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postgres/src/backend/commands/policy.c

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Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* policy.c
* Commands for manipulating policies.
*
Update copyright for 2015 Backpatch certain files through 9.0
11 years ago
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2015, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* src/backend/commands/policy.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include "access/genam.h"
#include "access/heapam.h"
#include "access/htup.h"
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "access/sysattr.h"
#include "catalog/catalog.h"
#include "catalog/dependency.h"
#include "catalog/indexing.h"
#include "catalog/namespace.h"
#include "catalog/objectaccess.h"
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
#include "catalog/pg_policy.h"
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
#include "catalog/pg_type.h"
#include "commands/policy.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "nodes/makefuncs.h"
#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
#include "parser/parse_clause.h"
Add now-required #include. Fixes compiler warning induced by 808ea8fc7bb259ddd810353719cac66e85a608c8.
11 years ago
#include "parser/parse_collate.h"
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
#include "parser/parse_node.h"
#include "parser/parse_relation.h"
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
#include "rewrite/rewriteManip.h"
Clean up includes from RLS patch The initial patch for RLS mistakenly included headers associated with the executor and planner bits in rewrite/rowsecurity.h. Per policy and general good sense, executor headers should not be included in planner headers or vice versa. The include of execnodes.h was a mistaken holdover from previous versions, while the include of relation.h was used for Relation's definition, which should have been coming from utils/relcache.h. This patch cleans these issues up, adds comments to the RowSecurityPolicy struct and the RowSecurityConfigType enum, and changes Relation->rsdesc to Relation->rd_rsdesc to follow Relation field naming convention. Additionally, utils/rel.h was including rewrite/rowsecurity.h, which wasn't a great idea since that was pulling in things not really needed in utils/rel.h (which gets included in quite a few places). Instead, use 'struct RowSecurityDesc' for the rd_rsdesc field and add comments explaining why. Lastly, add an include into access/nbtree/nbtsort.c for utils/sortsupport.h, which was evidently missed due to the above mess. Pointed out by Tom in 16970.1415838651@sss.pgh.pa.us; note that the concerns regarding a similar situation in the custom-path commit still need to be addressed.
11 years ago
#include "rewrite/rowsecurity.h"
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
#include "storage/lock.h"
#include "utils/acl.h"
#include "utils/array.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/fmgroids.h"
#include "utils/inval.h"
#include "utils/lsyscache.h"
#include "utils/memutils.h"
#include "utils/rel.h"
#include "utils/syscache.h"
static void RangeVarCallbackForPolicy(const RangeVar *rv,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Oid relid, Oid oldrelid, void *arg);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
static char parse_policy_command(const char *cmd_name);
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
static Datum *policy_role_list_to_array(List *roles, int *num_roles);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
* Callback to RangeVarGetRelidExtended().
*
* Checks the following:
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* - the relation specified is a table.
* - current user owns the table.
* - the table is not a system table.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*
* If any of these checks fails then an error is raised.
*/
static void
RangeVarCallbackForPolicy(const RangeVar *rv, Oid relid, Oid oldrelid,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
void *arg)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
HeapTuple tuple;
Form_pg_class classform;
char relkind;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
tuple = SearchSysCache1(RELOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(relid));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
return;
classform = (Form_pg_class) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
relkind = classform->relkind;
/* Must own relation. */
if (!pg_class_ownercheck(relid, GetUserId()))
aclcheck_error(ACLCHECK_NOT_OWNER, ACL_KIND_CLASS, rv->relname);
/* No system table modifications unless explicitly allowed. */
if (!allowSystemTableMods && IsSystemClass(relid, classform))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied: \"%s\" is a system catalog",
rv->relname)));
/* Relation type MUST be a table. */
if (relkind != RELKIND_RELATION)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_WRONG_OBJECT_TYPE),
errmsg("\"%s\" is not a table", rv->relname)));
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
}
/*
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
* parse_policy_command -
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* helper function to convert full command strings to their char
* representation.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*
* cmd_name - full string command name. Valid values are 'all', 'select',
* 'insert', 'update' and 'delete'.
*
*/
Fix compiler warning. It is meaningless to declare a pass-by-value return type const.
11 years ago
static char
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
parse_policy_command(const char *cmd_name)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
{
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
char polcmd;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (!cmd_name)
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized policy command");
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (strcmp(cmd_name, "all") == 0)
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd = '*';
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
else if (strcmp(cmd_name, "select") == 0)
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd = ACL_SELECT_CHR;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
else if (strcmp(cmd_name, "insert") == 0)
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd = ACL_INSERT_CHR;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
else if (strcmp(cmd_name, "update") == 0)
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd = ACL_UPDATE_CHR;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
else if (strcmp(cmd_name, "delete") == 0)
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd = ACL_DELETE_CHR;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
else
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized policy command");
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
return polcmd;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
/*
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
* policy_role_list_to_array
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
* helper function to convert a list of RoleSpecs to an array of
* role id Datums.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*/
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
static Datum *
policy_role_list_to_array(List *roles, int *num_roles)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
{
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
Datum *role_oids;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ListCell *cell;
int i = 0;
/* Handle no roles being passed in as being for public */
if (roles == NIL)
{
Suppress "variable may be used uninitialized" warning. Also re-pgindent, just because I'm a neatnik.
