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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2013-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (C) 2007-2013 Sourcefire, Inc.
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*
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* Authors: Trog
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*
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* Summary: Extract component parts of OLE2 files (e.g. MS Office Documents).
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*
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* Acknowledgements: Some ideas and algorithms were based upon OpenOffice and libgsf.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
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* MA 02110-1301, USA.
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*/
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#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include "clamav-config.h"
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#endif
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <conv.h>
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#include <zlib.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
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#include <unistd.h>
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#endif
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include "clamav.h"
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#include "others.h"
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#include "hwp.h"
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#include "ole2_extract.h"
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#include "xlm_extract.h"
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#include "scanners.h"
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#include "fmap.h"
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#include "json_api.h"
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#include "msdoc.h"
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#include "rijndael.h"
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#include "ole2_encryption.h"
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#ifdef DEBUG_OLE2_LIST
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#define ole2_listmsg(...) cli_dbgmsg(__VA_ARGS__)
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#else
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#define ole2_listmsg(...) ;
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#endif
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#define ole2_endian_convert_16(v) le16_to_host((uint16_t)(v))
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#define ole2_endian_convert_32(v) le32_to_host((uint32_t)(v))
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#define ole2_endian_convert_64(v) le64_to_host((uint64_t)(v))
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#ifndef HAVE_ATTRIB_PACKED
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#define __attribute__(x)
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_PRAGMA_PACK
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#pragma pack(1)
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_PRAGMA_PACK_HPPA
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#pragma pack 1
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#endif
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// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-cfb/05060311-bfce-4b12-874d-71fd4ce63aea
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typedef struct ole2_header_tag {
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unsigned char magic[8]; /* should be: 0xd0cf11e0a1b11ae1 */
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unsigned char clsid[16];
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uint16_t minor_version __attribute__((packed));
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uint16_t dll_version __attribute__((packed));
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int16_t byte_order __attribute__((packed)); /* -2=intel */
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uint16_t log2_big_block_size __attribute__((packed)); /* usually 9 (2^9 = 512) */
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uint32_t log2_small_block_size __attribute__((packed)); /* usually 6 (2^6 = 64) */
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int32_t reserved[2] __attribute__((packed));
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int32_t bat_count __attribute__((packed));
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int32_t prop_start __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t signature __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t sbat_cutoff __attribute__((packed)); /* cutoff for files held
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* in small blocks
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* (4096) */
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int32_t sbat_start __attribute__((packed));
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int32_t sbat_block_count __attribute__((packed));
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int32_t xbat_start __attribute__((packed));
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int32_t xbat_count __attribute__((packed));
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int32_t bat_array[109] __attribute__((packed));
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/*
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* The following is not part of the ole2 header, but stuff we need in
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* order to decode.
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*
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* IMPORTANT: These must take account of the size of variables below here
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* when calculating hdr_size to read the header.
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*
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* See the top of cli_ole2_extract().
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*/
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int32_t sbat_root_start __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t max_block_no;
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size_t m_length;
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bitset_t *bitset;
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struct uniq *U;
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fmap_t *map;
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bool has_vba;
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bool has_xlm;
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bool has_image;
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hwp5_header_t *is_hwp; // This value MUST be last in this structure,
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// otherwise you will get short file reads.
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} ole2_header_t;
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/*
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* DirectoryEntry
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*
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* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-cfb/60fe8611-66c3-496b-b70d-a504c94c9ace
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*/
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typedef struct property_tag {
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char name[64]; /* in unicode */
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uint16_t name_size __attribute__((packed));
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unsigned char type; /* 1=dir 2=file 5=root */
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unsigned char color; /* black or red */
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uint32_t prev __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t next __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t child __attribute__((packed));
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unsigned char clsid[16];
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uint32_t user_flags __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t create_lowdate __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t create_highdate __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t mod_lowdate __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t mod_highdate __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t start_block __attribute__((packed));
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uint32_t size __attribute__((packed));
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unsigned char reserved[4];
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} property_t;
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/*
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* File Information Block Base.
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* Naming is consistent with
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* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-doc/26fb6c06-4e5c-4778-ab4e-edbf26a545bb
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* */
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typedef struct __attribute__((packed)) fib_base_type {
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uint16_t wIdent;
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uint16_t nFib;
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uint16_t unused;
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uint16_t lid;
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uint16_t pnNext;
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uint16_t ABCDEFGHIJKLM;
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uint16_t nFibBack;
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uint32_t lKey;
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uint8_t envr;
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uint8_t NOPQRS;
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uint16_t reserved3;
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uint16_t reserved4;
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uint32_t reserved5;
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uint32_t reserved6;
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} fib_base_t;
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struct ole2_list_node;
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typedef struct ole2_list_node {
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uint32_t Val;
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struct ole2_list_node *Next;
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} ole2_list_node_t;
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typedef struct ole2_list {
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uint32_t Size;
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ole2_list_node_t *Head;
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} ole2_list_t;
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int ole2_list_init(ole2_list_t *list);
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int ole2_list_is_empty(ole2_list_t *list);
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uint32_t ole2_list_size(ole2_list_t *list);
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int ole2_list_push(ole2_list_t *list, uint32_t val);
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uint32_t ole2_list_pop(ole2_list_t *list);
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int ole2_list_delete(ole2_list_t *list);
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int ole2_list_init(ole2_list_t *list)
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{
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list->Head = NULL;
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list->Size = 0;
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return CL_SUCCESS;
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}
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int ole2_list_is_empty(ole2_list_t *list)
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{
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return (list->Head == NULL);
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}
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uint32_t
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ole2_list_size(ole2_list_t *list)
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{
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return (list->Size);
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}
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int ole2_list_push(ole2_list_t *list, uint32_t val)
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{
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libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
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|
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ole2_list_node_t *new_node = NULL;
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int status = CL_EMEM;
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CLI_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(new_node, sizeof(ole2_list_node_t),
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cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: could not allocate new node for worklist!\n"));
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new_node->Val = val;
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new_node->Next = list->Head;
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list->Head = new_node;
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(list->Size)++;
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status = CL_SUCCESS;
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|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_pop(ole2_list_t *list)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t val;
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_node_t *next;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ole2_list_is_empty(list)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: work list is empty and ole2_list_pop() called!\n");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
val = list->Head->Val;
|
|
|
|
next = list->Head->Next;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(list->Head);
|
|
|
|
list->Head = next;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(list->Size)--;
|
|
|
|
return val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ole2_list_delete(ole2_list_t *list)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
while (!ole2_list_is_empty(list))
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_pop(list);
|
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_PRAGMA_PACK
|
|
|
|
#pragma pack()
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_PRAGMA_PACK_HPPA
|
|
|
|
#pragma pack
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned char magic_id[] = {0xd0, 0xcf, 0x11, 0xe0, 0xa1, 0xb1, 0x1a, 0xe1};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Get the property name, converting to lower case and replacing non-printable characters.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param name The property name
|
|
|
|
* @param size The size of the property name
|
|
|
|
* @return char* The new property name
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *cli_ole2_get_property_name2(const char *name, int size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
char *newname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((name[0] == 0 && name[1] == 0) || size <= 0 || size > 128) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// We may need to replace every character with '_XY_' or '_XYZ_' to form a printable name.
|
|
|
|
// This is because the name may contain non-printable characters.
|
|
|
|
// Allocate 5 times the size of the name to be safe, plus 1 for the NULL terminator.
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(newname, size * 5 + 1,
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [cli_ole2_get_property_name2]: Unable to allocate memory for newname: %u\n", size * 5));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* size-2 to ignore trailing NULL */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < size - 2; i += 2) {
|
|
|
|
if ((!(name[i] & 0x80)) &&
|
|
|
|
(isprint(name[i])) &&
|
|
|
|
(name[i + 1] == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
// Printable ASCII
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = tolower(name[i]);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Non-printable. Expand to something unique and printable.
|
|
|
|
if (name[i] < 10 && name[i] >= 0 && name[i + 1] == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// Single digit (next byte is NULL)
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = '_';
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = name[i] + '0';
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Two digits (next byte is not NULL)
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t x = (((uint16_t)name[i]) << 8) | name[i + 1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = '_';
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = 'a' + ((x & 0xF));
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = 'a' + ((x >> 4) & 0xF);
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = 'a' + ((x >> 8) & 0xF);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newname[j++] = '_';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newname[j] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (strlen(newname) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
free(newname);
|
|
|
|
newname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return newname;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
|
|
get_property_name(char *name, int size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *carray = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz._";
|
|
|
|
int csize = size >> 1;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
char *newname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *cname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *oname = name;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (csize <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(newname, size,
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [get_property_name]: Unable to allocate memory for newname %u\n", size));
|
|
|
|
cname = newname;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (--csize) {
|
|
|
|
uint16_t lo, hi, u = cli_readint16(oname) - 0x3800;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
oname += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (u > 0x1040) {
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(newname);
|
|
|
|
return cli_ole2_get_property_name2(name, size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lo = u % 64;
|
|
|
|
u >>= 6;
|
|
|
|
hi = u % 64;
|
|
|
|
*cname++ = carray[lo];
|
|
|
|
if (csize != 1 || u != 64) {
|
|
|
|
*cname++ = carray[hi];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*cname = '\0';
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return newname;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
print_ole2_property(property_t *property)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char spam[128], *buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (property->name_size > 64) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("[err name len: %d]\n", property->name_size);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf = get_property_name(property->name, property->name_size);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(spam, sizeof(spam), "OLE2: %s ", buf ? buf : "<noname>");
|
|
|
|
spam[sizeof(spam) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (buf)
|
|
|
|
free(buf);
|
|
|
|
switch (property->type) {
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
strncat(spam, " [file] ", sizeof(spam) - 1 - strlen(spam));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
strncat(spam, " [dir ] ", sizeof(spam) - 1 - strlen(spam));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 5:
|
|
|
|
strncat(spam, " [root] ", sizeof(spam) - 1 - strlen(spam));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
strncat(spam, " [unkn] ", sizeof(spam) - 1 - strlen(spam));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spam[sizeof(spam) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
switch (property->color) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
strncat(spam, " r ", sizeof(spam) - 1 - strlen(spam));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
strncat(spam, " b ", sizeof(spam) - 1 - strlen(spam));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
strncat(spam, " u ", sizeof(spam) - 1 - strlen(spam));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spam[sizeof(spam) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("%s size:0x%.8x flags:0x%.8x\n", spam, property->size, property->user_flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
print_ole2_header(ole2_header_t *hdr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!hdr || !cli_debug_flag) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("\n");
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Magic:\t\t\t0x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x\n",
|
|
|
|
hdr->magic[0], hdr->magic[1], hdr->magic[2], hdr->magic[3],
|
|
|
|
hdr->magic[4], hdr->magic[5], hdr->magic[6], hdr->magic[7]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("CLSID:\t\t\t{%x%x%x%x-%x%x-%x%x-%x%x-%x%x%x%x%x%x}\n",
|
|
|
|
hdr->clsid[0], hdr->clsid[1], hdr->clsid[2], hdr->clsid[3],
|
|
|
|
hdr->clsid[4], hdr->clsid[5], hdr->clsid[6], hdr->clsid[7],
|
|
|
|
hdr->clsid[8], hdr->clsid[9], hdr->clsid[10], hdr->clsid[11],
|
|
|
|
hdr->clsid[12], hdr->clsid[13], hdr->clsid[14], hdr->clsid[15]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Minor version:\t\t0x%x\n", hdr->minor_version);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("DLL version:\t\t0x%x\n", hdr->dll_version);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Byte Order:\t\t%d\n", hdr->byte_order);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Big Block Size:\t%i\n", hdr->log2_big_block_size);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Small Block Size:\t%i\n", hdr->log2_small_block_size);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("BAT count:\t\t%d\n", hdr->bat_count);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Prop start:\t\t%d\n", hdr->prop_start);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("SBAT cutoff:\t\t%d\n", hdr->sbat_cutoff);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("SBat start:\t\t%d\n", hdr->sbat_start);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("SBat block count:\t%d\n", hdr->sbat_block_count);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("XBat start:\t\t%d\n", hdr->xbat_start);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("XBat block count:\t%d\n", hdr->xbat_count);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("\n");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool ole2_read_block(ole2_header_t *hdr, void *buff, size_t size, int32_t blockno)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t offset, offend;
|
|
|
|
const void *pblock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (blockno < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* other methods: (blockno+1) * 512 or (blockno * block_size) + 512; */
|
|
|
|
if (((uint64_t)blockno << hdr->log2_big_block_size) < (INT32_MAX - MAX(512, (uint64_t)1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size))) {
|
|
|
|
/* 512 is header size */
|
|
|
|
offset = (blockno << hdr->log2_big_block_size) + MAX(512, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size);
|
|
|
|
offend = offset + size;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
offset = INT32_MAX - size;
|
|
|
|
offend = INT32_MAX;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((offend == 0) || (offset >= hdr->m_length)) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
} else if (offend > hdr->m_length) {
|
|
|
|
/* bb#11369 - ole2 files may not be a block multiple in size */
|
|
|
|
memset(buff, 0, size);
|
|
|
|
size = hdr->m_length - offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(pblock = fmap_need_off_once(hdr->map, offset, size))) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buff, pblock, size);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
ole2_get_next_bat_block(ole2_header_t *hdr, int32_t current_block)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int32_t bat_array_index;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t bat[128];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (current_block < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bat_array_index = current_block / 128;
|
|
|
|
if (bat_array_index > hdr->bat_count) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("bat_array index error\n");
|
|
|
|
return -10;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, &bat, 512,
|
|
|
|
ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr->bat_array[bat_array_index]))) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ole2_endian_convert_32(bat[current_block - (bat_array_index * 128)]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
ole2_get_next_xbat_block(ole2_header_t *hdr, int32_t current_block)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int32_t xbat_index, xbat_block_index, bat_index, bat_blockno;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t xbat[128], bat[128];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (current_block < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xbat_index = current_block / 128;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* NB: The last entry in each XBAT points to the next XBAT block.
