We realized years ago that it's better for libpq to accept all
connection parameters syntactically, even if some are ignored or
restricted due to lack of the feature in a particular build.
However, that lesson from the SSL support was for some reason never
applied to the GSSAPI support. This is causing various buildfarm
members to have problems with a test case added by commit 6136e94dc,
and it's just a bad idea from a user-experience standpoint anyway,
so fix it.
While at it, fix some places where parameter-related infrastructure
was added with the aid of a dartboard, or perhaps with the aid of
the anti-pattern "add new stuff at the end". It should be safe
to rearrange the contents of struct pg_conn even in released
branches, since that's private to libpq (and we'd have to move
some fields in some builds to fix this, anyway).
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/11297.1576868677@sss.pgh.pa.us
This patch providies for support for password protected SSL client
keys in libpq, and for DER format keys, both encrypted and unencrypted.
There is a new connection parameter sslpassword, which is supplied to
the OpenSSL libraries via a callback function. The callback function can
also be set by an application by calling PQgetSSLKeyPassHook(). There is
also a function to retreive the connection setting, PQsslpassword().
Craig Ringer and Andrew Dunstan
Reviewed by: Greg Nancarrow
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/f7ee88ed-95c4-95c1-d4bf-7b415363ab62@2ndQuadrant.com
Similarly to the set of parameters for keepalive, a connection parameter
for libpq is added as well as a backend GUC, called tcp_user_timeout.
Increasing the TCP user timeout is useful to allow a connection to
survive extended periods without end-to-end connection, and decreasing
it allows application to fail faster. By default, the parameter is 0,
which makes the connection use the system default, and follows a logic
close to the keepalive parameters in its handling. When connecting
through a Unix-socket domain, the parameters have no effect.
Author: Ryohei Nagaura
Reviewed-by: Fabien Coelho, Robert Haas, Kyotaro Horiguchi, Kirk
Jamison, Mikalai Keida, Takayuki Tsunakawa, Andrei Yahorau
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/EDA4195584F5064680D8130B1CA91C45367328@G01JPEXMBYT04
On both the frontend and backend, prepare for GSSAPI encryption
support by moving common code for error handling into a separate file.
Fix a TODO for handling multiple status messages in the process.
Eliminate the OIDs, which have not been needed for some time.
Add frontend and backend encryption support functions. Keep the
context initiation for authentication-only separate on both the
frontend and backend in order to avoid concerns about changing the
requested flags to include encryption support.
In postmaster, pull GSSAPI authorization checking into a shared
function. Also share the initiator name between the encryption and
non-encryption codepaths.
For HBA, add "hostgssenc" and "hostnogssenc" entries that behave
similarly to their SSL counterparts. "hostgssenc" requires either
"gss", "trust", or "reject" for its authentication.
Similarly, add a "gssencmode" parameter to libpq. Supported values are
"disable", "require", and "prefer". Notably, negotiation will only be
attempted if credentials can be acquired. Move credential acquisition
into its own function to support this behavior.
Add a simple pg_stat_gssapi view similar to pg_stat_ssl, for monitoring
if GSSAPI authentication was used, what principal was used, and if
encryption is being used on the connection.
Finally, add documentation for everything new, and update existing
documentation on connection security.
Thanks to Michael Paquier for the Windows fixes.
Author: Robbie Harwood, with changes to the read/write functions by me.
Reviewed in various forms and at different times by: Michael Paquier,
Andres Freund, David Steele.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/jlg1tgq1ktm.fsf@thriss.redhat.com
Originally, if libpq got a failure (e.g., ECONNRESET) while trying to
send data to the server, it would just report that and wash its hands
of the matter. It was soon found that that wasn't a very pleasant way
of coping with server-initiated disconnections, so we introduced a hack
(pqHandleSendFailure) in the code that sends queries to make it peek
ahead for server error reports before reporting the send failure.