11 years ago
*num_roles = 1;
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
role_oids = (Datum *) palloc(*num_roles * sizeof(Datum));
role_oids[0] = ObjectIdGetDatum(ACL_ID_PUBLIC);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
return role_oids;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
Suppress "variable may be used uninitialized" warning. Also re-pgindent, just because I'm a neatnik.
11 years ago
*num_roles = list_length(roles);
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
role_oids = (Datum *) palloc(*num_roles * sizeof(Datum));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
foreach(cell, roles)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RoleSpec *spec = lfirst(cell);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
* PUBLIC covers all roles, so it only makes sense alone.
*/
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as user specifiers in place of an explicit user name. This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards- mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail to work in presence of a role named "current_user". The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent handling now. Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers. Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera. Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
11 years ago
if (spec->roletype == ROLESPEC_PUBLIC)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
{
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
if (*num_roles != 1)
{
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ereport(WARNING,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
Improve some messages
10 years ago
errmsg("ignoring specified roles other than PUBLIC"),
errhint("All roles are members of the PUBLIC role.")));
Suppress "variable may be used uninitialized" warning. Also re-pgindent, just because I'm a neatnik.
11 years ago
*num_roles = 1;
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
}
role_oids[0] = ObjectIdGetDatum(ACL_ID_PUBLIC);
return role_oids;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
else
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
role_oids[i++] =
Allow CURRENT/SESSION_USER to be used in certain commands Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as user specifiers in place of an explicit user name. This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards- mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail to work in presence of a role named "current_user". The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent handling now. Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers. Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera. Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
11 years ago
ObjectIdGetDatum(get_rolespec_oid((Node *) spec, false));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
return role_oids;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
/*
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
* Load row security policy from the catalog, and store it in
* the relation's relcache entry.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*/
void
RelationBuildRowSecurity(Relation relation)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
MemoryContext rscxt;
MemoryContext oldcxt = CurrentMemoryContext;
RowSecurityDesc *volatile rsdesc = NULL;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/*
* Create a memory context to hold everything associated with this
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* relation's row security policy. This makes it easy to clean up during
* a relcache flush.
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
*/
rscxt = AllocSetContextCreate(CacheMemoryContext,
"row security descriptor",
ALLOCSET_SMALL_MINSIZE,
ALLOCSET_SMALL_INITSIZE,
ALLOCSET_SMALL_MAXSIZE);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/*
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* Since rscxt lives under CacheMemoryContext, it is long-lived. Use a
* PG_TRY block to ensure it'll get freed if we fail partway through.
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
*/
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
PG_TRY();
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Relation catalog;
ScanKeyData skey;
SysScanDesc sscan;
HeapTuple tuple;
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
rsdesc = MemoryContextAllocZero(rscxt, sizeof(RowSecurityDesc));
rsdesc->rscxt = rscxt;
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
catalog = heap_open(PolicyRelationId, AccessShareLock);
ScanKeyInit(&skey,
Anum_pg_policy_polrelid,
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(RelationGetRelid(relation)));
sscan = systable_beginscan(catalog, PolicyPolrelidPolnameIndexId, true,
NULL, 1, &skey);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
* Loop through the row level security policies for this relation, if
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
* any.
*/
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Datum value_datum;
char cmd_value;
Datum roles_datum;
char *qual_value;
Expr *qual_expr;
char *with_check_value;
Expr *with_check_qual;
char *policy_name_value;
bool isnull;
RowSecurityPolicy *policy;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/*
* Note: all the pass-by-reference data we collect here is either
* still stored in the tuple, or constructed in the caller's
* short-lived memory context. We must copy it into rscxt
* explicitly below.
*/
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Get policy command */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
value_datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polcmd,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RelationGetDescr(catalog), &isnull);
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
Assert(!isnull);
cmd_value = DatumGetChar(value_datum);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Get policy name */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
value_datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polname,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RelationGetDescr(catalog), &isnull);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Assert(!isnull);
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
policy_name_value = NameStr(*(DatumGetName(value_datum)));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Get policy roles */
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
roles_datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polroles,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RelationGetDescr(catalog), &isnull);
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/* shouldn't be null, but initdb doesn't mark it so, so check */
if (isnull)
elog(ERROR, "unexpected null value in pg_policy.polroles");
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Get policy qual */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
value_datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polqual,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RelationGetDescr(catalog), &isnull);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (!isnull)
{
qual_value = TextDatumGetCString(value_datum);
qual_expr = (Expr *) stringToNode(qual_value);
}
else
qual_expr = NULL;
/* Get WITH CHECK qual */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
value_datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polwithcheck,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RelationGetDescr(catalog), &isnull);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (!isnull)
{
with_check_value = TextDatumGetCString(value_datum);
with_check_qual = (Expr *) stringToNode(with_check_value);
}
else
with_check_qual = NULL;
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/* Now copy everything into the cache context */
MemoryContextSwitchTo(rscxt);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
policy = palloc0(sizeof(RowSecurityPolicy));
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
policy->policy_name = pstrdup(policy_name_value);
policy->polcmd = cmd_value;
policy->roles = DatumGetArrayTypePCopy(roles_datum);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
policy->qual = copyObject(qual_expr);
policy->with_check_qual = copyObject(with_check_qual);
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
policy->hassublinks = checkExprHasSubLink((Node *) qual_expr) ||
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
checkExprHasSubLink((Node *) with_check_qual);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
rsdesc->policies = lcons(policy, rsdesc->policies);
MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/* clean up some (not all) of the junk ... */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (qual_expr != NULL)
pfree(qual_expr);
if (with_check_qual != NULL)
pfree(with_check_qual);
}
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
systable_endscan(sscan);
heap_close(catalog, AccessShareLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
PG_CATCH();
{
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/* Delete rscxt, first making sure it isn't active */
MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
MemoryContextDelete(rscxt);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
PG_RE_THROW();
}
PG_END_TRY();
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
/* Success --- attach the policy descriptor to the relcache entry */
Clean up includes from RLS patch The initial patch for RLS mistakenly included headers associated with the executor and planner bits in rewrite/rowsecurity.h. Per policy and general good sense, executor headers should not be included in planner headers or vice versa. The include of execnodes.h was a mistaken holdover from previous versions, while the include of relation.h was used for Relation's definition, which should have been coming from utils/relcache.h. This patch cleans these issues up, adds comments to the RowSecurityPolicy struct and the RowSecurityConfigType enum, and changes Relation->rsdesc to Relation->rd_rsdesc to follow Relation field naming convention. Additionally, utils/rel.h was including rewrite/rowsecurity.h, which wasn't a great idea since that was pulling in things not really needed in utils/rel.h (which gets included in quite a few places). Instead, use 'struct RowSecurityDesc' for the rd_rsdesc field and add comments explaining why. Lastly, add an include into access/nbtree/nbtsort.c for utils/sortsupport.h, which was evidently missed due to the above mess. Pointed out by Tom in 16970.1415838651@sss.pgh.pa.us; note that the concerns regarding a similar situation in the custom-path commit still need to be addressed.