|
|
|
|
* This reduces the number of entries in each block by 1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
xbat_block_index = (xbat_index - 109) / 127;
|
|
|
|
bat_blockno = (xbat_index - 109) % 127;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bat_index = current_block % 128;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, &xbat, 512, hdr->xbat_start)) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Follow the chain of XBAT blocks */
|
|
|
|
while (xbat_block_index > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, &xbat, 512,
|
|
|
|
ole2_endian_convert_32(xbat[127]))) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xbat_block_index--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, &bat, 512, ole2_endian_convert_32(xbat[bat_blockno]))) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ole2_endian_convert_32(bat[bat_index]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
ole2_get_next_block_number(ole2_header_t *hdr, int32_t current_block)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (current_block < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((current_block / 128) > 108) {
|
|
|
|
return ole2_get_next_xbat_block(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return ole2_get_next_bat_block(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
ole2_get_next_sbat_block(ole2_header_t *hdr, int32_t current_block)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int32_t iter, current_bat_block;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t sbat[128];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (current_block < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
current_bat_block = hdr->sbat_start;
|
|
|
|
iter = current_block / 128;
|
|
|
|
while (iter > 0) {
|
|
|
|
current_bat_block = ole2_get_next_block_number(hdr, current_bat_block);
|
|
|
|
iter--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, &sbat, 512, current_bat_block)) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ole2_endian_convert_32(sbat[current_block % 128]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieve the block containing the data for the given sbat index */
|
|
|
|
static bool ole2_get_sbat_data_block(ole2_header_t *hdr, void *buff, int32_t sbat_index)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int32_t block_count, current_block;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sbat_index < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->sbat_root_start < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("No root start block\n");
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
block_count = sbat_index / (1 << (hdr->log2_big_block_size - hdr->log2_small_block_size));
|
|
|
|
current_block = hdr->sbat_root_start;
|
|
|
|
while (block_count > 0) {
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_block_number(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
block_count--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* current_block now contains the block number of the sbat array
|
|
|
|
* containing the entry for the required small block
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (ole2_read_block(hdr, buff, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size, current_block));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief File handler for use when walking ole2 property trees.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param hdr The ole2 header metadata
|
|
|
|
* @param prop The property
|
|
|
|
* @param dir (optional) directory to write temp files to.
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx The scan context
|
|
|
|
* @param ole2_data (optional) Context needed by the handler
|
|
|
|
* @return cl_error_t
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef cl_error_t ole2_walk_property_tree_file_handler(ole2_header_t *hdr,
|
|
|
|
property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_writefile(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_enum(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_otf_encrypted(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_otf(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compare strings ignoring case.
|
|
|
|
* This is a somewhat special case, since name is actually a utf-16 encoded string, stored
|
|
|
|
* in a char * with a known size of 64 bytes, so we can avoid a 'alloc since the size is
|
|
|
|
* so small. See https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-cfb/60fe8611-66c3-496b-b70d-a504c94c9ace
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param name: 'name' from property_t struct
|
|
|
|
* @param name_size: 'name_size' from property_t struct
|
|
|
|
* @param keyword: Known value we are looking for
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @return int: Return '0' if the values are equivalent, something else otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ole2_cmp_name(const char *const name, uint32_t name_size, const char *const keyword)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char decoded[64];
|
|
|
|
uint32_t i = 0, j = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (64 < name_size || name_size % 2) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(decoded, 0, sizeof(decoded));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < name_size; i += 2, j++) {
|
|
|
|
decoded[j] = ((unsigned char)name[i + 1]) << 4;
|
|
|
|
decoded[j] += name[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return strcasecmp(decoded, keyword);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void copy_fib_base(fib_base_t *pFib, const uint8_t *const ptr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memcpy(pFib, ptr, sizeof(fib_base_t));
|
|
|
|
pFib->wIdent = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->wIdent);
|
|
|
|
pFib->nFib = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->nFib);
|
|
|
|
pFib->unused = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->unused);
|
|
|
|
pFib->lid = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->lid);
|
|
|
|
pFib->pnNext = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->pnNext);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Don't know whether to do this or not.*/
|
|
|
|
pFib->ABCDEFGHIJKLM = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->ABCDEFGHIJKLM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pFib->nFibBack = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->nFibBack);
|
|
|
|
pFib->nFibBack = ole2_endian_convert_32(pFib->lKey);
|
|
|
|
pFib->reserved3 = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->reserved3);
|
|
|
|
pFib->reserved4 = ole2_endian_convert_16(pFib->reserved4);
|
|
|
|
pFib->reserved5 = ole2_endian_convert_32(pFib->reserved5);
|
|
|
|
pFib->reserved6 = ole2_endian_convert_32(pFib->reserved6);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool is_encrypted(const fib_base_t *const pFib)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return pFib->ABCDEFGHIJKLM & (1 << 8);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#pragma GCC diagnostic push
|
|
|
|
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-function"
|
|
|
|
static void dump_fib_base(fib_base_t *pFib)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s::%d::%x\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, pFib->wIdent);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is currently unused, but I am leaving it in in case it can be useful in the future. See
|
|
|
|
* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-doc/79dea1e9-4dce-4fa0-8c6b-56ba37b68351
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* I have not looked into it in detail, but if it is a 1-byte xor, it could be possible to brute-force it in some cases.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline bool is_obfuscated(const fib_base_t *const pFib)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return pFib->ABCDEFGHIJKLM & (1 << 15);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
|
|
bool velvet_sweatshop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool encrypted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *encryption_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} encryption_status_t;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *const ENCRYPTED_JSON_KEY = "Encrypted";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *const RC4_ENCRYPTION = "RC4";
|
|
|
|
const char *const XOR_OBFUSCATION = "XORObfuscation";
|
|
|
|
const char *const AES128_ENCRYPTION = "AES128";
|
|
|
|
const char *const AES192_ENCRYPTION = "AES192";
|
|
|
|
const char *const AES256_ENCRYPTION = "AES256";
|
|
|
|
const char *const VELVET_SWEATSHOP_ENCRYPTION = "VelvetSweatshop";
|
|
|
|
const char *const GENERIC_ENCRYPTED = "ENCRYPTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *const OLE2_HEURISTIC_ENCRYPTED_WARNING = "Heuristics.Encrypted.OLE2";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t XLS_XOR_OBFUSCATION = 0;
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t XLS_RC4_ENCRYPTION = 1;
|
|
|
|
const uint32_t MINISTREAM_CUTOFF_SIZE = 0x1000;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static size_t get_stream_data_offset(ole2_header_t *hdr, const property_t *word_block, uint16_t sector)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t offset = (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size);
|
|
|
|
size_t sector_size = offset;
|
|
|
|
size_t fib_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (word_block->size < MINISTREAM_CUTOFF_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
fib_offset = offset + sector_size * hdr->sbat_root_start;
|
|
|
|
fib_offset += (word_block->start_block * (1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
fib_offset = offset + sector_size * sector;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fib_offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* See information about the File Information Block here
|
|
|
|
* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-doc/26fb6c06-4e5c-4778-ab4e-edbf26a545bb
|
|
|
|
* for more information.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void test_for_encryption(const property_t *word_block, ole2_header_t *hdr, encryption_status_t *pEncryptionStatus)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
fib_base_t fib = {0};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t fib_offset = get_stream_data_offset(hdr, word_block, word_block->start_block);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((size_t)(hdr->m_length) < (size_t)(fib_offset + sizeof(fib_base_t))) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ERROR: Invalid offset for File Information Block %d (0x%x)\n", fib_offset, fib_offset);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ptr = fmap_need_off_once(hdr->map, fib_offset, sizeof(fib_base_t));
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == ptr) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ERROR: Invalid offset for File Information Block %d (0x%x)\n", fib_offset, fib_offset);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
copy_fib_base(&fib, ptr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define FIB_BASE_IDENTIFIER 0xa5ec
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (FIB_BASE_IDENTIFIER != fib.wIdent) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ERROR: Invalid identifier for File Information Block %d (0x%x)\n", fib.wIdent, fib.wIdent);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*TODO: Look into whether or not it's possible to determine the xor key when
|
|
|
|
* a document is obfuscated with xor
|
|
|
|
* (is_obfuscated function)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encrypted = is_encrypted(&fib);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_obfuscated(&fib)) {
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = XOR_OBFUSCATION;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static size_t read_uint16(const uint8_t *const ptr, uint32_t ptr_size, uint32_t *idx, uint16_t *dst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (*idx + sizeof(uint16_t) >= ptr_size) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(dst, &(ptr[*idx]), 2);
|
|
|
|
*dst = ole2_endian_convert_16(*dst);
|
|
|
|
*idx += sizeof(uint16_t);
|
|
|
|
return sizeof(uint16_t);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Search for the FILE_PASS number. If I don't find it, the next two bytes are
|
|
|
|
* a length. Consume that length of data, and try again. Go until you either find
|
|
|
|
* the number or run out of data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool find_file_pass(const uint8_t *const ptr, uint32_t ptr_size, uint32_t *idx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint16_t val, size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint32_t FILE_PASS_NUM = 47;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
|
|
if (sizeof(uint16_t) != read_uint16(ptr, ptr_size, idx, &val)) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sizeof(uint16_t) != read_uint16(ptr, ptr_size, idx, &size)) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (FILE_PASS_NUM == val) {
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*idx += size;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Should never get here.*/
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Search for the FilePass structure.
|
|
|
|
* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-xls/cf9ae8d5-4e8c-40a2-95f1-3b31f16b5529
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void test_for_xls_encryption(const property_t *word_block, ole2_header_t *hdr, encryption_status_t *pEncryptionStatus)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint16_t tmp16;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t idx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t stream_data_offset = get_stream_data_offset(hdr, word_block, word_block->start_block);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t block_size = (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size);
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *const ptr = fmap_need_off_once(hdr->map, stream_data_offset, block_size);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == ptr) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ERROR: Invalid offset for File Information Block %d (0x%x)\n", stream_data_offset, stream_data_offset);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Validate keyword*/
|
|
|
|
idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sizeof(uint16_t) != read_uint16(ptr, block_size, &idx, &tmp16)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Invalid keyword*/
|
|
|
|
if (2057 != tmp16) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Skip past this size.*/
|
|
|
|
if (sizeof(uint16_t) != read_uint16(ptr, block_size, &idx, &tmp16)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
idx += tmp16;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!find_file_pass(ptr, block_size, &idx)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sizeof(uint16_t) != read_uint16(ptr, block_size, &idx, &tmp16)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (XLS_RC4_ENCRYPTION == tmp16) {
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = RC4_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encrypted = true;
|
|
|
|
} else if (XLS_XOR_OBFUSCATION == tmp16) {
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = XOR_OBFUSCATION;
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encrypted = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Walk an ole2 property tree, calling the handler for each file found
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param hdr The ole2 header metadata (an ole2-specific context struct)
|
|
|
|
* @param dir (optional) directory to write temp files to, passed to the handler.
|
|
|
|
* @param prop_index Index of the property being walked, to be recorded with a pointer to the root node in an ole2 node list.
|
|
|
|
* @param handler The file handler to call when a file is found.
|
|
|
|
* @param rec_level The recursion level. Max is 100.
|
|
|
|
* @param[in,out] file_count A running count of the total # of files. Max is 100000.
