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@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ ERROR: SELinux: security policy violation |
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</para> |
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<para> |
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A combination of dynamic domain transition and trusted procedure |
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enables an interesting use case that fits the typical process life- |
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cycle of connection pooling software. |
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enables an interesting use case that fits the typical process life-cycle |
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of connection pooling software. |
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Even if your connection pooling software is not allowed to run most |
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of SQL commands, you can allow it to switch the security label |
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of the client using the <literal>sepgsql_setcon()</literal> function |
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@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ ERROR: SELinux: security policy violation |
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procedure with appropriate permissions checks. |
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The point here is that only the trusted procedure actually has permission |
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to change the effective security label, and only does so when given proper |
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credentials. Of course, for secure operation, the credential store must |
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credentials. Of course, for secure operation, the credential store |
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(table, procedure definition, or whatever) must be protected from |
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unauthorized access. |
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</para> |
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