11 years ago
relation->rd_rsdesc = rsdesc;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
/*
* RemovePolicyById -
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* remove a policy by its OID. If a policy does not exist with the provided
* oid, then an error is raised.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
* policy_id - the oid of the policy.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*/
void
RemovePolicyById(Oid policy_id)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Relation pg_policy_rel;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
SysScanDesc sscan;
ScanKeyData skey[1];
HeapTuple tuple;
Oid relid;
Relation rel;
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
pg_policy_rel = heap_open(PolicyRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
* Find the policy to delete.
*/
ScanKeyInit(&skey[0],
ObjectIdAttributeNumber,
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(policy_id));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_policy_rel, PolicyOidIndexId, true,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
NULL, 1, skey);
tuple = systable_getnext(sscan);
/* If the policy exists, then remove it, otherwise raise an error. */
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
elog(ERROR, "could not find tuple for policy %u", policy_id);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
* Open and exclusive-lock the relation the policy belong to.
*/
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
relid = ((Form_pg_policy) GETSTRUCT(tuple))->polrelid;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
rel = heap_open(relid, AccessExclusiveLock);
if (rel->rd_rel->relkind != RELKIND_RELATION)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_WRONG_OBJECT_TYPE),
errmsg("\"%s\" is not a table",
RelationGetRelationName(rel))));
if (!allowSystemTableMods && IsSystemRelation(rel))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied: \"%s\" is a system catalog",
RelationGetRelationName(rel))));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
simple_heap_delete(pg_policy_rel, &tuple->t_self);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
systable_endscan(sscan);
heap_close(rel, AccessExclusiveLock);
/*
Code review for row security. Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS for me and should resolve the buildfarm error. In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies), rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy, but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore. Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki, Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
* Note that, unlike some of the other flags in pg_class, relrowsecurity
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* is not just an indication of if policies exist. When relrowsecurity is
* set by a user, then all access to the relation must be through a
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
* policy. If no policy is defined for the relation then a default-deny
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
* policy is created and all records are filtered (except for queries from
* the owner).
*/
CacheInvalidateRelcache(rel);
/* Clean up */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
heap_close(pg_policy_rel, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
/*
* CreatePolicy -
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* handles the execution of the CREATE POLICY command.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*
* stmt - the CreatePolicyStmt that describes the policy to create.
*/
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes. Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress is more widely useful. Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument that's an object address which provides further info about the executed command. To wit: * for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of the new constraint * for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the schema that originally contained the object. * for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address of the object added to or dropped from the extension. There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change either. Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
11 years ago
ObjectAddress
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
CreatePolicy(CreatePolicyStmt *stmt)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Relation pg_policy_rel;
Oid policy_id;
Relation target_table;
Oid table_id;
char polcmd;
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
Datum *role_oids;
int nitems = 0;
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
ArrayType *role_ids;
ParseState *qual_pstate;
ParseState *with_check_pstate;
RangeTblEntry *rte;
Node *qual;
Node *with_check_qual;
ScanKeyData skey[2];
SysScanDesc sscan;
HeapTuple policy_tuple;
Datum values[Natts_pg_policy];
bool isnull[Natts_pg_policy];
ObjectAddress target;
ObjectAddress myself;
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
int i;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Parse command */
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd = parse_policy_command(stmt->cmd_name);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
* If the command is SELECT or DELETE then WITH CHECK should be NULL.
*/
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if ((polcmd == ACL_SELECT_CHR || polcmd == ACL_DELETE_CHR)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
&& stmt->with_check != NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
errmsg("WITH CHECK cannot be applied to SELECT or DELETE")));
/*
* If the command is INSERT then WITH CHECK should be the only expression
* provided.