It now emerges that related cases can occur during connection setup;
in particular, as of TLS 1.3 it's unsafe to assume that SSL connection
failures will be reported by SSL_connect rather than during our first
send attempt. We could have fixed that in a hacky way by applying
pqHandleSendFailure after a startup packet send failure, but
(a) pqHandleSendFailure explicitly disclaims suitability for use in any
state except query startup, and (b) the problem still potentially exists
for other send attempts in libpq.
Instead, let's fix this in a more general fashion by eliminating
pqHandleSendFailure altogether, and instead arranging to postpone
all reports of send failures in libpq until after we've made an
attempt to read and process server messages. The send failure won't
be reported at all if we find a server message or detect input EOF.
(Note: this removes one of the reasons why libpq typically overwrites,
rather than appending to, conn->errorMessage: pqHandleSendFailure needed
that behavior so that the send failure report would be replaced if we
got a server message or read failure report. Eventually I'd like to get
rid of that overwrite behavior altogether, but today is not that day.
For the moment, pqSendSome is assuming that its callees will overwrite
not append to conn->errorMessage.)
Possibly this change should get back-patched someday; but it needs
testing first, so let's not consider that till after v12 beta.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm=2n6Nv+5tFfe8YnkUm1fXgvxR0Mm1FoD+QKG-vLNGLyKg@mail.gmail.com
When hostaddr is given, the actual IP address that psql is connected to
can be totally unexpected for the given host. The more verbose output
we now generate makes things clearer. Since the "host" and "hostaddr"
parts of the conninfo could come from different sources (say, one of
them is in the service specification or a URI-style conninfo and the
other is not), this is not as silly as it may first appear. This is
also definitely useful if the hostname resolves to multiple addresses.
Author: Fabien Coelho
Reviewed-by: Pavel Stehule, Arthur Zakirov
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/alpine.DEB.2.21.1810261532380.27686@lancrehttps://postgr.es/m/alpine.DEB.2.21.1808201323020.13832@lancre
This provides the features that used to exist in useful_strerror()
for users of strerror_r(), too. Also, standardize on the GNU convention
that strerror_r returns a char pointer that may not be NULL.
I notice that libpq's win32.c contains a variant version of strerror_r
that probably ought to be folded into strerror.c. But lacking a
Windows environment, I should leave that to somebody else.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/2975.1526862605@sss.pgh.pa.us
Historically, we looked up the target hostname in connectDBStart, so that
PQconnectPoll did not need to do DNS name resolution. The patches that
added multiple-target-host support to libpq preserved this division of
labor; but it's really nonsensical now, because it means that if any one
of the target hosts fails to resolve in DNS, the connection fails. That
negates the no-single-point-of-failure goal of the feature. Additionally,
DNS lookups aren't exactly cheap, but the code did them all even if the
first connection attempt succeeds.
Hence, rearrange so that PQconnectPoll does the lookups, and only looks
up a hostname when it's time to try that host. This does mean that
PQconnectPoll could block on a DNS lookup --- but if you wanted to avoid
that, you should be using hostaddr, as the documentation has always
specified. It seems fairly unlikely that any applications would really
care whether the lookup occurs inside PQconnectStart or PQconnectPoll.
In addition to calling out that fact explicitly, do some other minor
wordsmithing in the docs around the multiple-target-host feature.
Since this seems like a bug in the multiple-target-host feature,
backpatch to v10 where that was introduced. In the back branches,
avoid moving any existing fields of struct pg_conn, just in case
any third-party code is looking into that struct.
Tom Lane, reviewed by Fabien Coelho
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/4913.1533827102@sss.pgh.pa.us
The logic in PQconnectPoll() did not take care to ensure that all of
a PGconn's internal state variables were reset before trying a new
connection attempt. If we got far enough in the connection sequence
to have changed any of these variables, and then decided to try a new
server address or server name, the new connection might be completed
with some state that really only applied to the failed connection.
