.' && host_begin < urlend) ++host_begin;
last = strchr(host_begin, '/');
p = host_begin;
while (p < urlend) {
if (p + 2 < urlend && *p == '/' && p[1] == '.') {
if (p[2] == '/') {
/* remove /./ */
if (p + 3 < urlend)
memmove(p + 1, p + 3, urlend - p - 3);
urlend -= 2;
} else if (p[2] == '.' && (p[3] == '/' || p[3] == '\0') && last) {
/* remove /component/../ */
if (p + 4 < urlend)
memmove(last + 1, p + 4, urlend - p - 4);
urlend -= 3 + (p - last);
}
}
if (*p == '/')
last = p;
p++;
}
p = &url[urlend - url];
*p = '\0';
p = host_begin;
while (p < urlend && p + 2 < url + dest_len && urlend < urlbuff + dest_len) {
unsigned char c = *p;
if (c <= 32 || c >= 127 || c == '%' || c == '#') {
/* convert non-ascii characters back to % escaped */
const char hexchars[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
memmove(p + 3, p + 1, urlend - p - 1);
*p++ = '%';
*p++ = hexchars[c >> 4];
*p = hexchars[c & 0xf];
urlend += 2;
}
p++;
}
*p = '\0';
urlend = p;
len = urlend - url;
/* determine end of hostname */
host_len = strcspn(host_begin, ":/?");
path_begin = host_begin + host_len;
if (host_len <= len) {
/* url without path, use a single / */
memmove(path_begin + 2, path_begin + 1, len - host_len);
*path_begin++ = '/';
*path_begin++ = '\0';
} else
path_begin = url + len;
if (url + len >= path_begin) {
path_len = url + len - path_begin + 1;
p = strchr(path_begin, '#');
if (p) {
/* ignore anchor */
*p = '\0';
path_len = p - path_begin;
}
*path = path_begin;
} else {
path_len = 0;
*path = "";
}
/* lowercase entire URL */
str_make_lowercase(host_begin, host_len);
*host = host_begin;
*hostlen = host_len;
*pathlen = path_len;
return CL_PHISH_NODECISION;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
static cl_error_t url_hash_match(
const struct regex_matcher* rlist,
const char* inurl,
size_t len,
enum phish_status* phishing_verdict)
{
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
cl_error_t status = CL_SUCCESS;
size_t j, k, ji, ki;
char* host_begin;
const char* path_begin;
const char* component;
size_t path_len;
size_t host_len;
char* p;
enum phish_status phish_rc;
cl_error_t rc;
int prefix_matched = 0;
const char* lp[COMPONENTS + 1];
size_t pp[COMPONENTS + 2];
char urlbuff[URL_MAX_LEN + 3]; /* htmlnorm truncates at 1024 bytes + terminating null + slash + host end null */
unsigned count;
if (!rlist || !rlist->sha256_hashes.bm_patterns) {
/* no hashes loaded -> don't waste time canonicalizing and
* looking up */
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
goto done;
}
if ((NULL == inurl) || (NULL == phishing_verdict)) {
status = CL_ENULLARG;
goto done;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
*phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_NODECISION;
phish_rc = cli_url_canon(inurl, len, urlbuff, sizeof(urlbuff), &host_begin, &host_len, &path_begin, &path_len);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if (phish_rc == CL_PHISH_CLEAN) {
*phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
/* get last 5 components of hostname */
j = COMPONENTS;
component = strrchr(host_begin, '.');
while (component && j > 0) {
do {
--component;
} while (*component != '.' && component > host_begin);
if (*component != '.')
component = NULL;
if (component)
lp[j--] = component + 1;
}
lp[j] = host_begin;
/* get first 5 components of path */
pp[0] = path_len;
if (path_len) {
pp[1] = strcspn(path_begin, "?");
if (pp[1] != pp[0])
k = 2;
else
k = 1;
pp[k++] = 0;
while (k < COMPONENTS + 2) {
p = strchr(path_begin + pp[k - 1] + 1, '/');
if (p && p > path_begin) {
pp[k++] = p - path_begin + 1;
} else
break;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
} else {
k = 1;
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
}
count = 0;
for (ki = k; ki > 0;) {
--ki;
for (ji = COMPONENTS + 1; ji > j;) {
/* lookup last 2 and 3 components of host, as hostkey prefix,
* if not matched, shortcircuit lookups */
int need_prefixmatch = (count < 2 && !prefix_matched) &&
rlist->hostkey_prefix.bm_patterns;
--ji;
assert(pp[ki] <= path_len);
/* lookup prefix/suffix hashes of URL */
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
rc = hash_match(rlist,
lp[ji],
host_begin + host_len - lp[ji] + 1,
path_begin,
pp[ki],
need_prefixmatch ? &prefix_matched : NULL,
phishing_verdict);
if ((CL_SUCCESS == rc) &&
(CL_PHISH_NODECISION != *phishing_verdict)) {
return rc;
}
count++;
#if 0
if (count == 2 && !prefix_matched && rlist->hostkey_prefix.bm_patterns) {
/* if hostkey is not matched, don't bother calculating
* hashes for other parts of the URL, they are not in the DB
*/
cli_dbgmsg("hostkey prefix not matched, short-circuiting lookups\n");
return CL_SUCCESS;
}
#endif
}
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
done:
return status;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
/**
* @brief Check if a displayLink & realLink URL pair are an attempt at phishing.