*/
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if (polcmd == ACL_INSERT_CHR && stmt->qual != NULL)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
Code review for row security. Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS for me and should resolve the buildfarm error. In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies), rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy, but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore. Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki, Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
errmsg("only WITH CHECK expression allowed for INSERT")));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Collect role ids */
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
role_oids = policy_role_list_to_array(stmt->roles, &nitems);
role_ids = construct_array(role_oids, nitems, OIDOID,
sizeof(Oid), true, 'i');
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Parse the supplied clause */
qual_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
with_check_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
/* zero-clear */
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
memset(values, 0, sizeof(values));
memset(isnull, 0, sizeof(isnull));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Get id of table. Also handles permissions checks. */
table_id = RangeVarGetRelidExtended(stmt->table, AccessExclusiveLock,
false, false,
RangeVarCallbackForPolicy,
(void *) stmt);
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
/* Open target_table to build quals. No lock is necessary. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
target_table = relation_open(table_id, NoLock);
/* Add for the regular security quals */
rte = addRangeTableEntryForRelation(qual_pstate, target_table,
NULL, false, false);
addRTEtoQuery(qual_pstate, rte, false, true, true);
/* Add for the with-check quals */
rte = addRangeTableEntryForRelation(with_check_pstate, target_table,
NULL, false, false);
addRTEtoQuery(with_check_pstate, rte, false, true, true);
qual = transformWhereClause(qual_pstate,
copyObject(stmt->qual),
Create new ParseExprKind for use by policy expressions. Policy USING and WITH CHECK expressions were using EXPR_KIND_WHERE for parse analysis, which results in inappropriate ERROR messages when the expression contains unsupported constructs such as aggregates. Create a new ParseExprKind called EXPR_KIND_POLICY and tailor the related messages to fit. Reported by Noah Misch. Reviewed by Dean Rasheed, Alvaro Herrera, and Robert Haas. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
EXPR_KIND_POLICY,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
"POLICY");
with_check_qual = transformWhereClause(with_check_pstate,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
copyObject(stmt->with_check),
Create new ParseExprKind for use by policy expressions. Policy USING and WITH CHECK expressions were using EXPR_KIND_WHERE for parse analysis, which results in inappropriate ERROR messages when the expression contains unsupported constructs such as aggregates. Create a new ParseExprKind called EXPR_KIND_POLICY and tailor the related messages to fit. Reported by Noah Misch. Reviewed by Dean Rasheed, Alvaro Herrera, and Robert Haas. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
EXPR_KIND_POLICY,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
"POLICY");
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Add assign_expr_collations() to CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy(). As noted by Noah Misch, CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to call assign_expr_collations() on the node trees. Fix the omission and add his test case to the rowsecurity regression test.
11 years ago
/* Fix up collation information */
assign_expr_collations(qual_pstate, qual);
assign_expr_collations(with_check_pstate, with_check_qual);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Open pg_policy catalog */
pg_policy_rel = heap_open(PolicyRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Set key - policy's relation id. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[0],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polrelid,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(table_id));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Set key - policy's name. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[1],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polname,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_NAMEEQ,
CStringGetDatum(stmt->policy_name));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_policy_rel,
PolicyPolrelidPolnameIndexId, true, NULL, 2,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
skey);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Complain if the policy name already exists for the table */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if (HeapTupleIsValid(policy_tuple))
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
Make RLS related error messages more consistent and compliant. Also updated regression expected output to match. Noted and patch by Daniele Varrazzo.
11 years ago
errmsg("policy \"%s\" for table \"%s\" already exists",
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
stmt->policy_name, RelationGetRelationName(target_table))));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
values[Anum_pg_policy_polrelid - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(table_id);
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
values[Anum_pg_policy_polname - 1] = DirectFunctionCall1(namein,
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
CStringGetDatum(stmt->policy_name));
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
values[Anum_pg_policy_polcmd - 1] = CharGetDatum(polcmd);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
values[Anum_pg_policy_polroles - 1] = PointerGetDatum(role_ids);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Add qual if present. */
if (qual)
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
values[Anum_pg_policy_polqual - 1] = CStringGetTextDatum(nodeToString(qual));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
else
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
isnull[Anum_pg_policy_polqual - 1] = true;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Add WITH CHECK qual if present */
if (with_check_qual)
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
values[Anum_pg_policy_polwithcheck - 1] = CStringGetTextDatum(nodeToString(with_check_qual));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
else
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
isnull[Anum_pg_policy_polwithcheck - 1] = true;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_tuple = heap_form_tuple(RelationGetDescr(pg_policy_rel), values,
isnull);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_id = simple_heap_insert(pg_policy_rel, policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Update Indexes */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_policy_rel, policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Record Dependencies */
target.classId = RelationRelationId;
target.objectId = table_id;
target.objectSubId = 0;
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
myself.classId = PolicyRelationId;
myself.objectId = policy_id;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
myself.objectSubId = 0;
recordDependencyOn(&myself, &target, DEPENDENCY_AUTO);
recordDependencyOnExpr(&myself, qual, qual_pstate->p_rtable,
DEPENDENCY_NORMAL);
recordDependencyOnExpr(&myself, with_check_qual,
with_check_pstate->p_rtable, DEPENDENCY_NORMAL);
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
/* Register role dependencies */
target.classId = AuthIdRelationId;
target.objectSubId = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nitems; i++)
{
target.objectId = DatumGetObjectId(role_oids[i]);
/* no dependency if public */
if (target.objectId != ACL_ID_PUBLIC)
recordSharedDependencyOn(&myself, &target,
SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY);
}
Add missing post create and alter hooks to policy objects. AlterPolicy() and CreatePolicy() lacked their respective hook invocations. Noted by Noah Misch, review by Dean Rasheed. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
InvokeObjectPostCreateHook(PolicyRelationId, policy_id, 0);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Invalidate Relation Cache */
CacheInvalidateRelcache(target_table);
/* Clean up. */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
heap_freetuple(policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
free_parsestate(qual_pstate);
free_parsestate(with_check_pstate);
systable_endscan(sscan);
relation_close(target_table, NoLock);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
heap_close(pg_policy_rel, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes. Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress is more widely useful. Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument that's an object address which provides further info about the executed command. To wit: * for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of the new constraint * for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the schema that originally contained the object. * for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address of the object added to or dropped from the extension. There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change either. Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
11 years ago
return myself;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
/*
* AlterPolicy -
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* handles the execution of the ALTER POLICY command.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*
* stmt - the AlterPolicyStmt that describes the policy and how to alter it.