While this has assorted bad consequences, the only one that is clearly
a security issue is that password_needed didn't get reset, so that
if the first server asked for a password and the second didn't,
PQconnectionUsedPassword() would return an incorrect result. This
could be leveraged by unprivileged users of dblink or postgres_fdw
to allow them to use server-side login credentials that they should
not be able to use.
Other notable problems include the possibility of forcing a v2-protocol
connection to a server capable of supporting v3, or overriding
"sslmode=prefer" to cause a non-encrypted connection to a server that
would have accepted an encrypted one. Those are certainly bugs but
it's harder to paint them as security problems in themselves. However,
forcing a v2-protocol connection could result in libpq having a wrong
idea of the server's standard_conforming_strings setting, which opens
the door to SQL-injection attacks. The extent to which that's actually
a problem, given the prerequisite that the attacker needs control of
the client's connection parameters, is unclear.
These problems have existed for a long time, but became more easily
exploitable in v10, both because it introduced easy ways to force libpq
to abandon a connection attempt at a late stage and then try another one
(rather than just giving up), and because it provided an easy way to
specify multiple target hosts.
Fix by rearranging PQconnectPoll's state machine to provide centralized
places to reset state properly when moving to a new target host or when
dropping and retrying a connection to the same host.
Tom Lane, reviewed by Noah Misch. Our thanks to Andrew Krasichkov
for finding and reporting the problem.
Security: CVE-2018-10915
There are some problems with the tls-unique channel binding type. It's not
supported by all SSL libraries, and strictly speaking it's not defined for
TLS 1.3 at all, even though at least in OpenSSL, the functions used for it
still seem to work with TLS 1.3 connections. And since we had no
mechanism to negotiate what channel binding type to use, there would be
awkward interoperability issues if a server only supported some channel
binding types. tls-server-end-point seems feasible to support with any SSL
library, so let's just stick to that.
This removes the scram_channel_binding libpq option altogether, since there
is now only one supported channel binding type.
This also removes all the channel binding tests from the SSL test suite.
They were really just testing the scram_channel_binding option, which
is now gone. Channel binding is used if both client and server support it,
so it is used in the existing tests. It would be good to have some tests
specifically for channel binding, to make sure it really is used, and the
different combinations of a client and a server that support or doesn't
support it. The current set of settings we have make it hard to write such
tests, but I did test those things manually, by disabling
HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH and/or
HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH.
I also removed the SCRAM_CHANNEL_BINDING_TLS_END_POINT constant. This is a
matter of taste, but IMO it's more readable to just use the
"tls-server-end-point" string.
Refactor the checks on whether the SSL library supports the functions
needed for tls-server-end-point channel binding. Now the server won't
advertise, and the client won't choose, the SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS variant, if
compiled with an OpenSSL version too old to support it.
In the passing, add some sanity checks to check that the chosen SASL
mechanism, SCRAM-SHA-256 or SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, matches whether the SCRAM
exchange used channel binding or not. For example, if the client selects
the non-channel-binding variant SCRAM-SHA-256, but in the SCRAM message
uses channel binding anyway. It's harmless from a security point of view,
I believe, and I'm not sure if there are some other conditions that would
cause the connection to fail, but it seems better to be strict about these
things and check explicitly.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/ec787074-2305-c6f4-86aa-6902f98485a4%40iki.fi
Separate the parts specific to the SSL library from the general logic.
The previous code structure was
open_client_SSL()
calls verify_peer_name_matches_certificate()
calls verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name()
calls wildcard_certificate_match()
and was completely in fe-secure-openssl.c. The new structure is
open_client_SSL() [openssl]
calls pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate() [generic]
calls pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts() [openssl]
calls openssl_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name() [openssl]
calls pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name() [generic]
calls wildcard_certificate_match() [generic]
Move the generic functions into a new file fe-secure-common.c, so the
calls generally go fe-connect.c -> fe-secure.c -> fe-secure-${impl}.c ->
fe-secure-common.c, although there is a bit of back-and-forth between
the last two.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Move the documentation of the SSL API calls are supposed to do into the
headers files, instead of keeping them in the files for the OpenSSL
implementation. That way, they don't have to be duplicated or be
inconsistent when other implementations are added.
