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release-6-3
${ noResults }
31 Commits (137935bd1167a94b0bfea7239033f1ba1a1d95bb)
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
137935bd11 |
Don't reduce output request size on non-Unix-socket connections.
Traditionally, libpq's pqPutMsgEnd has rounded down the amount-to-send
to be a multiple of 8K when it is eagerly writing some data. This
still seems like a good idea when sending through a Unix socket, as
pipes typically have a buffer size of 8K or some fraction/multiple of
that. But there's not much argument for it on a TCP connection, since
(a) standard MTU values are not commensurate with that, and (b) the
kernel typically applies its own packet splitting/merging logic.
Worse, our SSL and GSSAPI code paths both have API stipulations that
if they fail to send all the data that was offered in the previous
write attempt, we mustn't offer less data in the next attempt; else
we may get "SSL error: bad length" or "GSSAPI caller failed to
retransmit all data needing to be retried". The previous write
attempt might've been pqFlush attempting to send everything in the
buffer, so pqPutMsgEnd can't safely write less than the full buffer
contents. (Well, we could add some more state to track exactly how
much the previous write attempt was, but there's little value evident
in such extra complication.) Hence, apply the round-down only on
AF_UNIX sockets, where we never use SSL or GSSAPI.
Interestingly, we had a very closely related bug report before,
which I attempted to fix in commit
|
6 months ago |
|
|
d98cefe114 |
Allow larger packets during GSSAPI authentication exchange.
Our GSSAPI code only allows packet sizes up to 16kB. However it emerges that during authentication, larger packets might be needed; various authorities suggest 48kB or 64kB as the maximum packet size. This limitation caused login failure for AD users who belong to many AD groups. To add insult to injury, we gave an unintelligible error message, typically "GSSAPI context establishment error: The routine must be called again to complete its function: Unknown error". As noted in code comments, the 16kB packet limit is effectively a protocol constant once we are doing normal data transmission: the GSSAPI code splits the data stream at those points, and if we change the limit then we will have cross-version compatibility problems due to the receiver's buffer being too small in some combinations. However, during the authentication exchange the packet sizes are not determined by us, but by the underlying GSSAPI library. So we might as well just try to send what the library tells us to. An unpatched recipient will fail on a packet larger than 16kB, but that's not worse than the sender failing without even trying. So this doesn't introduce any meaningful compatibility problem. We still need a buffer size limit, but we can easily make it be 64kB rather than 16kB until transport negotiation is complete. (Larger values were discussed, but don't seem likely to add anything.) Reported-by: Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com> Fix-suggested-by: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/DS0PR22MB5971A9C8A3F44BCC6293C4DABE99A@DS0PR22MB5971.namprd22.prod.outlook.com Backpatch-through: 13 |
7 months ago |
|
|
827b4060a8 |
Remove unnecessary (char *) casts [mem]
Remove (char *) casts around memory functions such as memcmp(),
memcpy(), or memset() where the cast is useless. Since these
functions don't take char * arguments anyway, these casts are at best
complicated casts to (void *), about which see commit
|
10 months ago |
|
|
50e6eb731d |
Update copyright for 2025
Backpatch-through: 13 |
12 months ago |
|
|
29275b1d17 |
Update copyright for 2024
Reported-by: Michael Paquier Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZZKTDPxBBMt3C0J9@paquier.xyz Backpatch-through: 12 |
2 years ago |
|
|
d053a879bb |
Fix timing-dependent failure in GSSAPI data transmission.
When using GSSAPI encryption in non-blocking mode, libpq sometimes failed with "GSSAPI caller failed to retransmit all data needing to be retried". The cause is that pqPutMsgEnd rounds its transmit request down to an even multiple of 8K, and sometimes that can lead to not requesting a write of data that was requested to be written (but reported as not written) earlier. That can upset pg_GSS_write's logic for dealing with not-yet-written data, since it's possible the data in question had already been incorporated into an encrypted packet that we weren't able to send during the previous call. We could fix this with a one-or-two-line hack to disable pqPutMsgEnd's round-down behavior, but that seems like making the caller work around a behavior that pg_GSS_write shouldn't expose in this way. Instead, adjust pg_GSS_write to never report a partial write: it either reports a complete write, or reflects the failure of the lower-level pqsecure_raw_write call. The requirement still exists for the caller to present at least as much data as on the previous call, but with the caller-visible write start point not moving there is no temptation for it to present less. We lose some ability to reclaim buffer space early, but I doubt that that will make much difference in practice. This also gets rid of a rather dubious assumption that "any interesting failure condition (from pqsecure_raw_write) will recur on the next try". We've not seen failure reports traceable to that, but I've never trusted it particularly and am glad to remove it. Make the same adjustments to the equivalent backend routine be_gssapi_write(). It is probable that there's no bug on the backend side, since we don't have a notion of nonblock mode there; but we should keep the logic the same to ease future maintenance. Per bug #18210 from Lars Kanis. Back-patch to all supported branches. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/18210-4c6d0b14627f2eb8@postgresql.org |
2 years ago |
|
|
1f9f6aa491 |
Spell the values of libpq's gssdelegation parameter as "0" and "1".