*/
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes. Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress is more widely useful. Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument that's an object address which provides further info about the executed command. To wit: * for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of the new constraint * for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the schema that originally contained the object. * for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address of the object added to or dropped from the extension. There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change either. Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
11 years ago
ObjectAddress
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
AlterPolicy(AlterPolicyStmt *stmt)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Relation pg_policy_rel;
Oid policy_id;
Relation target_table;
Oid table_id;
Suppress "variable may be used uninitialized" warning. Also re-pgindent, just because I'm a neatnik.
11 years ago
Datum *role_oids = NULL;
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
int nitems = 0;
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
ArrayType *role_ids = NULL;
List *qual_parse_rtable = NIL;
List *with_check_parse_rtable = NIL;
Node *qual = NULL;
Node *with_check_qual = NULL;
ScanKeyData skey[2];
SysScanDesc sscan;
HeapTuple policy_tuple;
HeapTuple new_tuple;
Datum values[Natts_pg_policy];
bool isnull[Natts_pg_policy];
bool replaces[Natts_pg_policy];
ObjectAddress target;
ObjectAddress myself;
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
Datum polcmd_datum;
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
char polcmd;
bool polcmd_isnull;
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
int i;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Parse role_ids */
if (stmt->roles != NULL)
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
{
role_oids = policy_role_list_to_array(stmt->roles, &nitems);
role_ids = construct_array(role_oids, nitems, OIDOID,
sizeof(Oid), true, 'i');
}
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Get id of table. Also handles permissions checks. */
table_id = RangeVarGetRelidExtended(stmt->table, AccessExclusiveLock,
false, false,
RangeVarCallbackForPolicy,
(void *) stmt);
target_table = relation_open(table_id, NoLock);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Parse the using policy clause */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (stmt->qual)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RangeTblEntry *rte;
ParseState *qual_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
rte = addRangeTableEntryForRelation(qual_pstate, target_table,
NULL, false, false);
addRTEtoQuery(qual_pstate, rte, false, true, true);
qual = transformWhereClause(qual_pstate, copyObject(stmt->qual),
Create new ParseExprKind for use by policy expressions. Policy USING and WITH CHECK expressions were using EXPR_KIND_WHERE for parse analysis, which results in inappropriate ERROR messages when the expression contains unsupported constructs such as aggregates. Create a new ParseExprKind called EXPR_KIND_POLICY and tailor the related messages to fit. Reported by Noah Misch. Reviewed by Dean Rasheed, Alvaro Herrera, and Robert Haas. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
EXPR_KIND_POLICY,
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
"POLICY");
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Add assign_expr_collations() to CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy(). As noted by Noah Misch, CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to call assign_expr_collations() on the node trees. Fix the omission and add his test case to the rowsecurity regression test.
11 years ago
/* Fix up collation information */
assign_expr_collations(qual_pstate, qual);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
qual_parse_rtable = qual_pstate->p_rtable;
free_parsestate(qual_pstate);
}
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Parse the with-check policy clause */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (stmt->with_check)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
RangeTblEntry *rte;
ParseState *with_check_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
rte = addRangeTableEntryForRelation(with_check_pstate, target_table,
NULL, false, false);
addRTEtoQuery(with_check_pstate, rte, false, true, true);
with_check_qual = transformWhereClause(with_check_pstate,
copyObject(stmt->with_check),
Create new ParseExprKind for use by policy expressions. Policy USING and WITH CHECK expressions were using EXPR_KIND_WHERE for parse analysis, which results in inappropriate ERROR messages when the expression contains unsupported constructs such as aggregates. Create a new ParseExprKind called EXPR_KIND_POLICY and tailor the related messages to fit. Reported by Noah Misch. Reviewed by Dean Rasheed, Alvaro Herrera, and Robert Haas. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
EXPR_KIND_POLICY,
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
"POLICY");
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Add assign_expr_collations() to CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy(). As noted by Noah Misch, CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to call assign_expr_collations() on the node trees. Fix the omission and add his test case to the rowsecurity regression test.