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx The scan context
|
|
|
|
* @param[in,out] scansize A running sum of the file sizes processed.
|
|
|
|
* @return int
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ole2_walk_property_tree(ole2_header_t *hdr, const char *dir, int32_t prop_index,
|
|
|
|
ole2_walk_property_tree_file_handler handler,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int rec_level, unsigned int *file_count,
|
|
|
|
cli_ctx *ctx, unsigned long *scansize, void *handler_ctx,
|
|
|
|
encryption_status_t *pEncryptionStatus)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
property_t prop_block[4];
|
|
|
|
int32_t idx, current_block, i, curindex;
|
|
|
|
char *dirname;
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_t node_list;
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret;
|
|
|
|
char *name;
|
|
|
|
int toval = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("ole2_walk_property_tree() called\n");
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_init(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("rec_level: %d\n", rec_level);
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("file_count: %d\n", *file_count);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((rec_level > 100) || (*file_count > 100000)) {
|
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx && ctx->engine->max_recursion_level && (rec_level > ctx->engine->max_recursion_level)) {
|
|
|
|
// Note: engine->max_recursion_level is re-purposed here out of convenience.
|
|
|
|
// ole2 recursion does not leverage the ctx->recursion_stack stack.
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: Recursion limit reached (max: %d)\n", ctx->engine->max_recursion_level);
|
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(ctx, "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.MaxRecursion");
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
return CL_EMAXREC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// push the 'root' node for the level onto the local list
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ole2_list_push(&node_list, prop_index)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (!ole2_list_is_empty(&node_list)) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("within working loop, worklist size: %d\n", ole2_list_size(&node_list));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_json_timeout_cycle_check(ctx, &toval) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return CL_ETIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_block = hdr->prop_start;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// pop off a node to work on
|
|
|
|
curindex = ole2_list_pop(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("current index: %d\n", curindex);
|
|
|
|
if ((curindex < 0) || (curindex > (int32_t)hdr->max_block_no)) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// read in the sector referenced by the current index
|
|
|
|
idx = curindex / 4;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < idx; i++) {
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_block_number(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
if (current_block < 0) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
idx = curindex % 4;
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, prop_block, 512, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (prop_block[idx].type <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("reading prop block\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].name_size = ole2_endian_convert_16(prop_block[idx].name_size);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].prev = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].prev);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].next = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].next);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].child = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].child);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].user_flags = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].user_flags);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].create_lowdate = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].create_lowdate);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].create_highdate = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].create_highdate);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].mod_lowdate = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].mod_lowdate);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].mod_highdate = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].mod_highdate);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].start_block = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].start_block);
|
|
|
|
prop_block[idx].size = ole2_endian_convert_32(prop_block[idx].size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((64 < prop_block[idx].name_size) || (prop_block[idx].name_size % 2)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ERROR: Invalid name_size %d\n", prop_block[idx].name_size);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0 == ole2_cmp_name(prop_block[idx].name, prop_block[idx].name_size, "WORDDocument")) {
|
|
|
|
test_for_encryption(&(prop_block[idx]), hdr, pEncryptionStatus);
|
|
|
|
} else if (0 == ole2_cmp_name(prop_block[idx].name, prop_block[idx].name_size, "WorkBook")) {
|
|
|
|
test_for_xls_encryption(&(prop_block[idx]), hdr, pEncryptionStatus);
|
|
|
|
} else if (0 == ole2_cmp_name(prop_block[idx].name, prop_block[idx].name_size, "PowerPoint Document")) {
|
|
|
|
test_for_encryption(&(prop_block[idx]), hdr, pEncryptionStatus);
|
|
|
|
} else if (0 == ole2_cmp_name(prop_block[idx].name, prop_block[idx].name_size, "EncryptionInfo")) {
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encrypted = true;
|
|
|
|
} else if (0 == ole2_cmp_name(prop_block[idx].name, prop_block[idx].name_size, "EncryptedPackage")) {
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encrypted = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("printing ole2 property\n");
|
|
|
|
if (dir)
|
|
|
|
print_ole2_property(&prop_block[idx]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("checking bitset\n");
|
|
|
|
/* Check we aren't in a loop */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_bitset_test(hdr->bitset, (unsigned long)curindex)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Loop in property tree detected */
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: Property tree loop detected at index %d\n", curindex);
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return CL_BREAK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("setting bitset\n");
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_bitset_set(hdr->bitset, (unsigned long)curindex)) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("prev: %d next %d child %d\n", prop_block[idx].prev, prop_block[idx].next, prop_block[idx].child);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("node type: %d\n", prop_block[idx].type);
|
|
|
|
switch (prop_block[idx].type) {
|
|
|
|
case 5: /* Root Entry */
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("root node\n");
|
|
|
|
if ((curindex != 0) || (rec_level != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(*file_count != 0)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Can only have RootEntry as the top */
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ERROR: illegal Root Entry\n");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hdr->sbat_root_start = prop_block[idx].start_block;
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].child) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
ret = ole2_walk_property_tree(hdr, dir, prop_block[idx].child, handler, rec_level + 1, file_count, ctx, scansize, handler_ctx, pEncryptionStatus);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].prev) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ole2_list_push(&node_list, prop_block[idx].prev)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].next) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ole2_list_push(&node_list, prop_block[idx].next)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2: /* File */
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("file node\n");
|
|
|
|
if (ctx && ctx->engine->maxfiles && ((*file_count > ctx->engine->maxfiles) || (ctx->scannedfiles > ctx->engine->maxfiles - *file_count))) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: files limit reached (max: %u)\n", ctx->engine->maxfiles);
|
|
|
|
cli_append_potentially_unwanted_if_heur_exceedsmax(ctx, "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.MaxFiles");
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return CL_EMAXFILES;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx || !(ctx->engine->maxfilesize) || prop_block[idx].size <= ctx->engine->maxfilesize || prop_block[idx].size <= *scansize) {
|
|
|
|
(*file_count)++;
|
|
|
|
*scansize -= prop_block[idx].size;
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("running file handler\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = handler(hdr, &prop_block[idx], dir, ctx, handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("file handler returned %d\n", ret);
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: filesize exceeded\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].child) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
ret = ole2_walk_property_tree(hdr, dir, prop_block[idx].child, handler, rec_level, file_count, ctx, scansize, handler_ctx, pEncryptionStatus);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].prev) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ole2_list_push(&node_list, prop_block[idx].prev)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].next) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ole2_list_push(&node_list, prop_block[idx].next)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1: /* Directory */
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("directory node\n");
|
|
|
|
if (dir) {
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && (ctx->wrkproperty != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(ctx->wrkproperty, "DigitalSignatures", NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop_block[idx].name, prop_block[idx].name_size);
|
|
|
|
if (name) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, "_xmlsignatures") || !strcmp(name, "_signatures")) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonbool(ctx->wrkproperty, "HasDigitalSignatures", 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dirname = (char *)cli_max_malloc(strlen(dir) + 8);
|
|
|
|
if (!dirname) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("OLE2: malloc failed for dirname\n");
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snprintf(dirname, strlen(dir) + 8, "%s" PATHSEP "%.6d", dir, curindex);
|
|
|
|
if (mkdir(dirname, 0700) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("OLE2: mkdir failed for directory %s\n", dirname);
|
|
|
|
free(dirname);
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return CL_BREAK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 dir entry: %s\n", dirname);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
dirname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].child) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
ret = ole2_walk_property_tree(hdr, dirname, prop_block[idx].child, handler, rec_level + 1, file_count, ctx, scansize, handler_ctx, pEncryptionStatus);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
if (dirname) {
|
|
|
|
free(dirname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dirname) {
|
|
|
|
free(dirname);
|
|
|
|
dirname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].prev) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ole2_list_push(&node_list, prop_block[idx].prev)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((int)(prop_block[idx].next) != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ole2_list_push(&node_list, prop_block[idx].next)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ERROR: unknown OLE2 entry type: %d\n", prop_block[idx].type);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ole2_listmsg("loop ended: %d %d\n", ole2_list_size(&node_list), ole2_list_is_empty(&node_list));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ole2_list_delete(&node_list);
|
|
|
|
return CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Write file Handler - write the contents of the entry to a file */
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_writefile(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_BREAK;
|
|
|
|
char newname[1024];
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
char *name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int32_t current_block = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t len = 0, offset = 0;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
int ofd = -1;
|
|
|
|
char *hash = NULL;
|
|
|
|
bitset_t *blk_bitset = NULL;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t cnt = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(ctx);
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->type != 2) {
|
|
|
|
/* Not a file */
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->name_size > 64) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: property name too long: %d\n", prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
if (name) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Storing %s in uniq\n", name);
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != uniq_add(hdr->U, name, strlen(name), &hash, &cnt)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: too many property names added to uniq store.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != uniq_add(hdr->U, NULL, 0, &hash, &cnt)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: too many property names added to uniq store.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(newname, sizeof(newname), "%s" PATHSEP "%s_%u", dir, hash, cnt);
|
|
|
|
newname[sizeof(newname) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: Dumping '%s' to '%s'\n", name ? name : "<empty>", newname);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ofd = open(newname, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
if (ofd < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: failed to create file: %s\n", newname);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_block = prop->start_block;
|
|
|
|
len = prop->size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(buff, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size,
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: Unable to allocate memory for buff: %u\n", 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
blk_bitset = cli_bitset_init();
|
|
|
|
if (!blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: init bitset failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((current_block >= 0) && (len > 0)) {
|
|
|
|
if (current_block > (int32_t)hdr->max_block_no) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: Max block number for file size exceeded: %d\n", current_block);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check we aren't in a loop */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_bitset_test(blk_bitset, (unsigned long)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Loop in block list */
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: Block list loop detected\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_bitset_set(blk_bitset, (unsigned long)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->size < (int64_t)hdr->sbat_cutoff) {
|
|
|
|
/* Small block file */
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_get_sbat_data_block(hdr, buff, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_writefile]: ole2_get_sbat_data_block failed\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* buff now contains the block with N small blocks in it */
|
|
|
|
offset = (((size_t)1) << hdr->log2_small_block_size) * (((size_t)current_block) % (((size_t)1) << (hdr->log2_big_block_size - hdr->log2_small_block_size)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_writen(ofd, &buff[offset], MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size)) != MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len -= MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size);
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_sbat_block(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Big block file */
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, buff, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_writen(ofd, buff, MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size))) != MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EWRITE;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_block_number(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
len -= MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unlike w/ handler_otf(), the ole2 summary JSON will be recorded
|
|
|
|
* when we re-ingest the files we wrote above when we scan the directory.