This adds a second standard channel binding type for SCRAM. It is
mainly intended for third-party clients that cannot implement
tls-unique, for example JDBC.
Author: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
This parameter can be used to enforce the channel binding type used
during a SCRAM authentication. This can be useful to check code paths
where an invalid channel binding type is used by a client and will be
even more useful to allow testing other channel binding types when they
are added.
The default value is tls-unique, which is what RFC 5802 specifies.
Clients can optionally specify an empty value, which has as effect to
not use channel binding and use SCRAM-SHA-256 as chosen SASL mechanism.
More tests for SCRAM and channel binding are added to the SSL test
suite.
Author: Author: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
This is the basic feature set using OpenSSL to support the feature. In
order to allow the frontend and the backend to fetch the sent and
expected TLS Finished messages, a PG-like API is added to be able to
make the interface pluggable for other SSL implementations.
This commit also adds a infrastructure to facilitate the addition of
future channel binding types as well as libpq parameters to control the
SASL mechanism names and channel binding names. Those will be added by
upcoming commits.
Some tests are added to the SSL test suite to test SCRAM authentication
with channel binding.
Author: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>
Also fix two other issues, while we're at it:
* In error message on connection failure, if multiple network addresses
were given as the host option, as in "host=127.0.0.1,127.0.0.2", the
error message printed the address twice.
* If there were many more ports than hostnames, the error message would
always claim that there was one port too many, even if there was more than
one. For example, if you gave 2 hostnames and 5 ports, the error message
claimed that you gave 2 hostnames and 3 ports.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/10badbc6-4d5a-a769-623a-f7ada43e14dd@iki.fi
Change pg_bsd_indent to follow upstream rules for placement of comments
to the right of code, and remove pgindent hack that caused comments
following #endif to not obey the general rule.
Commit e3860ffa4d wasn't actually using
the published version of pg_bsd_indent, but a hacked-up version that
tried to minimize the amount of movement of comments to the right of
code. The situation of interest is where such a comment has to be
moved to the right of its default placement at column 33 because there's
code there. BSD indent has always moved right in units of tab stops
in such cases --- but in the previous incarnation, indent was working
in 8-space tab stops, while now it knows we use 4-space tabs. So the
net result is that in about half the cases, such comments are placed
one tab stop left of before. This is better all around: it leaves
more room on the line for comment text, and it means that in such
cases the comment uniformly starts at the next 4-space tab stop after
the code, rather than sometimes one and sometimes two tabs after.
Also, ensure that comments following #endif are indented the same
as comments following other preprocessor commands such as #else.
That inconsistency turns out to have been self-inflicted damage
from a poorly-thought-through post-indent "fixup" in pgindent.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
Reformat various places in which pgindent will make a mess, and
fix a few small violations of coding style that I happened to notice
while perusing the diffs from a pgindent dry run.
There is one actual bug fix here: the need-to-enlarge-the-buffer code
path in icu_convert_case was obviously broken. Perhaps it's unreachable
in our usage? Or maybe this is just sadly undertested.
Move the responsibility of reading the data from the authentication request
message from PQconnectPoll() to pg_fe_sendauth(). This way, PQconnectPoll()
doesn't need to know about all the different authentication request types,
and we don't need the extra fields in the pg_conn struct to pass the data
from PQconnectPoll() to pg_fe_sendauth() anymore.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6490b975-5ee1-6280-ac1d-af975b19fb9a%40iki.fi
This used to mean "Visual C++ except in those parts where Borland C++
was supported where it meant one of those". Now that we don't support
Borland C++ anymore, simplify by using _MSC_VER which is the normal way
to detect Visual C++.