*
* The urls structure must not contain null pointers, caller must ensure this.
*
* @param ctx scan context
* @param urls struct url_check containing real & display URLs (eg from html href tag)
* @return enum phish_status
*/
static enum phish_status phishingCheck(cli_ctx* ctx, struct url_check* urls)
{
struct url_check host_url;
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
struct url_check domain_url;
enum phish_status phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_NODECISION;
cl_error_t status = CL_SUCCESS;
int phishy = 0;
const struct phishcheck* pchk = (const struct phishcheck*)ctx->engine->phishcheck;
char* realData = NULL;
char* displayData = NULL;
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
url_check_init(&host_url);
url_check_init(&domain_url);
if (!urls->realLink.data) {
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck:Checking url %s->%s\n", urls->realLink.data,
urls->displayLink.data);
if (!isURL(urls->realLink.data, 0)) {
cli_dbgmsg("Real 'url' is not url:%s\n", urls->realLink.data);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
if (CL_SUCCESS != (status = url_hash_match(ctx->engine->domain_list_matcher,
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
urls->realLink.data,
strlen(urls->realLink.data),
&phishing_verdict))) {
cli_dbgmsg("Error occured in url_hash_match\n");
goto done;
} else if (phishing_verdict != CL_PHISH_NODECISION) {
if (phishing_verdict == CL_PHISH_CLEAN) {
cli_dbgmsg("Not analyzing, not a real url: %s\n", urls->realLink.data);
goto done;
} else {
cli_dbgmsg("Hash matched for: %s\n", urls->realLink.data);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
goto done;
}
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if (!strcmp(urls->realLink.data, urls->displayLink.data)) {
/* displayed and real URL are identical -> clean */
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
if (urls->displayLink.data[0] == '\0') {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if ((phishing_verdict = cleanupURLs(urls)) == CL_PHISH_CLEAN) {
/* displayed and real URL are identical after cleanup -> clean */
goto done;
}
cli_dbgmsg("Phishcheck:URL after cleanup: %s->%s\n", urls->realLink.data,
urls->displayLink.data);
if ((!isURL(urls->displayLink.data, 1)) &&
((phishy & PHISHY_NUMERIC_IP && !isNumericURL(pchk, urls->displayLink.data)) ||
!(phishy & PHISHY_NUMERIC_IP))) {
cli_dbgmsg("Displayed 'url' is not url:%s\n", urls->displayLink.data);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
/*
* AllowList X-type WDB signatures: X:RealURL:DisplayedURL
* Eg:
* X:.+\.benign\.com([/?].*)?:.+\.benign\.de
*/
if (allow_list_check(ctx->engine, urls, 0)) { /* if url is allowed don't perform further checks */
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
/*
* Match R-type PDB signatures: R:RealURL:DisplayedURL
* Eg:
* R:.+\.malicious\.net([/?].*)?:.+\.benign\.com
*/
/* Provide copies of the oirinal URL's, because domain_list_match() may modify the buffer,
and we don't want that to happen in this case. */
realData = cli_strdup(urls->realLink.data);
if (!realData) {
cli_errmsg("Phishcheck: Failed to allocate memory for temporary real link string.\n");
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
displayData = cli_strdup(urls->displayLink.data);
if (!displayData) {
cli_errmsg("Phishcheck: Failed to allocate memory for temporary display link string.\n");
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
if (domain_list_match(ctx->engine, realData, displayData, &urls->pre_fixup, 0)) {
phishy |= DOMAIN_LISTED;
}
/*
* Get copy of URLs stripped down to just the FQDN.
*/
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if ((phishing_verdict = url_get_host(urls, &host_url, DOMAIN_DISPLAY, &phishy))) {
phishing_verdict = phishing_verdict < 0 ? phishing_verdict : CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
if ((phishing_verdict = url_get_host(urls, &host_url, DOMAIN_REAL, &phishy))) {
phishing_verdict = phishing_verdict < 0 ? phishing_verdict : CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
/*
* Exit early if the realLink and displayLink are the same.