|
|
|
|
* See cli_ole2_tempdir_scan_vba()
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(name);
|
|
|
|
if (-1 != ofd) {
|
|
|
|
close(ofd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(buff);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_bitset_free(blk_bitset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum biff_parser_states {
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_INITIAL,
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_2ND_TAG_BYTE,
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_1ST_LENGTH_BYTE,
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_2ND_LENGTH_BYTE,
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_NAME_RECORD,
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_BOUNDSHEET_RECORD,
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_MSODRAWINGGROUP_RECORD,
|
|
|
|
BIFF_PARSER_DATA,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct biff_parser_state {
|
|
|
|
enum biff_parser_states state;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t opcode;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t length;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t data_offset;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t tmp;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Scan through a buffer of BIFF records and find PARSERNAME, BOUNDSHEET records (Which indicate XLM macros).
|
|
|
|
* BIFF streams follow the format OOLLDDDDDDDDD..., where OO is the opcode (little endian 16 bit value),
|
|
|
|
* LL is the data length (little endian 16 bit value), followed by LL bytes of data. Records are defined in
|
|
|
|
* the MICROSOFT OFFICE EXCEL 97-2007 BINARY FILE FORMAT SPECIFICATION.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* \param state The parser state.
|
|
|
|
* \param buff The buffer.
|
|
|
|
* \param len The buffer's size in bytes.
|
|
|
|
* \param ctx The ClamAV context for emitting JSON about the document.
|
|
|
|
* \returns true if a macro has been found, false otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images(
|
|
|
|
struct biff_parser_state *state,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buff,
|
|
|
|
size_t len,
|
|
|
|
cli_ctx *ctx,
|
|
|
|
bool *found_macro,
|
|
|
|
bool *found_image)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_EFORMAT;
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
|
|
|
|
switch (state->state) {
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_INITIAL:
|
|
|
|
state->opcode = buff[i];
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_2ND_TAG_BYTE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_2ND_TAG_BYTE:
|
|
|
|
state->opcode |= buff[i] << 8;
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_1ST_LENGTH_BYTE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_1ST_LENGTH_BYTE:
|
|
|
|
state->length = buff[i];
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_2ND_LENGTH_BYTE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_EXPECTING_2ND_LENGTH_BYTE:
|
|
|
|
state->length |= buff[i] << 8;
|
|
|
|
state->data_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (state->opcode) {
|
|
|
|
case OPC_BOUNDSHEET:
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_BOUNDSHEET_RECORD;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case OPC_NAME:
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_NAME_RECORD;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case OPC_MSODRAWINGGROUP:
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_MSODRAWINGGROUP_RECORD;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_DATA;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (state->length == 0) {
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_INITIAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
switch (state->state) {
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_NAME_RECORD:
|
|
|
|
if (state->data_offset == 0) {
|
|
|
|
state->tmp = buff[i] & 0x20;
|
|
|
|
} else if ((state->data_offset == 14 || state->data_offset == 15) && state->tmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (buff[i] == 1 || buff[i] == 2) {
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && (ctx->wrkproperty != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
json_object *indicators = cli_jsonarray(ctx->wrkproperty, "MacroIndicators");
|
|
|
|
if (indicators) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(indicators, NULL, "autorun");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("[scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images] Failed to add \"autorun\" entry to MacroIndicators JSON array\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (buff[i] != 0) {
|
|
|
|
state->tmp = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_BOUNDSHEET_RECORD:
|
|
|
|
if (state->data_offset == 4) {
|
|
|
|
state->tmp = buff[i];
|
|
|
|
} else if (state->data_offset == 5 && buff[i] == 1) { // Excel 4.0 macro sheet
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("[scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images] Found XLM macro sheet\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && (ctx->wrkproperty != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonbool(ctx->wrkproperty, "HasMacros", 1);
|
|
|
|
json_object *macro_languages = cli_jsonarray(ctx->wrkproperty, "MacroLanguages");
|
|
|
|
if (macro_languages) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(macro_languages, NULL, "XLM");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("[scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images] Failed to add \"XLM\" entry to MacroLanguages JSON array\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (state->tmp == 1 || state->tmp == 2) {
|
|
|
|
json_object *indicators = cli_jsonarray(ctx->wrkproperty, "MacroIndicators");
|
|
|
|
if (indicators) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(indicators, NULL, "hidden");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("[scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images] Failed to add \"hidden\" entry to MacroIndicators JSON array\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*found_macro = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_DATA:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case BIFF_PARSER_MSODRAWINGGROUP_RECORD:
|
|
|
|
// Embedded image found
|
|
|
|
if (true != *found_image) {
|
|
|
|
*found_image = true;
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("[scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images] Found image in sheet\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
// Should never arrive here
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("[scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images] Unexpected state value %d\n", (int)state->state);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
state->data_offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (state->data_offset >= state->length) {
|
|
|
|
state->state = BIFF_PARSER_INITIAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Scan for XLM (Excel 4.0) macro sheets and images in an OLE2 Workbook stream.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The stream should be encoded with <= BIFF8.
|
|
|
|
* The found_macro and found_image out-params should be checked even if an error occurred.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param hdr
|
|
|
|
* @param prop
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx
|
|
|
|
* @param found_macro [out] If any macros were found
|
|
|
|
* @param found_image [out] If any images were found
|
|
|
|
* @return cl_error_t CL_EPARSE if an error was encountered
|
|
|
|
* @return cl_error_t CL_EMEM if a memory issue was encountered.
|
|
|
|
* @return cl_error_t CL_SUCCESS if no errors were encountered.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t scan_for_xlm_macros_and_images(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, cli_ctx *ctx, bool *found_macro, bool *found_image)
|
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_EPARSE;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int32_t current_block = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t len = 0, offset = 0;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
bitset_t *blk_bitset = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct biff_parser_state state = {0};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->type != 2) {
|
|
|
|
/* Not a file */
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
|
|
|
|
state.state = BIFF_PARSER_INITIAL;
|
|
|
|
current_block = prop->start_block;
|
|
|
|
len = prop->size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(buff, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size,
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [scan_for_xlm_macros_and_images]: Unable to allocate memory for buff: %u\n", 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size);
|
|
|
|
status = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
blk_bitset = cli_bitset_init();
|
|
|
|
if (!blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [scan_for_xlm_macros_and_images]: init bitset failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while ((current_block >= 0) && (len > 0)) {
|
|
|
|
if (current_block > (int32_t)hdr->max_block_no) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [scan_for_xlm_macros_and_images]: Max block number for file size exceeded: %d\n", current_block);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check we aren't in a loop */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_bitset_test(blk_bitset, (unsigned long)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Loop in block list */
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [scan_for_xlm_macros_and_images]: Block list loop detected\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_bitset_set(blk_bitset, (unsigned long)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (prop->size < (int64_t)hdr->sbat_cutoff) {
|
|
|
|
/* Small block file */
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_get_sbat_data_block(hdr, buff, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [scan_for_xlm_macros_and_images]: ole2_get_sbat_data_block failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* buff now contains the block with N small blocks in it */
|
|
|
|
offset = (1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size) * (current_block % (1 << (hdr->log2_big_block_size - hdr->log2_small_block_size)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(void)scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images(&state, &buff[offset], MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size), ctx, found_macro, found_image);
|
|
|
|
len -= MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size);
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_sbat_block(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Big block file */
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, buff, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(void)scan_biff_for_xlm_macros_and_images(&state, buff, MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size)), ctx, found_macro, found_image);
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_block_number(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
len -= MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(buff);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_bitset_free(blk_bitset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief enum file Handler - checks for VBA presence
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param hdr
|
|
|
|
* @param prop
|
|
|
|
* @param dir
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx the scan context
|
|
|
|
* @return cl_error_t
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_enum(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = CL_EREAD;
|
|
|
|
char *name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *hwp_check = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int32_t offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
json_object *arrobj = NULL;
|
|
|
|
json_object *strmobj = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(dir);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
if (name) {
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && ctx->wrkproperty != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
arrobj = cli_jsonarray(ctx->wrkproperty, "Streams");
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == arrobj) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("ole2: no memory for streams list or streams is not an array\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
strmobj = json_object_new_string(name);
|
|
|
|
json_object_array_add(arrobj, strmobj);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, "powerpoint document")) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(ctx->wrkproperty, "FileType", "CL_TYPE_MSPPT");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, "worddocument")) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(ctx->wrkproperty, "FileType", "CL_TYPE_MSWORD");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, "workbook")) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(ctx->wrkproperty, "FileType", "CL_TYPE_MSXL");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!hdr->has_vba) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
if (name) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, "_vba_project") || !strcmp(name, "powerpoint document") || !strcmp(name, "worddocument") || !strcmp(name, "_1_ole10native"))
|
|
|
|
hdr->has_vba = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* if we can find a root entry fileheader, it may be a HWP file
|
|
|
|
* identify the HWP signature "HWP Document File" at offset 0 stream
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!hdr->is_hwp) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (name) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, "fileheader")) {
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_CALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(hwp_check, 1, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size, status = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* reading safety checks; do-while used for breaks */
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
if (prop->size == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->start_block > hdr->max_block_no)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* read the header block (~256 bytes) */
|
|
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (prop->size < (int64_t)hdr->sbat_cutoff) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_get_sbat_data_block(hdr, hwp_check, prop->start_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset = (1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size) *
|
|
|
|
(prop->start_block % (1 << (hdr->log2_big_block_size - hdr->log2_small_block_size)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* reading safety */
|
|
|
|
if (offset + 40 >= 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, hwp_check, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size, prop->start_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* compare against HWP signature; we could add the 15 padding NULLs too */
|
|
|
|
if (!memcmp(hwp_check + offset, "HWP Document File", 17)) {
|
|
|
|
hwp5_header_t *hwp_new;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(ctx->wrkproperty, "FileType", "CL_TYPE_HWP5");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLI_CALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(hwp_new, 1, sizeof(hwp5_header_t), status = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copy the header information into our header struct.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
memcpy(hwp_new, hwp_check + offset, sizeof(hwp5_header_t));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hwp_new->version = ole2_endian_convert_32(hwp_new->version);
|
|
|
|
hwp_new->flags = ole2_endian_convert_32(hwp_new->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->is_hwp = hwp_new;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} while (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we've already found a macro and an image, we can skip this initial check.