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
c.h #includes a number of core libc header files, such as <stdio.h>.
There's no point in re-including these after having read postgres.h,
postgres_fe.h, or c.h; so remove code that did so.
While at it, also fix some places that were ignoring our standard pattern
of "include postgres[_fe].h, then system header files, then other Postgres
header files". While there's not any great magic in doing it that way
rather than system headers last, it's silly to have just a few files
deviating from the general pattern. (But I didn't attempt to enforce this
globally, only in files I was touching anyway.)
I'd be the first to say that this is mostly compulsive neatnik-ism,
but over time it might save enough compile cycles to be useful.
Formerly an alternate password file could only be selected via the
environment variable PGPASSFILE; now it can also be selected via a
new connection parameter "passfile", corresponding to the conventions
for most other connection parameters. There was some concern about
this creating a security weakness, but it was agreed that that argument
was pretty thin, and there are clear use-cases for handling password
files this way.
Julian Markwort, reviewed by Fabien Coelho, some adjustments by me
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/a4b4f4f1-7b58-a0e8-5268-5f7db8e8ccaa@uni-muenster.de
Commit 274bb2b385 made it possible to
specify multiple IPs in a connection string, but that's not good
enough for the case where you have a read-write master and a bunch of
read-only standbys and want to connect to whichever server is the
master at the current time. This commit allows that, by making it
possible to specify target_session_attrs=read-write as a connection
parameter.
There was extensive discussion of the best name for the connection
parameter and its values as well as the best way to distinguish master
and standbys. For now, adopt the same solution as JDBC: if the user
wants a read-write connection, issue 'show transaction_read_only' and
rejection the connection if the result is 'on'. In the future, we
could add additional values of this new target_session_attrs parameter
that issue different queries; or we might have some way of
distinguishing the server type without resorting to an SQL query; but
right now, we have this, and that's (hopefully) a good start.
Victor Wagner and Mithun Cy. Design review by Álvaro Herrera, Catalin
Iacob, Takayuki Tsunakawa, and Craig Ringer; code review by me. I
changed Mithun's patch to skip all remaining IPs for a host if we
reject a connection based on this new parameter, rewrote the
documentation, and did some other cosmetic cleanup.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CAD__OuhqPRGpcsfwPHz_PDqAGkoqS1UvnUnOnAB-LBWBW=wu4A@mail.gmail.com
It's also possible to specify a separate port for each host.
Previously, we'd loop over every address returned by looking up the
host name; now, we'll try every address for every host name.
Patch by me. Victor Wagner wrote an earlier patch for this feature,
which I read, but I didn't use any of his code. Review by Mithun Cy.
OpenSSL officially only supports 1.0.1 and newer. Some OS distributions
still provide patches for 0.9.8, but anything older than that is not
interesting anymore. Let's simplify things by removing compatibility code.
Andreas Karlsson, with small changes by me.
Often, upon getting an unexpected error in psql, one's first wish is that
the verbosity setting had been higher; for example, to be able to see the
schema-name field or the server code location info. Up to now the only way
has been to adjust the VERBOSITY variable and repeat the failing query.
That's a pain, and it doesn't work if the error isn't reproducible.
This commit adds support in libpq for regenerating the error message for
an existing error PGresult at any desired verbosity level. This is almost
just a matter of refactoring the existing code into a subroutine, but there
is one bit of possibly-needed information that was not getting put into
PGresults: the text of the last query sent to the server. We must add that
string to the contents of an error PGresult. But we only need to save it
if it might be used, which with the existing error-formatting code only
happens if there is a PG_DIAG_STATEMENT_POSITION error field, which is
probably pretty rare for errors in production situations. So really the
overhead when the feature isn't used should be negligible.
