Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rewrite/rowsecurity.c
|
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes
As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity
pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This
patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to
match the new catalog name.
The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also
pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and
re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY
processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we
finish planning out the query which has been built.
Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries
for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various
places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the
ability to COMMENT on policies.
In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments,
and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of
'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor
of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate.
Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
|
|
|
* Routines to support policies for row level security (aka RLS).
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Policies in PostgreSQL provide a mechanism to limit what records are
|
|
|
|
* returned to a user and what records a user is permitted to add to a table.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Policies can be defined for specific roles, specific commands, or provided
|
|
|
|
* by an extension. Row security can also be enabled for a table without any
|
|
|
|
* policies being explicitly defined, in which case a default-deny policy is
|
|
|
|
* applied.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Any part of the system which is returning records back to the user, or
|
|
|
|
* which is accepting records from the user to add to a table, needs to
|
|
|
|
* consider the policies associated with the table (if any). For normal
|
|
|
|
* queries, this is handled by calling prepend_row_security_policies() during
|
|
|
|
* rewrite, which looks at each RTE and adds the expressions defined by the
|
|
|
|
* policies to the securityQuals list for the RTE. For queries which modify
|
|
|
|
* the relation, any WITH CHECK policies are added to the list of
|
|
|
|
* WithCheckOptions for the Query and checked against each row which is being
|
|
|
|
* added to the table. Other parts of the system (eg: COPY) simply construct
|
|
|
|
* a normal query and use that, if RLS is to be applied.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The check to see if RLS should be enabled is provided through
|
|
|
|
* check_enable_rls(), which returns an enum (defined in rowsecurity.h) to
|
|
|
|
* indicate if RLS should be enabled (RLS_ENABLED), or bypassed (RLS_NONE or
|
|
|
|
* RLS_NONE_ENV). RLS_NONE_ENV indicates that RLS should be bypassed
|
|
|
|
* in the current environment, but that may change if the row_security GUC or
|
|
|
|
* the current role changes.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2015, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "postgres.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "access/heapam.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "access/htup_details.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "access/sysattr.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_class.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_inherits_fn.h"
|
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes
As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity
pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This
patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to
match the new catalog name.
The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also
pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and
re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY
processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we
finish planning out the query which has been built.
Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries
for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various
places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the
ability to COMMENT on policies.
In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments,
and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of
'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor
of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate.
Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_policy.h"
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
#include "catalog/pg_type.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "miscadmin.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "nodes/makefuncs.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "nodes/nodeFuncs.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "nodes/plannodes.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "parser/parsetree.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "rewrite/rewriteHandler.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "rewrite/rewriteManip.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "rewrite/rowsecurity.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/acl.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/lsyscache.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/rel.h"
|
Fix column-privilege leak in error-message paths
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
11 years ago
|
|
|
#include "utils/rls.h"
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
#include "utils/syscache.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "tcop/utility.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static List *pull_row_security_policies(CmdType cmd, Relation relation,
|
|
|
|
Oid user_id);
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
static void process_policies(Query* root, List *policies, int rt_index,
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
Expr **final_qual,
|
|
|
|
Expr **final_with_check_qual,
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
bool *hassublinks,
|
|
|
|
BoolExprType boolop);
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
static bool check_role_for_policy(ArrayType *policy_roles, Oid user_id);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* hooks to allow extensions to add their own security policies
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* row_security_policy_hook_permissive can be used to add policies which
|
|
|
|
* are included in the "OR"d set of policies.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* row_security_policy_hook_restrictive can be used to add policies which
|
|
|
|
* are enforced, regardless of other policies (they are "AND"d).