|
|
|
|
This scan step is to save a little time so we don't have to fully parse it
|
|
|
|
later if never find anything.. */
|
|
|
|
if (!hdr->has_xlm || !hdr->has_image) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (name && (strcmp(name, "workbook") == 0 || strcmp(name, "book") == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
(void)scan_for_xlm_macros_and_images(hdr, prop, ctx, &hdr->has_xlm, &hdr->has_image);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(name);
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(hwp_check);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
likely_mso_stream(int fd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
off_t fsize;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char check[2];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fsize = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END);
|
|
|
|
if (fsize == -1) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("likely_mso_stream: call to lseek() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (fsize < 6) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (lseek(fd, 4, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("likely_mso_stream: call to lseek() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, check, 2) != 2) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("likely_mso_stream: reading from fd failed\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (check[0] == 0x78 && check[1] == 0x9C)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t scan_mso_stream(int fd, cli_ctx *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int zret, ofd;
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
fmap_t *input;
|
|
|
|
off_t off_in = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t count, outsize = 0;
|
|
|
|
z_stream zstrm;
|
|
|
|
char *tmpname;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t prefix;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char inbuf[FILEBUFF], outbuf[FILEBUFF];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* fmap the input file for easier manipulation */
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: Invalid file descriptor argument\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_ENULLARG;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
STATBUF statbuf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (FSTAT(fd, &statbuf) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: Can't stat file descriptor\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_ESTAT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
input = fmap(fd, 0, statbuf.st_size, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!input) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: Failed to get fmap for input stream\n");
|
|
|
|
return CL_EMAP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* reserve tempfile for output and scanning */
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = cli_gentempfd(ctx->sub_tmpdir, &tmpname, &ofd)) != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("scan_mso_stream: Can't generate temporary file\n");
|
|
|
|
funmap(input);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* initialize zlib inflation stream */
|
|
|
|
memset(&zstrm, 0, sizeof(zstrm));
|
|
|
|
zstrm.zalloc = Z_NULL;
|
|
|
|
zstrm.zfree = Z_NULL;
|
|
|
|
zstrm.opaque = Z_NULL;
|
|
|
|
zstrm.next_in = inbuf;
|
|
|
|
zstrm.next_out = outbuf;
|
|
|
|
zstrm.avail_in = 0;
|
|
|
|
zstrm.avail_out = FILEBUFF;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
zret = inflateInit(&zstrm);
|
|
|
|
if (zret != Z_OK) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: Can't initialize zlib inflation stream\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EUNPACK;
|
|
|
|
goto mso_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* extract 32-bit prefix */
|
|
|
|
if (fmap_readn(input, &prefix, off_in, sizeof(prefix)) != sizeof(prefix)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: Can't extract 4-byte prefix\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EREAD;
|
|
|
|
goto mso_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* RFC1952 says numbers are stored with least significant byte first */
|
|
|
|
prefix = le32_to_host(prefix);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
off_in += sizeof(uint32_t);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: stream prefix = %08x(%d)\n", prefix, prefix);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* inflation loop */
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
if (zstrm.avail_in == 0) {
|
|
|
|
size_t bytes_read;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
zstrm.next_in = inbuf;
|
|
|
|
bytes_read = fmap_readn(input, inbuf, off_in, FILEBUFF);
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_read == (size_t)-1) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("scan_mso_stream: Error reading MSO file\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EUNPACK;
|
|
|
|
goto mso_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_read == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
zstrm.avail_in = bytes_read;
|
|
|
|
off_in += bytes_read;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
zret = inflate(&zstrm, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
|
|
|
|
count = FILEBUFF - zstrm.avail_out;
|
|
|
|
if (count) {
|
|
|
|
if (cli_checklimits("MSO", ctx, outsize + count, 0, 0) != CL_SUCCESS)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (cli_writen(ofd, outbuf, count) != count) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("scan_mso_stream: Can't write to file %s\n", tmpname);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EWRITE;
|
|
|
|
goto mso_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
outsize += count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
zstrm.next_out = outbuf;
|
|
|
|
zstrm.avail_out = FILEBUFF;
|
|
|
|
} while (zret == Z_OK);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* post inflation checks */
|
|
|
|
if (zret != Z_STREAM_END && zret != Z_OK) {
|
|
|
|
if (outsize == 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_infomsg(ctx, "scan_mso_stream: Error decompressing MSO file. No data decompressed.\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EUNPACK;
|
|
|
|
goto mso_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_infomsg(ctx, "scan_mso_stream: Error decompressing MSO file. Scanning what was decompressed.\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: Decompressed %llu bytes to %s\n", (long long unsigned)outsize, tmpname);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (outsize != prefix) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("scan_mso_stream: declared prefix != inflated stream size, %llu != %llu\n",
|
|
|
|
(long long unsigned)prefix, (long long unsigned)outsize);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("scan_mso_stream: declared prefix == inflated stream size, %llu == %llu\n",
|
|
|
|
(long long unsigned)prefix, (long long unsigned)outsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* scanning inflated stream */
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_magic_scan_desc(ofd, tmpname, ctx, NULL, LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_NONE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* clean-up */
|
|
|
|
mso_end:
|
|
|
|
zret = inflateEnd(&zstrm);
|
|
|
|
if (zret != Z_OK)
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EUNPACK;
|
|
|
|
close(ofd);
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->engine->keeptmp)
|
|
|
|
if (cli_unlink(tmpname))
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EUNLINK;
|
|
|
|
free(tmpname);
|
|
|
|
funmap(input);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_otf(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_BREAK;
|
|
|
|
char *tempfile = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int32_t current_block = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t len = 0, offset = 0;
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
int ofd = -1;
|
|
|
|
int is_mso = 0;
|
|
|
|
bitset_t *blk_bitset = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(dir);
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(handler_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->type != 2) {
|
|
|
|
/* Not a file */
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
print_ole2_property(prop);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(tempfile = cli_gentemp(ctx->sub_tmpdir))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ofd = open(tempfile, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Can't create file %s\n", tempfile);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ECREAT;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_block = prop->start_block;
|
|
|
|
len = prop->size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_debug_flag) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Dumping '%s' to '%s'\n", name, tempfile);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(buff, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size, ret = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
blk_bitset = cli_bitset_init();
|
|
|
|
if (!blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: init bitset failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((current_block >= 0) && (len > 0)) {
|
|
|
|
if (current_block > (int32_t)hdr->max_block_no) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Max block number for file size exceeded: %d\n", current_block);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check we aren't in a loop */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_bitset_test(blk_bitset, (unsigned long)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Loop in block list */
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Block list loop detected\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_bitset_set(blk_bitset, (unsigned long)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->size < (int64_t)hdr->sbat_cutoff) {
|
|
|
|
/* Small block file */
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_get_sbat_data_block(hdr, buff, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: ole2_get_sbat_data_block failed\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* buff now contains the block with N small blocks in it */
|
|
|
|
offset = (1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size) * (current_block % (1 << (hdr->log2_big_block_size - hdr->log2_small_block_size)));
|
|
|
|
if (cli_writen(ofd, &buff[offset], MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size)) != MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len -= MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size);
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_sbat_block(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Big block file */
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, buff, 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_writen(ofd, buff, MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size))) != MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EWRITE;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_block_number(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
len -= MIN(len, (1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* defragmenting of ole2 stream complete */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
is_mso = likely_mso_stream(ofd);
|
|
|
|
if (lseek(ofd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ESEEK;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* JSON Output Summary Information */
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && (ctx->properties != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (name) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(name, "_5_summaryinformation", 21)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: detected a '_5_summaryinformation' stream\n");
|
|
|
|
/* JSONOLE2 - what to do if something breaks? */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_ole2_summary_json(ctx, ofd, 0) == CL_ETIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ETIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(name, "_5_documentsummaryinformation", 29)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: detected a '_5_documentsummaryinformation' stream\n");
|
|
|
|
/* JSONOLE2 - what to do if something breaks? */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_ole2_summary_json(ctx, ofd, 1) == CL_ETIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ETIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->is_hwp) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_scanhwp5_stream(ctx, hdr->is_hwp, name, ofd, tempfile);
|
|
|
|
} else if (is_mso < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ESEEK;
|
|
|
|
} else if (is_mso) {
|
|
|
|
/* MSO Stream Scan */
|
|
|
|
ret = scan_mso_stream(ofd, ctx);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Normal File Scan */
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_magic_scan_desc(ofd, tempfile, ctx, NULL, LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_NONE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = ret == CL_VIRUS ? CL_VIRUS : CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(name);
|
|
|
|
if (-1 != ofd) {
|
|
|
|
close(ofd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(buff);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_bitset_free(blk_bitset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != tempfile) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->engine->keeptmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (cli_unlink(tempfile)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EUNLINK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(tempfile);
|
|
|
|
tempfile = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* @brief Extracts encrypted files.
|
|
|
|
* @param hdr ole2_header_t structure
|
|
|
|
* @param prop property_t structure (DirectoryEntry)
|
|
|
|
* @param dir dir pointer. Unused by this function
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx cli_ctx
|
|
|
|
* @param handler_ctx handler context. For this function, it is the encryption key
|
|
|
|
* initialized by 'initialize_encryption_key'
|
|
|
|
* @return Success or failure depending on whether validation was successful.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For more information, see below
|
|
|
|
* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-offcrypto/e5ad39b8-9bc1-4a19-bad3-44e6246d21e6
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t handler_otf_encrypted(ole2_header_t *hdr, property_t *prop, const char *dir, cli_ctx *ctx, void *handler_ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_BREAK;
|
|
|
|
char *tempfile = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *buff = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int32_t current_block = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t len = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
int ofd = -1;
|
|
|
|
int is_mso = 0;
|
|
|
|
bitset_t *blk_bitset = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int nrounds = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *decryptDst = NULL;
|
|
|
|
encryption_key_t *key = (encryption_key_t *)handler_ctx;
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
1 year ago
|
|
|
uint32_t *rk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t bytesRead = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t actualFileLength;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t bytesWritten = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t leftover = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t readIdx = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNUSEDPARAM(dir);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == key) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("%s::%d::key NULL\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->type != 2) {
|
|
|
|
/* Not a file */
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
1 year ago
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(rk, RKLENGTH(key->key_length_bits) * sizeof(uint32_t), ret = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
print_ole2_property(prop);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nrounds = rijndaelSetupDecrypt(rk, key->key, key->key_length_bits);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(tempfile = cli_gentemp(ctx->sub_tmpdir))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ofd = open(tempfile, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Can't create file %s\n", tempfile);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ECREAT;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_block = prop->start_block;
|
|
|
|
len = prop->size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_debug_flag) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Dumping '%s' to '%s'\n", name, tempfile);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t blockSize = 1 << hdr->log2_big_block_size;
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(buff, blockSize + sizeof(uint64_t), ret = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
CLI_MAX_MALLOC_OR_GOTO_DONE(decryptDst, blockSize, ret = CL_EMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
blk_bitset = cli_bitset_init();
|
|
|
|
if (!blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: init bitset failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (bytesRead < len) {
|
|
|
|
if (current_block > (int32_t)hdr->max_block_no) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Max block number for file size exceeded: %d\n", current_block);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check we aren't in a loop */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_bitset_test(blk_bitset, (uint64_t)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Loop in block list */
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: Block list loop detected\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cli_bitset_set(blk_bitset, (uint64_t)current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prop->size < (int64_t)hdr->sbat_cutoff) {
|
|
|
|
/* Small block file */
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_get_sbat_data_block(hdr, buff, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 [handler_otf]: ole2_get_sbat_data_block failed\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* buff now contains the block with N small blocks in it */
|
|
|
|
offset = (((size_t)1) << hdr->log2_small_block_size) * (((size_t)current_block) % (((size_t)1) << (hdr->log2_big_block_size - hdr->log2_small_block_size)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_writen(ofd, &buff[offset], MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size)) != MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len -= MIN(len, 1 << hdr->log2_small_block_size);
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_sbat_block(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// These small block files don't seem to be encrypted.