11 years ago
/* Fix up collation information */
assign_expr_collations(with_check_pstate, with_check_qual);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
with_check_parse_rtable = with_check_pstate->p_rtable;
free_parsestate(with_check_pstate);
}
/* zero-clear */
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
memset(values, 0, sizeof(values));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
memset(replaces, 0, sizeof(replaces));
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
memset(isnull, 0, sizeof(isnull));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Find policy to update. */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
pg_policy_rel = heap_open(PolicyRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Set key - policy's relation id. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[0],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polrelid,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(table_id));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Set key - policy's name. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[1],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polname,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_NAMEEQ,
CStringGetDatum(stmt->policy_name));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_policy_rel,
PolicyPolrelidPolnameIndexId, true, NULL, 2,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
skey);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Check that the policy is found, raise an error if not. */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(policy_tuple))
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
Make RLS related error messages more consistent and compliant. Also updated regression expected output to match. Noted and patch by Daniele Varrazzo.
11 years ago
errmsg("policy \"%s\" for table \"%s\" does not exist",
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
stmt->policy_name,
RelationGetRelationName(target_table))));
/* Get policy command */
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd_datum = heap_getattr(policy_tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polcmd,
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
RelationGetDescr(pg_policy_rel),
&polcmd_isnull);
Clean up some mess in row-security patches. Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it "volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing a single assignment before entering the TRY block. I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL. Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were, and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too. This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
11 years ago
Assert(!polcmd_isnull);
Rename 'cmd' to 'cmd_name' in CreatePolicyStmt To avoid confusion, rename CreatePolicyStmt's 'cmd' to 'cmd_name', parse_policy_command's 'cmd' to 'polcmd', and AlterPolicy's 'cmd_datum' to 'polcmd_datum', per discussion with Noah and as a follow-up to his correction of copynodes/equalnodes handling of the CreatePolicyStmt 'cmd' field. Back-patch to 9.5 where the CreatePolicyStmt was introduced, as we are still only in alpha.
10 years ago
polcmd = DatumGetChar(polcmd_datum);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
* If the command is SELECT or DELETE then WITH CHECK should be NULL.
*/
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if ((polcmd == ACL_SELECT_CHR || polcmd == ACL_DELETE_CHR)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
&& stmt->with_check != NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
errmsg("only USING expression allowed for SELECT, DELETE")));
/*
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* If the command is INSERT then WITH CHECK should be the only expression
* provided.
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*/
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if ((polcmd == ACL_INSERT_CHR)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
&& stmt->qual != NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
errmsg("only WITH CHECK expression allowed for INSERT")));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_id = HeapTupleGetOid(policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (role_ids != NULL)
{
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
replaces[Anum_pg_policy_polroles - 1] = true;
values[Anum_pg_policy_polroles - 1] = PointerGetDatum(role_ids);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
Handle dependencies properly in ALTER POLICY ALTER POLICY hadn't fully considered partial policy alternation (eg: change just the roles on the policy, or just change one of the expressions) when rebuilding the dependencies. Instead, it would happily remove all dependencies which existed for the policy and then only recreate the dependencies for the objects referred to in the specific ALTER POLICY command. Correct that by extracting and building the dependencies for all objects referenced by the policy, regardless of if they were provided as part of the ALTER POLICY command or were already in place as part of the pre-existing policy.
10 years ago
else
{
Oid *roles;
Datum roles_datum;
bool attr_isnull;
ArrayType *policy_roles;
/*
* We need to pull the set of roles this policy applies to from
* what's in the catalog, so that we can recreate the dependencies
* correctly for the policy.
*/
roles_datum = heap_getattr(policy_tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polroles,
RelationGetDescr(pg_policy_rel),
&attr_isnull);
Assert(!attr_isnull);
policy_roles = DatumGetArrayTypePCopy(roles_datum);
roles = (Oid *) ARR_DATA_PTR(policy_roles);
nitems = ARR_DIMS(policy_roles)[0];
role_oids = (Datum *) palloc(nitems * sizeof(Datum));
for (i = 0; i < nitems; i++)
role_oids[i] = ObjectIdGetDatum(roles[i]);
}
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (qual != NULL)
{
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
replaces[Anum_pg_policy_polqual - 1] = true;
values[Anum_pg_policy_polqual - 1]
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
= CStringGetTextDatum(nodeToString(qual));
}
Handle dependencies properly in ALTER POLICY ALTER POLICY hadn't fully considered partial policy alternation (eg: change just the roles on the policy, or just change one of the expressions) when rebuilding the dependencies. Instead, it would happily remove all dependencies which existed for the policy and then only recreate the dependencies for the objects referred to in the specific ALTER POLICY command. Correct that by extracting and building the dependencies for all objects referenced by the policy, regardless of if they were provided as part of the ALTER POLICY command or were already in place as part of the pre-existing policy.
10 years ago
else
{
Datum value_datum;
bool attr_isnull;
/*
* We need to pull the USING expression and build the range table for
* the policy from what's in the catalog, so that we can recreate
* the dependencies correctly for the policy.
*/
/* Check if the policy has a USING expr */
value_datum = heap_getattr(policy_tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polqual,
RelationGetDescr(pg_policy_rel),
&attr_isnull);
if (!attr_isnull)
{
char *qual_value;
ParseState *qual_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
/* parsestate is built just to build the range table */
qual_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
qual_value = TextDatumGetCString(value_datum);
qual = stringToNode(qual_value);
/* Add this rel to the parsestate's rangetable, for dependencies */
addRangeTableEntryForRelation(qual_pstate, target_table, NULL,
false, false);
qual_parse_rtable = qual_pstate->p_rtable;
free_parsestate(qual_pstate);
}
}
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
if (with_check_qual != NULL)
{
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
replaces[Anum_pg_policy_polwithcheck - 1] = true;
values[Anum_pg_policy_polwithcheck - 1]
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
= CStringGetTextDatum(nodeToString(with_check_qual));
}
Handle dependencies properly in ALTER POLICY ALTER POLICY hadn't fully considered partial policy alternation (eg: change just the roles on the policy, or just change one of the expressions) when rebuilding the dependencies. Instead, it would happily remove all dependencies which existed for the policy and then only recreate the dependencies for the objects referred to in the specific ALTER POLICY command. Correct that by extracting and building the dependencies for all objects referenced by the policy, regardless of if they were provided as part of the ALTER POLICY command or were already in place as part of the pre-existing policy.