That's how other boolean options are handled, so do likewise. The previous coding with "enable" and "disable" was seemingly modeled on gssencmode, but that's a three-way flag. While at it, add PGGSSDELEGATION to the set of environment variables cleared by pg_regress and Utils.pm. Abhijit Menon-Sen, per gripe from Alvaro Herrera Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20230522091609.nlyuu4nolhycqs2p@alvherre.pgsql |
3 years ago |
|
|
a2eb99a01e |
Expand some more uses of "deleg" to "delegation" or "delegated".
Complete the task begun in 9c0a0e2ed: we don't want to use the abbreviation "deleg" for GSS delegation in any user-visible places. (For consistency, this also changes most internal uses too.) Abhijit Menon-Sen and Tom Lane Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/949048.1684639317@sss.pgh.pa.us |
3 years ago |
|
|
0245f8db36 |
Pre-beta mechanical code beautification.
Run pgindent, pgperltidy, and reformat-dat-files. This set of diffs is a bit larger than typical. We've updated to pg_bsd_indent 2.1.2, which properly indents variable declarations that have multi-line initialization expressions (the continuation lines are now indented one tab stop). We've also updated to perltidy version 20230309 and changed some of its settings, which reduces its desire to add whitespace to lines to make assignments etc. line up. Going forward, that should make for fewer random-seeming changes to existing code. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20230428092545.qfb3y5wcu4cm75ur@alvherre.pgsql |
3 years ago |
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|
b4dbf3e924 |
Fix various typos
This fixes many spelling mistakes in comments, but a few references to invalid parameter names, function names and option names too in comments and also some in string constants Also, fix an #undef that was undefining the incorrect definition Author: Alexander Lakhin Reviewed-by: Justin Pryzby Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/d5f68d19-c0fc-91a9-118d-7c6a5a3f5fad@gmail.com |
3 years ago |
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6633cfb216 |
De-Revert "Add support for Kerberos credential delegation"
This reverts commit
|
3 years ago |
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3d03b24c35 |
Revert "Add support for Kerberos credential delegation"
This reverts commit
|
3 years ago |
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3d4fa227bc |
Add support for Kerberos credential delegation
Support GSSAPI/Kerberos credentials being delegated to the server by a client. With this, a user authenticating to PostgreSQL using Kerberos (GSSAPI) credentials can choose to delegate their credentials to the PostgreSQL server (which can choose to accept them, or not), allowing the server to then use those delegated credentials to connect to another service, such as with postgres_fdw or dblink or theoretically any other service which is able to be authenticated using Kerberos. Both postgres_fdw and dblink are changed to allow non-superuser password-less connections but only when GSSAPI credentials have been delegated to the server by the client and GSSAPI is used to authenticate to the remote system. Authors: Stephen Frost, Peifeng Qiu Reviewed-By: David Christensen Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CO1PR05MB8023CC2CB575E0FAAD7DF4F8A8E29@CO1PR05MB8023.namprd05.prod.outlook.com |
3 years ago |
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71c37797d7 |
Properly NULL-terminate GSS receive buffer on error packet reception
pqsecure_open_gss() includes a code path handling error messages with v2-style protocol messages coming from the server. The client-side buffer holding the error message does not force a NULL-termination, with the data of the server getting copied to the errorMessage of the connection. Hence, it would be possible for a server to send an unterminated string and copy arbitrary bytes in the buffer receiving the error message in the client, opening the door to a crash or even data exposure. As at this stage of the authentication process the exchange has not been completed yet, this could be abused by an attacker without Kerberos credentials. Clients that have a valid kerberos cache are vulnerable as libpq opportunistically requests for it except if gssencmode is disabled. Author: Jacob Champion Backpatch-through: 12 Security: CVE-2022-41862 |
3 years ago |
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c8e1ba736b |
Update copyright for 2023
Backpatch-through: 11 |
3 years ago |
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a9e9a9f32b |
libpq error message refactoring, part 2
This applies the new APIs to the code. Reviewed-by: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org> Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/7c0232ef-7b44-68db-599d-b327d0640a77@enterprisedb.com |
3 years ago |
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cd4e8caaa0 |
Fix final warnings produced by -Wshadow=compatible-local
I thought I had these in
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3 years ago |
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27b77ecf9f |
Update copyright for 2022
Backpatch-through: 10 |
4 years ago |
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ffa2e46701 |
In libpq, always append new error messages to conn->errorMessage.