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t bytesToWrite = MIN(len - bytesRead, blockSize);
|
|
|
|
uint32_t writeIdx = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t decryptDstIdx = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ole2_read_block(hdr, &(buff[readIdx]), blockSize, current_block)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (0 == bytesRead) {
|
|
|
|
// first block. account for size of file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
writeIdx += sizeof(uint64_t);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&actualFileLength, buff, sizeof(actualFileLength));
|
|
|
|
actualFileLength = ole2_endian_convert_64(actualFileLength);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bytesRead += blockSize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (; writeIdx + 16 <= leftover + bytesToWrite; writeIdx += 16, decryptDstIdx += 16) {
|
|
|
|
rijndaelDecrypt(rk, nrounds, &(buff[writeIdx]), &(decryptDst[decryptDstIdx]));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Since our buffer size is a power of 2, leftover should always be
|
|
|
|
* either 0 or 8, but we have to decrypt in multiples of 16.*/
|
|
|
|
if (((leftover + bytesToWrite) - writeIdx) > 8) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Make sure we don't write more data than the file is actually supposed to be.*/
|
|
|
|
if ((decryptDstIdx + bytesWritten) > actualFileLength) {
|
|
|
|
decryptDstIdx = actualFileLength - bytesWritten;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_writen(ofd, decryptDst, decryptDstIdx) != decryptDstIdx) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("ole2: Error writing to file '%s'\n", tempfile);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bytesWritten += decryptDstIdx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
leftover = (leftover + bytesToWrite) - writeIdx;
|
|
|
|
if (leftover) {
|
|
|
|
memmove(buff, &(buff[writeIdx]), leftover);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
readIdx = leftover;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_block = ole2_get_next_block_number(hdr, current_block);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* defragmenting of ole2 stream complete */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
is_mso = likely_mso_stream(ofd);
|
|
|
|
if (lseek(ofd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ESEEK;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* JSON Output Summary Information */
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && (ctx->properties != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (name) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(name, "_5_summaryinformation", 21)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: detected a '_5_summaryinformation' stream\n");
|
|
|
|
/* JSONOLE2 - what to do if something breaks? */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_ole2_summary_json(ctx, ofd, 0) == CL_ETIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ETIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(name, "_5_documentsummaryinformation", 29)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: detected a '_5_documentsummaryinformation' stream\n");
|
|
|
|
/* JSONOLE2 - what to do if something breaks? */
|
|
|
|
if (cli_ole2_summary_json(ctx, ofd, 1) == CL_ETIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ETIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->is_hwp) {
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
name = cli_ole2_get_property_name2(prop->name, prop->name_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_scanhwp5_stream(ctx, hdr->is_hwp, name, ofd, tempfile);
|
|
|
|
} else if (is_mso < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_ESEEK;
|
|
|
|
} else if (is_mso) {
|
|
|
|
/* MSO Stream Scan */
|
|
|
|
ret = scan_mso_stream(ofd, ctx);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Normal File Scan */
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_magic_scan_desc(ofd, tempfile, ctx, NULL, LAYER_ATTRIBUTES_NONE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = ret == CL_VIRUS ? CL_VIRUS : CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(name);
|
|
|
|
if (-1 != ofd) {
|
|
|
|
close(ofd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(buff);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != blk_bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_bitset_free(blk_bitset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NULL != tempfile) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->engine->keeptmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (cli_unlink(tempfile)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EUNLINK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(tempfile);
|
|
|
|
tempfile = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(decryptDst);
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(rk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIB_PACKED) && !defined(HAVE_PRAGMA_PACK) && !defined(HAVE_PRAGMA_PACK_HPPA)
|
|
|
|
static bool ole2_read_header(int fd, ole2_header_t *hdr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->magic, 8) != 8) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->clsid, 16) != 16) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->minor_version, 2) != 2) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->dll_version, 2) != 2) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->byte_order, 2) != 2) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->log2_big_block_size, 2) != 2) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->log2_small_block_size, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->reserved, 8) != 8) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->bat_count, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->prop_start, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->signature, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->sbat_cutoff, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->sbat_start, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->sbat_block_count, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->xbat_start, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->xbat_count, 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 109; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (cli_readn(fd, &hdr->bat_array[i], 4) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void copy_encryption_info_stream_standard(encryption_info_stream_standard_t *dst, const uint8_t *src)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(encryption_info_stream_standard_t));
|
|
|
|
dst->version_major = ole2_endian_convert_16(dst->version_major);
|
|
|
|
dst->version_minor = ole2_endian_convert_16(dst->version_minor);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dst->flags = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->flags);
|
|
|
|
dst->size = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.flags = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.flags);
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.sizeExtra = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.sizeExtra);
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.algorithmID = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.algorithmID);
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.algorithmIDHash = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.algorithmIDHash);
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.keySize = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.keySize);
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.providerType = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.providerType);
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.reserved1 = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.reserved1);
|
|
|
|
dst->encryptionInfo.reserved2 = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->encryptionInfo.reserved2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void copy_encryption_verifier(encryption_verifier_t *dst, const uint8_t *src)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(encryption_verifier_t));
|
|
|
|
dst->salt_size = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->salt_size);
|
|
|
|
dst->verifier_hash_size = ole2_endian_convert_32(dst->verifier_hash_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool key_length_valid_aes_bits(const uint32_t keyLength)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (keyLength) {
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES128_KEYSIZE:
|
|
|
|
/* fall-through */
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES192_KEYSIZE:
|
|
|
|
/* fall-through */
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES256_KEYSIZE:
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Definitions for generate_key_aes*/
|
|
|
|
#define GENERATE_KEY_AES_ITERATIONS 50000
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* @brief Generate the key for aes encryption based on the password
|
|
|
|
* @param password Password to generate the key from
|
|
|
|
* @param key [out] location to store the key
|
|
|
|
* @param verifier encryption_verifier_t from the header. Contains information necessary to generate the key
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @return Error code based on whether or not the key was generated. This function
|
|
|
|
* does NOT validate the key, you must call 'verify_key' for that.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static cl_error_t generate_key_aes(const char *const password, encryption_key_t *key,
|
|
|
|
encryption_verifier_t *verifier)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *buffer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t bufLen = 0;
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t i = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t sha1[sizeof(uint32_t) + SHA1_HASH_SIZE + sizeof(uint32_t)] = {0};
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *sha1Dst = &(sha1[sizeof(uint32_t)]);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf1[64];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf2[64];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t doubleSha[SHA1_HASH_SIZE * 2];
|
|
|
|
uint32_t tmp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!key_length_valid_aes_bits(key->key_length_bits)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("ole2: Invalid key length '0x%x'\n", key->key_length_bits / 8);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(key->key, 0, key->key_length_bits / 8);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bufLen = verifier->salt_size + (strlen(password) * 2);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buffer = calloc(bufLen, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (NULL == buffer) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("ole2: calloc failed\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = verifier->salt_size;
|
|
|
|
if (verifier->salt_size > sizeof(verifier->salt)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid salt length '0x%x'\n", verifier->salt_size);
|
|
|
|
tmp = sizeof(verifier->salt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buffer, verifier->salt, tmp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Convert to UTF16-LE*/
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (uint32_t)strlen(password); i++) {
|
|
|
|
buffer[verifier->salt_size + (i * 2)] = password[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(void)cl_sha1(buffer, bufLen, sha1Dst, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < GENERATE_KEY_AES_ITERATIONS; i++) {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t eye = ole2_endian_convert_32(i);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(sha1, &eye, sizeof(eye));
|
|
|
|
(void)cl_sha1(sha1, SHA1_HASH_SIZE + sizeof(uint32_t), sha1Dst, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&(sha1Dst[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]), 0, sizeof(uint32_t));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(void)cl_sha1(sha1Dst, SHA1_HASH_SIZE + sizeof(uint32_t), sha1Dst, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(buf1, 0x36, sizeof(buf1));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
|
|
|
|
buf1[i] = buf1[i] ^ sha1Dst[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// now sha1 buf1
|
|
|
|
(void)cl_sha1(buf1, sizeof(buf1), doubleSha, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(buf2, 0x5c, sizeof(buf2));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
|
|
|
|
buf2[i] = buf2[i] ^ sha1Dst[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(void)cl_sha1(buf2, sizeof(buf2), &(doubleSha[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]), NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = key->key_length_bits / 8;
|
|
|
|
if (tmp > sizeof(key->key)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_warnmsg("ole2: Invalid key length 0x%x\n", key->key_length_bits / 8);
|
|
|
|
tmp = sizeof(key->key);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(key->key, doubleSha, tmp);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
CLI_FREE_AND_SET_NULL(buffer);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool aes_128ecb_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, size_t length, unsigned char *out, const encryption_key_t *const key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
Windows: Fix C/Rust FFI compat issue + Windows compile warnings
Primarily this commit fixes an issue with the size of the parameters
passed to cli_checklimits(). The parameters were "unsigned long", which
varies in size depending on platform.
I've switched them to uint64_t / u64.
While working on this, I observed some concerning warnigns on Windows,
and some less serious ones, primarily regarding inconsistencies with
`const` parameters.
Finally, in `scanmem.c`, there is a warning regarding use of `wchar_t *`
with `GetModuleFileNameEx()` instead of `GetModuleFileNameExW()`.
This made me realize this code assumes we're not defining `UNICODE`,
which would have such macros use the 'A' variant.
I have fixed it the best I can, although I'm still a little
uncomfortable with some of this code that uses `char` or `wchar_t`
instead of TCHAR.
I also remove the `if (GetModuleFileNameEx) {` conditional, because this
macro/function will always be defined. The original code was checking a
function pointer, and so this was a bug when integrating into ClamAV.
Regarding the changes to `rijndael.c`, I found that this module assumes
`unsigned long` == 32bits. It does not.
I have corrected it to use `uint32_t`.
1 year ago
|
|
|
uint32_t rk[RKLENGTH(128)];
|
|
|
|
int nrounds;
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
bool bRet = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SE_HEADER_EI_AES128_KEYSIZE != key->key_length_bits) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Unsupported AES key length in aes_128ecb_decrypt\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nrounds = rijndaelSetupDecrypt(rk, (const unsigned char *)key->key, key->key_length_bits);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!nrounds) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("ole2: Unable to initialize decryption.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < length; i += 16) {
|
|
|
|
rijndaelDecrypt(rk, nrounds, &(in[i]), &(out[i]));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bRet = true;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return bRet;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Definitions for verify_key_aes*/
|
|
|
|
#define AES_VERIFIER_HASH_LEN 32
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* @brief Returns true if it is actually encrypted with the key.
|
|
|
|
* @param key encryption_key_t to attempt validation
|
|
|
|
* @param verifier encryption_verifier_t to attempt validation.
|
|
|
|
* @return Success or failure depending on whether validation was successful.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For more information, see below
|
|
|
|
* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-offcrypto/e5ad39b8-9bc1-4a19-bad3-44e6246d21e6
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool verify_key_aes(const encryption_key_t *const key, encryption_verifier_t *verifier)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool bRet = false;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t sha[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t decrypted[AES_VERIFIER_HASH_LEN] = {0};
|
|
|
|
uint32_t actual_hash_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// The hash size should be 20 bytes, even though the buffer is 32 bytes.
|
|
|
|
// If it claims to be LARGER than 32 bytes, we have a problem - because the buffer isn't that big.
|
|
|
|
actual_hash_size = verifier->verifier_hash_size;
|
|
|
|
if (actual_hash_size > sizeof(verifier->encrypted_verifier_hash)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid encrypted verifier hash length 0x%x\n", verifier->verifier_hash_size);
|
|
|
|
actual_hash_size = sizeof(verifier->encrypted_verifier_hash);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (key->key_length_bits) {
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES128_KEYSIZE:
|
|
|
|
// Decrypt the verifier, which is a randomly generated Verifier value encrypted using
|
|
|
|
// the algorithm chosen by the implementation.