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* See below where the hook is called in prepend_row_security_policies for
|
|
|
|
* insight into how to use this hook.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
row_security_policy_hook_type row_security_policy_hook_permissive = NULL;
|
|
|
|
row_security_policy_hook_type row_security_policy_hook_restrictive = NULL;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* Get any row security quals and check quals that should be applied to the
|
|
|
|
* specified RTE.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* In addition, hasRowSecurity is set to true if row level security is enabled
|
|
|
|
* (even if this RTE doesn't have any row security quals), and hasSubLinks is
|
|
|
|
* set to true if any of the quals returned contain sublinks.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
get_row_security_policies(Query* root, RangeTblEntry* rte, int rt_index,
|
|
|
|
List **securityQuals, List **withCheckOptions,
|
|
|
|
bool *hasRowSecurity, bool *hasSubLinks)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Expr *rowsec_expr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Expr *rowsec_with_check_expr = NULL;
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
Expr *hook_expr_restrictive = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Expr *hook_with_check_expr_restrictive = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Expr *hook_expr_permissive = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Expr *hook_with_check_expr_permissive = NULL;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
List *rowsec_policies;
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
List *hook_policies_restrictive = NIL;
|
|
|
|
List *hook_policies_permissive = NIL;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Relation rel;
|
|
|
|
Oid user_id;
|
|
|
|
int sec_context;
|
|
|
|
int rls_status;
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
bool defaultDeny = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Defaults for the return values */
|
|
|
|
*securityQuals = NIL;
|
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = NIL;
|
|
|
|
*hasRowSecurity = false;
|
|
|
|
*hasSubLinks = false;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is just to get the security context */
|
|
|
|
GetUserIdAndSecContext(&user_id, &sec_context);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Switch to checkAsUser if it's set */
|
|
|
|
user_id = rte->checkAsUser ? rte->checkAsUser : GetUserId();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this is not a normal relation, or we have been told
|
|
|
|
* to explicitly skip RLS (perhaps because this is an FK check)
|
|
|
|
* then just return immediately.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rte->relid < FirstNormalObjectId
|
|
|
|
|| rte->relkind != RELKIND_RELATION
|
|
|
|
|| (sec_context & SECURITY_ROW_LEVEL_DISABLED))
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
return;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Determine the state of RLS for this, pass checkAsUser explicitly */
|
Fix column-privilege leak in error-message paths
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
11 years ago
|
|
|
rls_status = check_enable_rls(rte->relid, rte->checkAsUser, false);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If there is no RLS on this table at all, nothing to do */
|
|
|
|
if (rls_status == RLS_NONE)
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
return;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* RLS_NONE_ENV means we are not doing any RLS now, but that may change
|
|
|
|
* with changes to the environment, so we mark it as hasRowSecurity to
|
|
|
|
* force a re-plan when the environment changes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rls_status == RLS_NONE_ENV)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Indicate that this query may involve RLS and must therefore
|
|
|
|
* be replanned if the environment changes (GUCs, role), but we
|
|
|
|
* are not adding anything here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*hasRowSecurity = true;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
return;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Grab the built-in policies which should be applied to this relation. */
|
|
|
|
rel = heap_open(rte->relid, NoLock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rowsec_policies = pull_row_security_policies(root->commandType, rel,
|
|
|
|
user_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if this is only the default-deny policy.
|
|
|
|
*
|
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes
As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity
pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This
patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to
match the new catalog name.
The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also
pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and
re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY
processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we
finish planning out the query which has been built.
Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries
for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various
places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the
ability to COMMENT on policies.
In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments,
and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of
'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor
of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate.
Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
|
|
|
* Normally, if the table has row security enabled but there are
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* no policies, we use a default-deny policy and not allow anything.
|
|
|
|
* However, when an extension uses the hook to add their own
|
|
|
|
* policies, we don't want to include the default deny policy or
|
|
|
|
* there won't be any way for a user to use an extension exclusively
|
|
|
|
* for the policies to be used.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes
As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity
pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This
patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to
match the new catalog name.
The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also
pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and
re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY
processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we
finish planning out the query which has been built.
Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries
for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various
places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the
ability to COMMENT on policies.
In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments,
and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of
'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor
of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate.
Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (((RowSecurityPolicy *) linitial(rowsec_policies))->policy_id
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
== InvalidOid)
|
|
|
|
defaultDeny = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now that we have our policies, build the expressions from them. */
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
process_policies(root, rowsec_policies, rt_index, &rowsec_expr,
|
|
|
|
&rowsec_with_check_expr, hasSubLinks, OR_EXPR);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Also, allow extensions to add their own policies.
|
|
|
|
*
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* extensions can add either permissive or restrictive policies.