Previously, we had an undisciplined mish-mash of printfPQExpBuffer and appendPQExpBuffer calls to report errors within libpq. This commit establishes a uniform rule that appendPQExpBuffer[Str] should be used. conn->errorMessage is reset only at the start of an application request, and then accumulates messages till we're done. We can remove no less than three different ad-hoc mechanisms that were used to get the effect of concatenation of error messages within a sequence of operations. Although this makes things quite a bit cleaner conceptually, the main reason to do it is to make the world safer for the multiple-target-host feature that was added awhile back. Previously, there were many cases in which an error occurring during an individual host connection attempt would wipe out the record of what had happened during previous attempts. (The reporting is still inadequate, in that it can be hard to tell which host got the failure, but that seems like a matter for a separate commit.) Currently, lo_import and lo_export contain exceptions to the "never use printfPQExpBuffer" rule. If we changed them, we'd risk reporting an incidental lo_close failure before the actual read or write failure, which would be confusing, not least because lo_close happened after the main failure. We could improve this by inventing an internal version of lo_close that doesn't reset the errorMessage; but we'd also need a version of PQfn() that does that, and it didn't quite seem worth the trouble for now. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/BN6PR05MB3492948E4FD76C156E747E8BC9160@BN6PR05MB3492.namprd05.prod.outlook.com |
5 years ago |
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ca3b37487b |
Update copyright for 2021
Backpatch-through: 9.5 |
5 years ago |
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ff6ce9a3a6 |
Fix bugs in libpq's GSSAPI encryption support.
The critical issue fixed here is that if a GSSAPI-encrypted connection is successfully made, pqsecure_open_gss() cleared conn->allow_ssl_try, as an admittedly-hacky way of preventing us from then trying to tunnel SSL encryption over the already-encrypted connection. The problem with that is that if we abandon the GSSAPI connection because of a failure during authentication, we would not attempt SSL encryption in the next try with the same server. This can lead to unexpected connection failure, or silently getting a non-encrypted connection where an encrypted one is expected. Fortunately, we'd only manage to make a GSSAPI-encrypted connection if both client and server hold valid tickets in the same Kerberos infrastructure, which is a relatively uncommon environment. Nonetheless this is a very nasty bug with potential security consequences. To fix, don't reset the flag, instead adding a check for conn->gssenc being already true when deciding whether to try to initiate SSL. While here, fix some lesser issues in libpq's GSSAPI code: * Use the need_new_connection stanza when dropping an attempted GSSAPI connection, instead of partially duplicating that code. The consequences of this are pretty minor: AFAICS it could only lead to auth_req_received or password_needed remaining set when they shouldn't, which is not too harmful. * Fix pg_GSS_error() to not repeat the "mprefix" it's given multiple times, and to notice any failure return from gss_display_status(). * Avoid gratuitous dependency on NI_MAXHOST in pg_GSS_load_servicename(). Per report from Mikael Gustavsson. Back-patch to v12 where this code was introduced. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e5b0b6ed05764324a2f3fe7acfc766d5@smhi.se |
5 years ago |
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86dba33217 |
Replace calls of htonl()/ntohl() with pg_bswap.h for GSSAPI encryption
The in-core equivalents can make use of built-in functions if the compiler supports this option, making optimizations possible. |
5 years ago |
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46da7bf671 |
Fix severe memory leaks in GSSAPI encryption support.
Both the backend and libpq leaked buffers containing encrypted data to be transmitted, so that the process size would grow roughly as the total amount of data sent. There were also far-less-critical leaks of the same sort in GSSAPI session establishment. Oversight in commit |
6 years ago |
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2c0cdc8183 |
Extensive code review for GSSAPI encryption mechanism.