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_128ecb_decrypt(verifier->encrypted_verifier, sizeof(verifier->encrypted_verifier), decrypted, key)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Get hash of decrypted verifier.
|
|
|
|
// The hash type is from the encryption header, but in this case should always be SHA1.
|
|
|
|
(void)cl_sha1(decrypted, sizeof(verifier->encrypted_verifier), sha, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Decrypt the verifier hash, which, for contains the encrypted form of the hash of the randomly generated Verifier value
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_128ecb_decrypt(verifier->encrypted_verifier_hash, actual_hash_size, decrypted, key)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES192_KEYSIZE:
|
|
|
|
// not implemented
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES256_KEYSIZE:
|
|
|
|
// not implemented
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
// unsupported/invalid key size
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Compare our (20-byte) SHA1 with the decrypted hash, which should be the same.
|
|
|
|
// Note: the hash size is different then ... what are we gonna do? We only support SHA1 hashes for this algorithm.
|
|
|
|
// So we'll just assume they're the same for this comparison.
|
|
|
|
bRet = (0 == memcmp(sha, decrypted, SHA1_HASH_SIZE));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return bRet;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Definitions for initialize_encryption_key*/
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_FCRYPTOAPI (1 << 2)
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_FEXTERNAL (1 << 4)
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_FDOCPROPS (1 << 3)
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_FAES (1 << 5)
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_EI_AES128 0x0000660e
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_EI_AES192 0x0000660f
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_EI_AES256 0x00006610
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_EI_RC4 0x00006801
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_EI_SHA1 0x00008004
|
|
|
|
#define SE_HEADER_EI_AES_PROVIDERTYPE 0x00000018
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Initialize encryption key, if the encryption validation passes.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param encryptionInfo Pointer to the encryption header.
|
|
|
|
* @param encryptionKey [out] Pointer to encryption_key_t structure to be initialized by this function.
|
|
|
|
* @return Success or failure depending on whether or not the
|
|
|
|
* encryption verifier was successful with the
|
|
|
|
* standard password (VelvetSweatshop).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Information about the encryption keys is here
|
|
|
|
* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-offcrypto/dca653b5-b93b-48df-8e1e-0fb9e1c83b0f
|
|
|
|
* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-offcrypto/2895eba1-acb1-4624-9bde-2cdad3fea015
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool initialize_encryption_key(
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *encryptionInfoStreamPtr,
|
|
|
|
size_t remainingBytes,
|
|
|
|
encryption_key_t *encryptionKey,
|
|
|
|
encryption_status_t *pEncryptionStatus)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool bRet = false;
|
|
|
|
size_t idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
encryption_key_t key;
|
|
|
|
bool bAES = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encryption_info_stream_standard_t encryptionInfo = {0};
|
|
|
|
uint16_t *encryptionInfo_CSPName = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t CSPName_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *encryptionVerifierPtr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
encryption_verifier_t encryptionVerifier = {0};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Populate the encryption_info_stream_standard_t structure
|
|
|
|
copy_encryption_info_stream_standard(&encryptionInfo, encryptionInfoStreamPtr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(encryptionKey, 0, sizeof(encryption_key_t));
|
|
|
|
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(encryption_key_t));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Major Version = 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.version_major);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Minor Version = 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.version_minor);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Flags = 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*Bit 0 and 1 must be 0*/
|
|
|
|
if (1 & encryptionInfo.flags) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid first bit, must be 0\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((1 << 1) & encryptionInfo.flags) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid second bit, must be 0\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-offcrypto/200a3d61-1ab4-4402-ae11-0290b28ab9cb
|
|
|
|
if ((SE_HEADER_FDOCPROPS & encryptionInfo.flags)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Unsupported document properties encrypted\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((SE_HEADER_FEXTERNAL & encryptionInfo.flags) &&
|
|
|
|
(SE_HEADER_FEXTERNAL != encryptionInfo.flags)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid fExternal flags. If fExternal bit is set, nothing else can be\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SE_HEADER_FAES & encryptionInfo.flags) {
|
|
|
|
if (!(SE_HEADER_FCRYPTOAPI & encryptionInfo.flags)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid combo of fAES and fCryptoApi flags\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Flags = AES\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Size = 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (encryptionInfo.flags != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.flags) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Flags must match\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0 != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.sizeExtra) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Size Extra must be 0\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.algorithmID) {
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES128:
|
|
|
|
if (SE_HEADER_EI_AES128_KEYSIZE != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.keySize) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Key length does not match algorithm id\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bAES = true;
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = AES128_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES192:
|
|
|
|
// not implemented
|
|
|
|
if (SE_HEADER_EI_AES192_KEYSIZE != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.keySize) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Key length does not match algorithm id\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bAES = true;
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = AES192_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_AES256:
|
|
|
|
// not implemented
|
|
|
|
if (SE_HEADER_EI_AES256_KEYSIZE != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.keySize) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Key length does not match algorithm id\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bAES = true;
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = AES256_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
case SE_HEADER_EI_RC4:
|
|
|
|
// not implemented
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = RC4_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid Algorithm ID: 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.algorithmID);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SE_HEADER_EI_SHA1 != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.algorithmIDHash) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid Algorithm ID Hash: 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.algorithmIDHash);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!key_length_valid_aes_bits(encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.keySize)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Invalid key size: 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.keySize);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("KeySize = 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.keySize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SE_HEADER_EI_AES_PROVIDERTYPE != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.providerType) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: WARNING: Provider Type should be '0x%x', is '0x%x'\n",
|
|
|
|
SE_HEADER_EI_AES_PROVIDERTYPE, encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.providerType);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Reserved1 = 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.reserved1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0 != encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.reserved2) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Reserved 2 must be zero, is 0x%x\n", encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.reserved2);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The encryption info is at the end of the CPSName string.
|
|
|
|
* Find the end, and we'll have the index of the EncryptionVerifier.
|
|
|
|
* The CPSName string *should* always be either
|
|
|
|
* 'Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider'
|
|
|
|
* or
|
|
|
|
* 'Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider (Prototype)'
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
encryptionInfo_CSPName = (uint16_t *)(encryptionInfoStreamPtr + sizeof(encryption_info_stream_standard_t));
|
|
|
|
remainingBytes -= sizeof(encryption_info_stream_standard_t);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0 == remainingBytes) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: No CSPName or encryption_verifier_t\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
|
|
// Check if we've gone past the end of the buffer without finding the end of the CSPName string.
|
|
|
|
if ((idx + 1) * sizeof(uint16_t) > remainingBytes) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: CSPName is missing null terminator before end of buffer.\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if we've found the end of the CSPName string.
|
|
|
|
if (encryptionInfo_CSPName[idx] == 0) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Found another character in the CSPName string, keep going.
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CSPName_length = (idx + 1) * sizeof(uint16_t);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encryptionVerifierPtr = (uint8_t *)encryptionInfo_CSPName + CSPName_length;
|
|
|
|
remainingBytes -= CSPName_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (remainingBytes < sizeof(encryption_verifier_t)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: No encryption_verifier_t\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
copy_encryption_verifier(&encryptionVerifier, encryptionVerifierPtr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key.key_length_bits = encryptionInfo.encryptionInfo.keySize;
|
|
|
|
if (!bAES) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Unsupported encryption algorithm\n");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != generate_key_aes("VelvetSweatshop", &key, &encryptionVerifier)) {
|
|
|
|
/*Error message printed by generate_key_aes*/
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_key_aes(&key, &encryptionVerifier)) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("ole2: Key verification for '%s' failed, unable to decrypt.\n", "VelvetSweatshop");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(encryptionKey, &key, sizeof(encryption_key_t));
|
|
|
|
bRet = true;
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type = VELVET_SWEATSHOP_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pEncryptionStatus->encryption_type) {
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->encrypted = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pEncryptionStatus->velvet_sweatshop = bRet;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return bRet;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Extract macros and images from an ole2 file
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param dirname A temp directory where we should store extracted content
|
|
|
|
* @param ctx The scan context
|
|
|
|
* @param files [out] A store of file names of extracted things to be processed later.
|
|
|
|
* @param has_vba [out] If the ole2 contained 1 or more VBA macros
|
|
|
|
* @param has_xlm [out] If the ole2 contained 1 or more XLM macros
|
|
|
|
* @param has_image [out] If the ole2 contained 1 or more images
|
|
|
|
* @return cl_error_t
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t cli_ole2_extract(const char *dirname, cli_ctx *ctx, struct uniq **files, int *has_vba, int *has_xlm, int *has_image)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ole2_header_t hdr;
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t ret = CL_CLEAN;
|
|
|
|
size_t hdr_size;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int file_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long scansize, scansize2;
|
|
|
|
const void *phdr;
|
|
|
|
encryption_key_t key;
|
|
|
|
bool bEncrypted = false;
|
|
|
|
size_t encryption_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
encryption_status_t encryption_status = {0};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("in cli_ole2_extract()\n");
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
|
|
return CL_ENULLARG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdr.is_hwp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hdr.bitset = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->engine->maxscansize) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->engine->maxscansize > ctx->scansize) {
|
|
|
|
scansize = ctx->engine->maxscansize - ctx->scansize;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return CL_EMAXSIZE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
scansize = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
scansize2 = scansize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* size of header - size of other values in struct */
|
|
|
|
hdr_size = sizeof(struct ole2_header_tag) -
|
|
|
|
sizeof(int32_t) - // sbat_root_start
|
|
|
|
sizeof(uint32_t) - // max_block_no
|
|
|
|
sizeof(off_t) - // m_length
|
|
|
|
sizeof(bitset_t *) - // bitset
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct uniq *) - // U
|
|
|
|
sizeof(fmap_t *) - // map
|
|
|
|
sizeof(bool) - // has_vba
|
|
|
|
sizeof(bool) - // has_xlm
|
|
|
|
sizeof(bool) - // has_image
|
|
|
|
sizeof(hwp5_header_t *); // is_hwp
|
|
|
|
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
|
|
if ((size_t)(ctx->fmap->len) < (size_t)(hdr_size)) {
|
|
|
|
return CL_CLEAN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
libclamav: Fix scan recursion tracking
Scan recursion is the process of identifying files embedded in other
files and then scanning them, recursively.
Internally this process is more complex than it may sound because a file
may have multiple layers of types before finding a new "file".
At present we treat the recursion count in the scanning context as an
index into both our fmap list AND our container list. These two lists
are conceptually a part of the same thing and should be unified.
But what's concerning is that the "recursion level" isn't actually
incremented or decremented at the same time that we add a layer to the
fmap or container lists but instead is more touchy-feely, increasing
when we find a new "file".
To account for this shadiness, the size of the fmap and container lists
has always been a little longer than our "max scan recursion" limit so
we don't accidentally overflow the fmap or container arrays (!).
I've implemented a single recursion-stack as an array, similar to before,
which includes a pointer to each fmap at each layer, along with the size
and type. Push and pop functions add and remove layers whenever a new
fmap is added. A boolean argument when pushing indicates if the new layer
represents a new buffer or new file (descriptor). A new buffer will reset
the "nested fmap level" (described below).
This commit also provides a solution for an issue where we detect
embedded files more than once during scan recursion.
For illustration, imagine a tarball named foo.tar.gz with this structure:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
But suppose baz.exe embeds a ZIP archive and a 7Z archive, like this:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| baz.exe | PE | 0 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 2 | 0 |
(A) If we scan for embedded files at any layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| ├── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| │ ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| │ │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| │ ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| │ └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 1 | 1 |
(A) is bad because it scans content more than once.
Note that for the GZ layer, it may detect the ZIP and 7Z if the
signature hits on the compressed data, which it might, though
extracting the ZIP and 7Z will likely fail.
The reason the above doesn't happen now is that we restrict embedded
type scans for a bunch of archive formats to include GZ and TAR.
(B) If we scan for embedded files at the foo.tar layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| ├── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 2 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
(B) is almost right. But we can achieve it easily enough only scanning for
embedded content in the current fmap when the "nested fmap level" is 0.
The upside is that it should safely detect all embedded content, even if
it may think the sfz.zip and sfx.7z are in foo.tar instead of in baz.exe.
The biggest risk I can think of affects ZIPs. SFXZIP detection
is identical to ZIP detection, which is why we don't allow SFXZIP to be
detected if insize of a ZIP. If we only allow embedded type scanning at
fmap-layer 0 in each buffer, this will fail to detect the embedded ZIP
if the bar.exe was not compressed in foo.zip and if non-compressed files
extracted from ZIPs aren't extracted as new buffers:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.zip | ZIP | 0 | 0 |
| └── bar.exe | PE | 1 | 1 |
| └── sfx.zip | ZIP | 2 | 2 |
Provided that we ensure all files extracted from zips are scanned in
new buffers, option (B) should be safe.