|
|
|
|
*
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* Note that, as with the internal policies, if multiple policies are
|
|
|
|
* returned then they will be combined into a single expression with
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* all of them OR'd (for permissive) or AND'd (for restrictive) together.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If only a USING policy is returned by the extension then it will be
|
|
|
|
* used for WITH CHECK as well, similar to how internal policies are
|
|
|
|
* handled.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The only caveat to this is that if there are NO internal policies
|
|
|
|
* defined, there ARE policies returned by the extension, and RLS is
|
|
|
|
* enabled on the table, then we will ignore the internally-generated
|
|
|
|
* default-deny policy and use only the policies returned by the
|
|
|
|
* extension.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (row_security_policy_hook_restrictive)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
hook_policies_restrictive = (*row_security_policy_hook_restrictive)(root->commandType, rel);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build the expression from any policies returned. */
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (hook_policies_restrictive != NIL)
|
|
|
|
process_policies(root, hook_policies_restrictive, rt_index,
|
|
|
|
&hook_expr_restrictive,
|
|
|
|
&hook_with_check_expr_restrictive,
|
|
|
|
hasSubLinks,
|
|
|
|
AND_EXPR);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (row_security_policy_hook_permissive)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hook_policies_permissive = (*row_security_policy_hook_permissive)(root->commandType, rel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build the expression from any policies returned. */
|
|
|
|
if (hook_policies_permissive != NIL)
|
|
|
|
process_policies(root, hook_policies_permissive, rt_index,
|
|
|
|
&hook_expr_permissive,
|
|
|
|
&hook_with_check_expr_permissive, hasSubLinks,
|
|
|
|
OR_EXPR);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the only built-in policy is the default-deny one, and hook
|
|
|
|
* policies exist, then use the hook policies only and do not apply
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* the default-deny policy. Otherwise, we will apply both sets below.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (defaultDeny &&
|
|
|
|
(hook_policies_restrictive != NIL || hook_policies_permissive != NIL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
rowsec_expr = NULL;
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
rowsec_with_check_expr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For INSERT or UPDATE, we need to add the WITH CHECK quals to
|
|
|
|
* Query's withCheckOptions to verify that any new records pass the
|
|
|
|
* WITH CHECK policy (this will be a copy of the USING policy, if no
|
|
|
|
* explicit WITH CHECK policy exists).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (root->commandType == CMD_INSERT || root->commandType == CMD_UPDATE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* WITH CHECK OPTIONS wants a WCO node which wraps each Expr, so
|
|
|
|
* create them as necessary.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Handle any restrictive policies first.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* They can simply be added.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (hook_with_check_expr_restrictive)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WithCheckOption *wco;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wco = (WithCheckOption *) makeNode(WithCheckOption);
|
|
|
|
wco->viewname = pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel));
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) hook_with_check_expr_restrictive;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
wco->cascaded = false;
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = lappend(*withCheckOptions, wco);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* Handle built-in policies, if there are no permissive
|
|
|
|
* policies from the hook.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (rowsec_with_check_expr && !hook_with_check_expr_permissive)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WithCheckOption *wco;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wco = (WithCheckOption *) makeNode(WithCheckOption);
|
|
|
|
wco->viewname = pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel));
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) rowsec_with_check_expr;
|
|
|
|
wco->cascaded = false;
|
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = lappend(*withCheckOptions, wco);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handle the hook policies, if there are no built-in ones. */
|
|
|
|
else if (!rowsec_with_check_expr && hook_with_check_expr_permissive)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WithCheckOption *wco;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wco = (WithCheckOption *) makeNode(WithCheckOption);
|
|
|
|
wco->viewname = pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel));
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) hook_with_check_expr_permissive;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
wco->cascaded = false;
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = lappend(*withCheckOptions, wco);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handle the case where there are both. */
|
|
|
|
else if (rowsec_with_check_expr && hook_with_check_expr_permissive)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WithCheckOption *wco;
|
|
|
|
List *combined_quals = NIL;
|
|
|
|
Expr *combined_qual_eval;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
combined_quals = lcons(copyObject(rowsec_with_check_expr), combined_quals);
|
|
|
|
combined_quals = lcons(copyObject(hook_with_check_expr_permissive), combined_quals);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
combined_qual_eval = makeBoolExpr(OR_EXPR, combined_quals, -1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wco = (WithCheckOption *) makeNode(WithCheckOption);
|
|
|
|
wco->viewname = pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel));
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) combined_qual_eval;
|
|
|
|
wco->cascaded = false;
|
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = lappend(*withCheckOptions, wco);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE, set the security quals */
|
|
|
|
if (root->commandType == CMD_SELECT
|
|
|
|
|| root->commandType == CMD_UPDATE
|
|
|
|
|| root->commandType == CMD_DELETE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
/* restrictive policies can simply be added to the list first */
|
|
|
|
if (hook_expr_restrictive)
|
|
|
|
*securityQuals = lappend(*securityQuals, hook_expr_restrictive);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we only have internal permissive, then just add those */
|
|
|
|
if (rowsec_expr && !hook_expr_permissive)
|
|
|
|
*securityQuals = lappend(*securityQuals, rowsec_expr);
|
|
|
|
/* .. and if we have only permissive policies from the hook */
|
|
|
|
else if (!rowsec_expr && hook_expr_permissive)
|
|
|
|
*securityQuals = lappend(*securityQuals, hook_expr_permissive);
|
|
|
|
/* if we have both, we have to combine them with an OR */
|
|
|
|
else if (rowsec_expr && hook_expr_permissive)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
List *combined_quals = NIL;
|
|
|
|
Expr *combined_qual_eval;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
combined_quals = lcons(copyObject(rowsec_expr), combined_quals);
|
|
|
|
combined_quals = lcons(copyObject(hook_expr_permissive), combined_quals);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
combined_qual_eval = makeBoolExpr(OR_EXPR, combined_quals, -1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*securityQuals = lappend(*securityQuals, combined_qual_eval);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
heap_close(rel, NoLock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Mark this query as having row security, so plancache can invalidate
|
|
|
|
* it when necessary (eg: role changes)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*hasRowSecurity = true;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
return;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pull_row_security_policies
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the list of policies to be added for this relation, based on the
|
|
|
|
* type of command and the roles to which it applies, from the relation cache.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static List *
|
|
|
|
pull_row_security_policies(CmdType cmd, Relation relation, Oid user_id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
List *policies = NIL;
|
|
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Row security is enabled for the relation and the row security GUC is
|
|
|
|
* either 'on' or 'force' here, so find the policies to apply to the table.