Fix assorted bugs in handling of non-blocking I/O when using GSSAPI encryption. The encryption layer could return the wrong status information to its caller, resulting in effectively dropping some data (or possibly in aborting a not-broken connection), or in a "livelock" situation where data remains to be sent but the upper layers think transmission is done and just go to sleep. There were multiple small thinkos contributing to that, as well as one big one (failure to think through what to do when a send fails after having already transmitted data). Note that these errors could cause failures whether the client application asked for non-blocking I/O or not, since both libpq and the backend always run things in non-block mode at this level. Also get rid of use of static variables for GSSAPI inside libpq; that's entirely not okay given that multiple connections could be open at once inside a single client process. Also adjust a bunch of random small discrepancies between the frontend and backend versions of the send/receive functions -- except for error handling, they should be identical, and now they are. Also extend the Kerberos TAP tests to exercise cases where nontrivial amounts of data need to be pushed through encryption. Before, those tests didn't provide any useful coverage at all for the cases of interest here. (They still might not, depending on timing, but at least there's a chance.) Per complaint from pmc@citylink and subsequent investigation. Back-patch to v12 where this code was introduced. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200109181822.GA74698@gate.oper.dinoex.org |
6 years ago |
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7559d8ebfa |
Update copyrights for 2020
Backpatch-through: update all files in master, backpatch legal files through 9.4 |
6 years ago |
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dddf4cdc33 |
Make the order of the header file includes consistent in non-backend modules.
Similar to commit
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6 years ago |
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e1c8743e6c |
GSSAPI error message improvements
Make the error messages around GSSAPI encryption a bit clearer. Tweak some messages to avoid plural problems. Also make a code change for clarity. Using "conf" for "confidential" is quite confusing. Using "conf_state" is perhaps not much better but that's what the GSSAPI documentation uses, so there is at least some hope of understanding it. |
6 years ago |
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4c9210f34c |
Update copyright year.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA%2BhUKGJFWXmtYo6Frd77RR8YXCHz7hJ2mRy5aHV%3D7fJOqDnBHA%40mail.gmail.com |
7 years ago |
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8cde7f4948 |
Fix assorted minor bogosity in GSSAPI transport error messages.
I noted that some buildfarm members were complaining about %ld being used to format values that are (probably) declared size_t. Use %zu instead, and insert a cast just in case some versions of the GSSAPI API declare the length field differently. While at it, clean up gratuitous differences in wording of equivalent messages, show the complained-of length in all relevant messages not just some, include trailing newline where needed, adjust random deviations from project-standard code layout and message style, etc. |
7 years ago |
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c46c85d459 |
Handle errors during GSSAPI startup better
There was some confusion over the format of the error message returned from the server during GSSAPI startup; specifically, it was expected that a length would be returned when, in reality, at this early stage in the startup sequence, no length is returned from the server as part of an error message. Correct the client-side code for dealing with error messages sent by the server during startup by simply reading what's available into our buffer, after we've discovered it's an error message, and then reporting back what was returned. In passing, also add in documentation of the environment variable PGGSSENCMODE which was missed previously, and adjust the code to look for the PGGSSENCMODE variable (the environment variable change was missed in the prior GSSMODE -> GSSENCMODE commit). Error-handling issue discovered by Peter Eisentraut, the rest were items discovered during testing of the error handling. |
7 years ago |
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b0b39f72b9 |
GSSAPI encryption support
On both the frontend and backend, prepare for GSSAPI encryption support by moving common code for error handling into a separate file. Fix a TODO for handling multiple status messages in the process. Eliminate the OIDs, which have not been needed for some time. Add frontend and backend encryption support functions. Keep the context initiation for authentication-only separate on both the frontend and backend in order to avoid concerns about changing the requested flags to include encryption support. In postmaster, pull GSSAPI authorization checking into a shared function. Also share the initiator name between the encryption and non-encryption codepaths. For HBA, add "hostgssenc" and "hostnogssenc" entries that behave similarly to their SSL counterparts. "hostgssenc" requires either "gss", "trust", or "reject" for its authentication. Similarly, add a "gssencmode" parameter to libpq. Supported values are "disable", "require", and "prefer". Notably, negotiation will only be attempted if credentials can be acquired. Move credential acquisition into its own function to support this behavior. Add a simple pg_stat_gssapi view similar to pg_stat_ssl, for monitoring if GSSAPI authentication was used, what principal was used, and if encryption is being used on the connection. Finally, add documentation for everything new, and update existing documentation on connection security. Thanks to Michael Paquier for the Windows fixes. Author: Robbie Harwood, with changes to the read/write functions by me. Reviewed in various forms and at different times by: Michael Paquier, Andres Freund, David Steele. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/jlg1tgq1ktm.fsf@thriss.redhat.com |
7 years ago |