10 years ago
else
{
Datum value_datum;
bool attr_isnull;
/*
* We need to pull the WITH CHECK expression and build the range table
* for the policy from what's in the catalog, so that we can recreate
* the dependencies correctly for the policy.
*/
/* Check if the policy has a WITH CHECK expr */
value_datum = heap_getattr(policy_tuple, Anum_pg_policy_polwithcheck,
RelationGetDescr(pg_policy_rel),
&attr_isnull);
if (!attr_isnull)
{
char *with_check_value;
ParseState *with_check_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
/* parsestate is built just to build the range table */
with_check_pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
with_check_value = TextDatumGetCString(value_datum);
with_check_qual = stringToNode(with_check_value);
/* Add this rel to the parsestate's rangetable, for dependencies */
addRangeTableEntryForRelation(with_check_pstate, target_table, NULL,
false, false);
with_check_parse_rtable = with_check_pstate->p_rtable;
free_parsestate(with_check_pstate);
}
}
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
new_tuple = heap_modify_tuple(policy_tuple,
RelationGetDescr(pg_policy_rel),
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
values, isnull, replaces);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
simple_heap_update(pg_policy_rel, &new_tuple->t_self, new_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Update Catalog Indexes */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_policy_rel, new_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Update Dependencies. */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
deleteDependencyRecordsFor(PolicyRelationId, policy_id, false);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Record Dependencies */
target.classId = RelationRelationId;
target.objectId = table_id;
target.objectSubId = 0;
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
myself.classId = PolicyRelationId;
myself.objectId = policy_id;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
myself.objectSubId = 0;
recordDependencyOn(&myself, &target, DEPENDENCY_AUTO);
recordDependencyOnExpr(&myself, qual, qual_parse_rtable, DEPENDENCY_NORMAL);
recordDependencyOnExpr(&myself, with_check_qual, with_check_parse_rtable,
DEPENDENCY_NORMAL);
Create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in TO clause of policies. CreatePolicy() and AlterPolicy() omit to create a pg_shdepend entry for each role in the TO clause. Fix this by creating a new shared dependency type called SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY and assigning it to each role. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, reviewed by Alvaro Herrera. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
/* Register role dependencies */
deleteSharedDependencyRecordsFor(PolicyRelationId, policy_id, 0);
target.classId = AuthIdRelationId;
target.objectSubId = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nitems; i++)
{
target.objectId = DatumGetObjectId(role_oids[i]);
/* no dependency if public */
if (target.objectId != ACL_ID_PUBLIC)
recordSharedDependencyOn(&myself, &target,
SHARED_DEPENDENCY_POLICY);
}
Add missing post create and alter hooks to policy objects. AlterPolicy() and CreatePolicy() lacked their respective hook invocations. Noted by Noah Misch, review by Dean Rasheed. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(PolicyRelationId, policy_id, 0);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
heap_freetuple(new_tuple);
/* Invalidate Relation Cache */
CacheInvalidateRelcache(target_table);
/* Clean up. */
systable_endscan(sscan);
relation_close(target_table, NoLock);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
heap_close(pg_policy_rel, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes. Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress is more widely useful. Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument that's an object address which provides further info about the executed command. To wit: * for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of the new constraint * for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the schema that originally contained the object. * for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address of the object added to or dropped from the extension. There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change either. Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
11 years ago
return myself;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
/*
* rename_policy -
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* change the name of a policy on a relation
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*/
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes. Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress is more widely useful. Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument that's an object address which provides further info about the executed command. To wit: * for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of the new constraint * for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the schema that originally contained the object. * for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address of the object added to or dropped from the extension. There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change either. Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
11 years ago
ObjectAddress
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
rename_policy(RenameStmt *stmt)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Relation pg_policy_rel;
Relation target_table;
Oid table_id;
Oid opoloid;
ScanKeyData skey[2];
SysScanDesc sscan;
HeapTuple policy_tuple;
ObjectAddress address;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Get id of table. Also handles permissions checks. */
table_id = RangeVarGetRelidExtended(stmt->relation, AccessExclusiveLock,
false, false,
RangeVarCallbackForPolicy,
(void *) stmt);
target_table = relation_open(table_id, NoLock);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
pg_policy_rel = heap_open(PolicyRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Code review for row security. Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS for me and should resolve the buildfarm error. In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies), rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy, but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore. Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki, Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
/* First pass -- check for conflict */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Add key - policy's relation id. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[0],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polrelid,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(table_id));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Add key - policy's name. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[1],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polname,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_NAMEEQ,
CStringGetDatum(stmt->newname));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_policy_rel,
PolicyPolrelidPolnameIndexId, true, NULL, 2,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
skey);
Code review for row security. Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS for me and should resolve the buildfarm error. In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies), rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy, but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore. Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki, Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
11 years ago
if (HeapTupleIsValid(systable_getnext(sscan)))
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
errmsg("policy \"%s\" for table \"%s\" already exists",
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
stmt->newname, RelationGetRelationName(target_table))));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
systable_endscan(sscan);
/* Second pass -- find existing policy and update */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Add key - policy's relation id. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[0],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polrelid,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(table_id));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Add key - policy's name. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[1],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polname,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_NAMEEQ,