|
|
|
|
* There must always be at least one policy defined (may be the simple
|
|
|
|
* 'default-deny' policy, if none are explicitly defined on the table).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Clean up includes from RLS patch
The initial patch for RLS mistakenly included headers associated with
the executor and planner bits in rewrite/rowsecurity.h. Per policy and
general good sense, executor headers should not be included in planner
headers or vice versa.
The include of execnodes.h was a mistaken holdover from previous
versions, while the include of relation.h was used for Relation's
definition, which should have been coming from utils/relcache.h. This
patch cleans these issues up, adds comments to the RowSecurityPolicy
struct and the RowSecurityConfigType enum, and changes Relation->rsdesc
to Relation->rd_rsdesc to follow Relation field naming convention.
Additionally, utils/rel.h was including rewrite/rowsecurity.h, which
wasn't a great idea since that was pulling in things not really needed
in utils/rel.h (which gets included in quite a few places). Instead,
use 'struct RowSecurityDesc' for the rd_rsdesc field and add comments
explaining why.
Lastly, add an include into access/nbtree/nbtsort.c for
utils/sortsupport.h, which was evidently missed due to the above mess.
Pointed out by Tom in 16970.1415838651@sss.pgh.pa.us; note that the
concerns regarding a similar situation in the custom-path commit still
need to be addressed.
11 years ago
|
|
|
foreach(item, relation->rd_rsdesc->policies)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Always add ALL policies, if they exist. */
|
|
|
|
if (policy->polcmd == '*' &&
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
policies = lcons(policy, policies);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add relevant command-specific policies to the list. */
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
switch(cmd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case CMD_SELECT:
|
|
|
|
if (policy->polcmd == ACL_SELECT_CHR
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
policies = lcons(policy, policies);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CMD_INSERT:
|
|
|
|
/* If INSERT then only need to add the WITH CHECK qual */
|
|
|
|
if (policy->polcmd == ACL_INSERT_CHR
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
policies = lcons(policy, policies);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CMD_UPDATE:
|
|
|
|
if (policy->polcmd == ACL_UPDATE_CHR
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
policies = lcons(policy, policies);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CMD_DELETE:
|
|
|
|
if (policy->polcmd == ACL_DELETE_CHR
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
policies = lcons(policy, policies);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized policy command type %d", (int) cmd);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* There should always be a policy applied. If there are none found then
|
|
|
|
* create a simply defauly-deny policy (might be that policies exist but
|
|
|
|
* that none of them apply to the role which is querying the table).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (policies == NIL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Datum role;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
role = ObjectIdGetDatum(ACL_ID_PUBLIC);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
policy = palloc0(sizeof(RowSecurityPolicy));
|
|
|
|
policy->policy_name = pstrdup("default-deny policy");
|
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes
As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity
pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This
patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to
match the new catalog name.
The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also
pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and
re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY
processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we
finish planning out the query which has been built.
Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries
for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various
places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the
ability to COMMENT on policies.
In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments,
and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of
'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor
of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate.
Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
|
|
|
policy->policy_id = InvalidOid;
|
|
|
|
policy->polcmd = '*';
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
policy->roles = construct_array(&role, 1, OIDOID, sizeof(Oid), true,
|
|
|
|
'i');
|
|
|
|
policy->qual = (Expr *) makeConst(BOOLOID, -1, InvalidOid,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(bool), BoolGetDatum(false),
|
|
|
|
false, true);
|
|
|
|
policy->with_check_qual = copyObject(policy->qual);
|
|
|
|
policy->hassublinks = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
policies = list_make1(policy);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Assert(policies != NIL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return policies;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* process_policies
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This will step through the policies which are passed in (which would come
|
|
|
|
* from either the built-in ones created on a table, or from policies provided
|
|
|
|
* by an extension through the hook provided), work out how to combine them,
|
|
|
|
* rewrite them as necessary, and produce an Expr for the normal security
|
|
|
|
* quals and an Expr for the with check quals.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* qual_eval, with_check_eval, and hassublinks are output variables
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
process_policies(Query* root, List *policies, int rt_index, Expr **qual_eval,
|
|
|
|
Expr **with_check_eval, bool *hassublinks,
|
|
|
|
BoolExprType boolop)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
|
|
|
List *quals = NIL;
|
|
|
|
List *with_check_quals = NIL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Extract the USING and WITH CHECK quals from each of the policies
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* and add them to our lists. We only want WITH CHECK quals if this
|
|
|
|
* RTE is the query's result relation.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
foreach(item, policies)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (policy->qual != NULL)
|
|
|
|
quals = lcons(copyObject(policy->qual), quals);
|
|
|
|
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (policy->with_check_qual != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
rt_index == root->resultRelation)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
with_check_quals = lcons(copyObject(policy->with_check_qual),
|
|
|
|
with_check_quals);
|
|
|
|
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For each policy, if there is only a USING clause then copy/use it for
|
|
|
|
* the WITH CHECK policy also, if this RTE is the query's result
|
|
|
|
* relation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (policy->qual != NULL && policy->with_check_qual == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
rt_index == root->resultRelation)
|
|
|
|
with_check_quals = lcons(copyObject(policy->qual),
|
|
|
|
with_check_quals);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (policy->hassublinks)
|
|
|
|
*hassublinks = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we end up without any normal quals (perhaps the only policy matched
|
|
|
|
* was for INSERT), then create a single all-false one.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (quals == NIL)
|
|
|
|
quals = lcons(makeConst(BOOLOID, -1, InvalidOid, sizeof(bool),
|
|
|
|
BoolGetDatum(false), false, true), quals);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Row security quals always have the target table as varno 1, as no
|
|
|
|
* joins are permitted in row security expressions. We must walk the
|
|
|
|
* expression, updating any references to varno 1 to the varno
|
|
|
|
* the table has in the outer query.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We rewrite the expression in-place.
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We must have some quals at this point; the default-deny policy, if
|
|
|
|
* nothing else. Note that we might not have any WITH CHECK quals-
|
|
|
|
* that's fine, as this might not be the resultRelation.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*/
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
Assert(quals != NIL);
|
|
|
|
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
ChangeVarNodes((Node *) quals, 1, rt_index, 0);
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (with_check_quals != NIL)
|
|
|
|
ChangeVarNodes((Node *) with_check_quals, 1, rt_index, 0);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If more than one security qual is returned, then they need to be
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* combined together.
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (list_length(quals) > 1)
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*qual_eval = makeBoolExpr(boolop, quals, -1);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*qual_eval = (Expr*) linitial(quals);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
* Similairly, if more than one WITH CHECK qual is returned, then
|
|
|
|
* they need to be combined together.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* with_check_quals is allowed to be NIL here since this might not be the
|
|
|
|
* resultRelation (see above).
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (list_length(with_check_quals) > 1)
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*with_check_eval = makeBoolExpr(boolop, with_check_quals, -1);
|
|
|
|
else if (with_check_quals != NIL)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
*with_check_eval = (Expr*) linitial(with_check_quals);
|
RLS fixes, new hooks, and new test module
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
11 years ago
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*with_check_eval = NULL;
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* check_role_for_policy -
|
|
|
|
* determines if the policy should be applied for the current role
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
check_role_for_policy(ArrayType *policy_roles, Oid user_id)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
Oid *roles = (Oid *) ARR_DATA_PTR(policy_roles);
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Quick fall-thru for policies applied to all roles */
|
|
|
|
if (roles[0] == ACL_ID_PUBLIC)
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARR_DIMS(policy_roles)[0]; i++)
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
Code review for row security.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
|
|
|
if (has_privs_of_role(user_id, roles[i]))
|
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS)
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|