*/
if (!strcmp(urls->realLink.data, urls->displayLink.data)) {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
/*
* Allow List M-type WDB signatures: M:RealHostname:DisplayedHostname
* Eg:
* M:email.isbenign.com:benign.com
*/
if (allow_list_check(ctx->engine, &host_url, 1)) {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
/*
* Match H-type PDB signatures: H:DisplayedHostname
* Eg:
* H:malicious.com
*/
if (domain_list_match(ctx->engine, host_url.displayLink.data, host_url.realLink.data, &urls->pre_fixup, 1)) {
phishy |= DOMAIN_LISTED;
} else {
urls->flags &= urls->always_check_flags;
/* don't return, we may need to check for ssl/cloaking */
}
/* link type filtering must occur after last domain_list_match */
if (urls->link_type & LINKTYPE_IMAGE && !(urls->flags & CHECK_IMG_URL)) {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
/* its listed, but this link type is filtered */
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
if (urls->flags & CHECK_CLOAKING) {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
/*
* Checks if URL is cloaked.
* Should we check if it contains another http://, https://?
* No because we might get false positives from redirect services.
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
*/
if (strchr(urls->realLink.data, 0x1)) {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLOAKED_NULL;
goto done;
}
}
if (urls->flags & CHECK_SSL && isSSL(urls->displayLink.data) && !isSSL(urls->realLink.data)) {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_SSL_SPOOF;
goto done;
}
if (!(phishy & DOMAIN_LISTED)) {
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
url_get_domain(&host_url, &domain_url);
if (!strcmp(domain_url.realLink.data, domain_url.displayLink.data)) {
phishing_verdict = CL_PHISH_CLEAN;
goto done;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
/*
* We failed to find a reason why the 2 URLs are different.
* This is probably phishing.
*/
phishing_verdict = phishy_map(phishy, CL_PHISH_NOMATCH);
done:
if (phishing_verdict != CL_PHISH_CLEAN && phishing_verdict != CL_PHISH_NODECISION) {
cli_infomsg(ctx, "Suspicious link found!\n");
cli_infomsg(ctx, " Real URL: %s\n", urls->realLink.data);
cli_infomsg(ctx, " Display URL: %s\n", urls->displayLink.data);
}
if (NULL != realData) {
free(realData);
}
if (NULL != displayData) {
free(displayData);
}
free_if_needed(&domain_url);
free_if_needed(&host_url);
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
return phishing_verdict;
}
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
static const char* phishing_ret_toString(enum phish_status phishing_verdict)
{
bb12506: Fix phishing/heuristic alert verbosity Some detections, like phishing, are considered heuristic alerts because they match based on behavior more than on content. A subset of these are considered "potentially unwanted" (low-severity). These low-severity alerts include: - phishing - PDFs with obfuscated object names - bytecode signature alerts that start with "BC.Heuristics" The concept is that unless you enable "heuristic precedence" (a method of lowing the threshold to immediateley alert on low-severity detections), the scan should continue after a match in case a higher severity match is found. Only at the end will it print the low-severity match if nothing else was found. The current implementation is buggy though. Scanning of archives does not correctly bail out for the entire archive if one email contains a phishing link. Instead, it sets the "heuristic found" flag then and alerts for every subsequent file in the archive because it doesn't know if the heuristic was found in an embedded file or the target file. Because it's just a heuristic and the status is "clean", it keeps scanning. This patch corrects the behavior by checking if a low-severity alerts were found at the end of scanning the target file, instead of at the end of each embedded file. Additionally, this patch fixes an in issue with phishing alerts wherein heuristic precedence mode did not cause a scan to stop after the first alert. The above changes required restructuring to create an fmap inside of cl_scandesc_callback() so that scan_common() could be modified to require an fmap and set up so that the current *ctx->fmap pointer is never NULL when scan_common() evaluates match results. Also fixed a couple minor bugs in the phishing unit tests and cleaned up the test code for improved legitibility and type safety.
6 years ago
switch (phishing_verdict) {
case CL_PHISH_CLEAN:
return "Clean";
case CL_PHISH_CLOAKED_NULL:
return "Link URL is cloaked (null byte %00)";
case CL_PHISH_CLOAKED_UIU:
return "Link URL contains username, and real<->displayed hosts don't match.";
/*username is a legit domain, and after the @ comes the evil one*/
case CL_PHISH_SSL_SPOOF:
return "Visible links is SSL, real link is not";
case CL_PHISH_NOMATCH:
return "URLs are way too different";
case CL_PHISH_HASH0:
case CL_PHISH_HASH1:
case CL_PHISH_HASH2:
return "Blocked";
default:
return "Unknown return code";
}
}