(C) If we scan for embedded files at the baz.exe layer, we may detect:
| description | type | rec level | nested fmap level |
| ------------------------- | ----- | --------- | ----------------- |
| foo.tar.gz | GZ | 0 | 0 |
| └── foo.tar | TAR | 1 | 0 |
| ├── bar.zip | ZIP | 2 | 1 |
| │ └── hola.txt | ASCII | 3 | 0 |
| └── baz.exe | PE | 2 | 1 |
| ├── sfx.zip | ZIP | 3 | 1 |
| │ └── hello.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
| └── sfx.7z | 7Z | 3 | 1 |
| └── world.txt | ASCII | 4 | 0 |
(C) is right. But it's harder to achieve. For this example we can get it by
restricting 7ZSFX and ZIPSFX detection only when scanning an executable.
But that may mean losing detection of archives embedded elsewhere.
And we'd have to identify allowable container types for each possible
embedded type, which would be very difficult.
So this commit aims to solve the issue the (B)-way.
Note that in all situations, we still have to scan with file typing
enabled to determine if we need to reassign the current file type, such
as re-identifying a Bzip2 archive as a DMG that happens to be Bzip2-
compressed. Detection of DMG and a handful of other types rely on
finding data partway through or near the ned of a file before
reassigning the entire file as the new type.
Other fixes and considerations in this commit:
- The utf16 HTML parser has weak error handling, particularly with respect
to creating a nested fmap for scanning the ascii decoded file.
This commit cleans up the error handling and wraps the nested scan with
the recursion-stack push()/pop() for correct recursion tracking.
Before this commit, each container layer had a flag to indicate if the
container layer is valid.
We need something similar so that the cli_recursion_stack_get_*()
functions ignore normalized layers. Details...
Imagine an LDB signature for HTML content that specifies a ZIP
container. If the signature actually alerts on the normalized HTML and
you don't ignore normalized layers for the container check, it will
appear as though the alert is in an HTML container rather than a ZIP
container.
This commit accomplishes this with a boolean you set in the scan context
before scanning a new layer. Then when the new fmap is created, it will
use that flag to set similar flag for the layer. The context flag is
reset those that anything after this doesn't have that flag.
The flag allows the new recursion_stack_get() function to ignore
normalized layers when iterating the stack to return a layer at a
requested index, negative or positive.
Scanning normalized extracted/normalized javascript and VBA should also
use the 'layer is normalized' flag.
- This commit also fixes Heuristic.Broken.Executable alert for ELF files
to make sure that:
A) these only alert if cli_append_virus() returns CL_VIRUS (aka it
respects the FP check).
B) all broken-executable alerts for ELF only happen if the
SCAN_HEURISTIC_BROKEN option is enabled.
- This commit also cleans up the error handling in cli_magic_scan_dir().
This was needed so we could correctly apply the layer-is-normalized-flag
to all VBA macros extracted to a directory when scanning the directory.
- Also fix an issue where exceeding scan maximums wouldn't cause embedded
file detection scans to abort. Granted we don't actually want to abort
if max filesize or max recursion depth are exceeded... only if max
scansize, max files, and max scantime are exceeded.
Add 'abort_scan' flag to scan context, to protect against depending on
correct error propagation for fatal conditions. Instead, setting this
flag in the scan context should guarantee that a fatal condition deep in
scan recursion isn't lost which result in more stuff being scanned
instead of aborting. This shouldn't be necessary, but some status codes
like CL_ETIMEOUT never used to be fatal and it's easier to do this than
to verify every parser only returns CL_ETIMEOUT and other "fatal
status codes" in fatal conditions.
- Remove duplicate is_tar() prototype from filestypes.c and include
is_tar.h instead.
- Presently we create the fmap hash when creating the fmap.
This wastes a bit of CPU if the hash is never needed.
Now that we're creating fmap's for all embedded files discovered with
file type recognition scans, this is a much more frequent occurence and
really slows things down.
This commit fixes the issue by only creating fmap hashes as needed.
This should not only resolve the perfomance impact of creating fmap's
for all embedded files, but also should improve performance in general.
- Add allmatch check to the zip parser after the central-header meta
match. That way we don't multiple alerts with the same match except in
allmatch mode. Clean up error handling in the zip parser a tiny bit.
- Fixes to ensure that the scan limits such as scansize, filesize,
recursion depth, # of embedded files, and scantime are always reported
if AlertExceedsMax (--alert-exceeds-max) is enabled.
- Fixed an issue where non-fatal alerts for exceeding scan maximums may
mask signature matches later on. I changed it so these alerts use the
"possibly unwanted" alert-type and thus only alert if no other alerts
were found or if all-match or heuristic-precedence are enabled.
- Added the "Heuristics.Limits.Exceeded.*" events to the JSON metadata
when the --gen-json feature is enabled. These will show up once under
"ParseErrors" the first time a limit is exceeded. In the present
implementation, only one limits-exceeded events will be added, so as to
prevent a malicious or malformed sample from filling the JSON buffer
with millions of events and using a tonne of RAM.
4 years ago
|
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hdr.map = ctx->fmap;
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hdr.m_length = hdr.map->len;
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phdr = fmap_need_off_once(hdr.map, 0, hdr_size);
|
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|
if (phdr) {
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memcpy(&hdr, phdr, hdr_size);
|
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|
} else {
|
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cli_dbgmsg("cli_ole2_extract: failed to read header\n");
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goto done;
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}
|
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hdr.minor_version = ole2_endian_convert_16(hdr.minor_version);
|
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hdr.dll_version = ole2_endian_convert_16(hdr.dll_version);
|
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hdr.byte_order = ole2_endian_convert_16(hdr.byte_order);
|
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hdr.log2_big_block_size = ole2_endian_convert_16(hdr.log2_big_block_size);
|
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hdr.log2_small_block_size = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.log2_small_block_size);
|
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hdr.bat_count = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.bat_count);
|
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hdr.prop_start = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.prop_start);
|
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|
hdr.sbat_cutoff = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.sbat_cutoff);
|
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hdr.sbat_start = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.sbat_start);
|
|
|
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hdr.sbat_block_count = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.sbat_block_count);
|
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hdr.xbat_start = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.xbat_start);
|
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hdr.xbat_count = ole2_endian_convert_32(hdr.xbat_count);
|
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|
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hdr.sbat_root_start = -1;
|
|
|
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|
hdr.bitset = cli_bitset_init();
|
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|
if (!hdr.bitset) {
|
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|
ret = CL_EMEM;
|
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|
goto done;
|
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|
}
|
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|
if (memcmp(hdr.magic, magic_id, 8) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 magic failed!\n");
|
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|
|
ret = CL_EFORMAT;
|
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|
goto done;
|
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}
|
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if (hdr.log2_big_block_size < 6 || hdr.log2_big_block_size > 28) {
|
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|
// The big block size (aka Sector Shift) is expected to be:
|
|
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|
// - 9 for Major Version 3
|
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// - 12 for Major Version 4
|
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// - TBD for Major Version 5?
|
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// To allow for future changes, and prevent overflowing an int32_t, we're limiting to 28.
|
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|
cli_dbgmsg("CAN'T PARSE: Invalid big block size (2^%u)\n", hdr.log2_big_block_size);
|
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|
goto done;
|
|
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|
}
|
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|
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if (!hdr.log2_small_block_size || hdr.log2_small_block_size > hdr.log2_big_block_size) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("CAN'T PARSE: Invalid small block size (2^%u)\n", hdr.log2_small_block_size);
|
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|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hdr.sbat_cutoff != 4096) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("WARNING: Untested sbat cutoff (%u); data may not extract correctly\n", hdr.sbat_cutoff);
|
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|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr.map->len > INT32_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2 extract: Overflow detected\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EFORMAT;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* determine if encrypted with VelvetSweatshop password */
|
|
|
|
encryption_offset = 4 * (1 << hdr.log2_big_block_size);
|
|
|
|
if ((encryption_offset + sizeof(encryption_info_stream_standard_t)) <= hdr.m_length) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bEncrypted = initialize_encryption_key(
|
|
|
|
&(((const uint8_t *)phdr)[encryption_offset]),
|
|
|
|
hdr.m_length - encryption_offset,
|
|
|
|
&key, &encryption_status);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* 8 SBAT blocks per file block */
|
|
|
|
hdr.max_block_no = (hdr.map->len - MAX(512, 1 << hdr.log2_big_block_size)) / (1 << hdr.log2_small_block_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
print_ole2_header(&hdr);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("Max block number: %lu\n", (unsigned long int)hdr.max_block_no);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* PASS 1 : Count files and check for VBA */
|
|
|
|
hdr.has_vba = false;
|
|
|
|
hdr.has_xlm = false;
|
|
|
|
hdr.has_image = false;
|
|
|
|
ret = ole2_walk_property_tree(&hdr, NULL, 0, handler_enum, 0, &file_count, ctx, &scansize, NULL, &encryption_status);
|
|
|
|
cli_bitset_free(hdr.bitset);
|
|
|
|
hdr.bitset = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!file_count || !(hdr.bitset = cli_bitset_init())) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr.is_hwp) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: identified HWP document\n");
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: HWP version: 0x%08x\n", hdr.is_hwp->version);
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: HWP flags: 0x%08x\n", hdr.is_hwp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = cli_hwp5header(ctx, hdr.is_hwp);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != CL_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If there's no VBA we scan OTF */
|
|
|
|
if (hdr.has_vba || hdr.has_xlm || hdr.has_image) {
|
|
|
|
/* PASS 2/A : VBA scan */
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: VBA project found\n");
|
|
|
|
if (!(hdr.U = uniq_init(file_count))) {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: uniq_init() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_EMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
file_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
ole2_walk_property_tree(&hdr, dirname, 0, handler_writefile, 0, &file_count, ctx, &scansize2, NULL, &encryption_status);
|
|
|
|
ret = CL_CLEAN;
|
|
|
|
*files = hdr.U;
|
|
|
|
if (has_vba) {
|
|
|
|
*has_vba = hdr.has_vba;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (has_xlm) {
|
|
|
|
*has_xlm = hdr.has_xlm;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (has_image) {
|
|
|
|
*has_image = hdr.has_image;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_dbgmsg("OLE2: no VBA projects found\n");
|
|
|
|
/* PASS 2/B : OTF scan */
|
|
|
|
file_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (bEncrypted) {
|
|
|
|
ret = ole2_walk_property_tree(&hdr, NULL, 0, handler_otf_encrypted, 0, &file_count, ctx, &scansize2, &key, &encryption_status);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ret = ole2_walk_property_tree(&hdr, NULL, 0, handler_otf, 0, &file_count, ctx, &scansize2, NULL, &encryption_status);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_COLLECT_METADATA && (ctx->wrkproperty != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
if (encryption_status.encrypted) {
|
|
|
|
if (encryption_status.encryption_type) {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(ctx->wrkproperty, ENCRYPTED_JSON_KEY, encryption_status.encryption_type);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cli_jsonstr(ctx->wrkproperty, ENCRYPTED_JSON_KEY, GENERIC_ENCRYPTED);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SCAN_HEURISTIC_ENCRYPTED_DOC && encryption_status.encrypted && (!encryption_status.velvet_sweatshop)) {
|
|
|
|
cl_error_t status = cli_append_potentially_unwanted(ctx, OLE2_HEURISTIC_ENCRYPTED_WARNING);
|
|
|
|
if (CL_SUCCESS != status) {
|
|
|
|
cli_errmsg("OLE2 : Unable to warn potentially unwanted signature '%s'\n", "Heuristics.Encrypted.OLE2");
|
|
|
|
ret = status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr.bitset) {
|
|
|
|
cli_bitset_free(hdr.bitset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hdr.is_hwp) {
|
|
|
|
free(hdr.is_hwp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret == CL_BREAK ? CL_CLEAN : ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|