CStringGetDatum(stmt->subname));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_policy_rel,
PolicyPolrelidPolnameIndexId, true, NULL, 2,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
skey);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Complain if we did not find the policy */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(policy_tuple))
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
errmsg("policy \"%s\" for table \"%s\" does not exist",
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
stmt->subname, RelationGetRelationName(target_table))));
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
opoloid = HeapTupleGetOid(policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_tuple = heap_copytuple(policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
namestrcpy(&((Form_pg_policy) GETSTRUCT(policy_tuple))->polname,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
stmt->newname);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
simple_heap_update(pg_policy_rel, &policy_tuple->t_self, policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* keep system catalog indexes current */
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_policy_rel, policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(PolicyRelationId,
HeapTupleGetOid(policy_tuple), 0);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes. Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress is more widely useful. Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument that's an object address which provides further info about the executed command. To wit: * for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of the new constraint * for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the schema that originally contained the object. * for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address of the object added to or dropped from the extension. There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change either. Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
11 years ago
ObjectAddressSet(address, PolicyRelationId, opoloid);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/*
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
* Invalidate relation's relcache entry so that other backends (and this
* one too!) are sent SI message to make them rebuild relcache entries.
* (Ideally this should happen automatically...)
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
*/
CacheInvalidateRelcache(target_table);
/* Clean up. */
systable_endscan(sscan);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
heap_close(pg_policy_rel, RowExclusiveLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
relation_close(target_table, NoLock);
Change many routines to return ObjectAddress rather than OID The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes. Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress is more widely useful. Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument that's an object address which provides further info about the executed command. To wit: * for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of the new constraint * for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the schema that originally contained the object. * for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address of the object added to or dropped from the extension. There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change either. Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
11 years ago
return address;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
}
/*
* get_relation_policy_oid - Look up a policy by name to find its OID
*
* If missing_ok is false, throw an error if policy not found. If
* true, just return InvalidOid.
*/
Oid
get_relation_policy_oid(Oid relid, const char *policy_name, bool missing_ok)
{
pgindent run for 9.5
11 years ago
Relation pg_policy_rel;
ScanKeyData skey[2];
SysScanDesc sscan;
HeapTuple policy_tuple;
Oid policy_oid;
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
pg_policy_rel = heap_open(PolicyRelationId, AccessShareLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Add key - policy's relation id. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[0],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polrelid,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(relid));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
/* Add key - policy's name. */
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
ScanKeyInit(&skey[1],
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
Anum_pg_policy_polname,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_NAMEEQ,
CStringGetDatum(policy_name));
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_policy_rel,
PolicyPolrelidPolnameIndexId, true, NULL, 2,
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
skey);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(policy_tuple))
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
{
if (!missing_ok)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
Make RLS related error messages more consistent and compliant. Also updated regression expected output to match. Noted and patch by Daniele Varrazzo.
11 years ago
errmsg("policy \"%s\" for table \"%s\" does not exist",
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
policy_name, get_rel_name(relid))));
policy_oid = InvalidOid;
}
else
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
policy_oid = HeapTupleGetOid(policy_tuple);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
/* Clean up. */
systable_endscan(sscan);
Rename pg_rowsecurity -> pg_policy and other fixes As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to match the new catalog name. The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we finish planning out the query which has been built. Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the ability to COMMENT on policies. In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments, and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of 'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate. Happy Thanksgiving!
11 years ago
heap_close(pg_policy_rel, AccessShareLock);
Row-Level Security Policies (RLS) Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions defined to check records being added to a table are added to the with-check options of the query. New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY. Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny policy is used and no records will be visible. By default, row security is applied at all times except for the table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers. When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row security. Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security. A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled. A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row security using row_security = OFF. Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback. Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me. Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith, Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
11 years ago
return policy_oid;
}
Disallow converting a table to a view if row security is present. When DefineQueryRewrite() is about to convert a table to a view, it checks the table for features unavailable to views. For example, it rejects tables having triggers. It omits to reject tables having relrowsecurity or a pg_policy record. Fix that. To faciliate the repair, invent relation_has_policies() which indicates the presence of policies on a relation even when row security is disabled for that relation. Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, review by Stephen Frost. Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
11 years ago
/*
* relation_has_policies - Determine if relation has any policies
*/
bool
relation_has_policies(Relation rel)
{
Relation catalog;
ScanKeyData skey;
SysScanDesc sscan;
HeapTuple policy_tuple;
bool ret = false;
catalog = heap_open(PolicyRelationId, AccessShareLock);
ScanKeyInit(&skey,
Anum_pg_policy_polrelid,
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(RelationGetRelid(rel)));
sscan = systable_beginscan(catalog, PolicyPolrelidPolnameIndexId, true,
NULL, 1, &skey);
policy_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan);
if (HeapTupleIsValid(policy_tuple))
ret = true;
systable_endscan(sscan);
heap_close(catalog, AccessShareLock);
return ret;
}