Alex Shulgin, reviewed by Daniel Vérité, some improvements by me
Previously, if no host information had been specified at connection time,
PQhost() would return NULL (unless you are on Windows, in which case you
got "localhost"). This is an unhelpful definition for a couple of reasons:
it can cause corner-case crashes in applications (cf commit c5ef8ce53d),
and there's no well-defined way for applications to find out the socket
directory path that's actually in use. As an example of the latter
problem, psql substituted DEFAULT_PGSOCKET_DIR for NULL in a couple of
places, but this is subtly wrong because it's conceivable that psql is
using a libpq shared library that was built with a different setting.
Hence, change PQhost() to return DEFAULT_PGSOCKET_DIR when appropriate,
and strip out the now-dead substitutions in psql. (There is still one
remaining reference to DEFAULT_PGSOCKET_DIR in psql, in prompt.c, which
I don't see a nice way to get rid of. But it only controls a prompt
abbreviation decision, so it seems noncritical.)
Also update the docs for PQhost, which had never previously mentioned
the possibility of a socket directory path being returned. In passing
fix the outright-incorrect code comment about PGconn.pgunixsocket.
In commit 210eb9b743 I centralized libpq's logic for closing down
the backend communication socket, and made the new pqDropConnection
routine always reset the I/O buffers to empty. Many of the call sites
previously had not had such code, and while that amounted to an oversight
in some cases, there was one place where it was intentional and necessary
*not* to flush the input buffer: pqReadData should never cause that to
happen, since we probably still want to process whatever data we read.
This is the true cause of the problem Robert was attempting to fix in
c3e7c24a1d, namely that libpq no longer reported the backend's final
ERROR message before reporting "server closed the connection unexpectedly".
But that only accidentally fixed it, by invoking parseInput before the
input buffer got flushed; and very likely there are timing scenarios
where we'd still lose the message before processing it.
To fix, pass a flag to pqDropConnection to tell it whether to flush the
input buffer or not. On review I think flushing is actually correct for
every other call site.
Back-patch to 9.3 where the problem was introduced. In HEAD, also improve
the comments added by c3e7c24a1d.
Remove the code in plpgsql that suppressed the innermost line of CONTEXT
for messages emitted by RAISE commands. That was never more than a quick
backwards-compatibility hack, and it's pretty silly in cases where the
RAISE is nested in several levels of function. What's more, it violated
our design theory that verbosity of error reports should be controlled
on the client side not the server side.
To alleviate the resulting noise increase, introduce a feature in libpq
and psql whereby the CONTEXT field of messages can be suppressed, either
always or only for non-error messages. Printing CONTEXT for errors only
is now their default behavior.
The actual code changes here are pretty small, but the effects on the
regression test outputs are widespread. I had to edit some of the
alternative expected outputs by hand; hopefully the buildfarm will soon
find anything I fat-fingered.
In passing, fix up (again) the output line counts in psql's various
help displays. Add some commentary about how to verify them.
Pavel Stehule, reviewed by Petr Jelínek, Jeevan Chalke, and others
This improves on commit bbfd7edae5 by
making two simple changes:
* pg_attribute_noreturn now takes parentheses, ie pg_attribute_noreturn().
Likewise pg_attribute_unused(), pg_attribute_packed(). This reduces
pgindent's tendency to misformat declarations involving them.
* attributes are now always attached to function declarations, not
definitions. Previously some places were taking creative shortcuts,
which were not merely candidates for bad misformatting by pgindent
but often were outright wrong anyway. (It does little good to put a
noreturn annotation where callers can't see it.) In any case, if
we would like to believe that these macros can be used with non-gcc
compilers, we should avoid gratuitous variance in usage patterns.
I also went through and manually improved the formatting of a lot of
declarations, and got rid of excessively repetitive (and now obsolete
anyway) comments informing the reader what pg_attribute_printf is for.
Until now __attribute__() was defined to be empty for all compilers but
gcc. That's problematic because it prevents using it in other compilers;
which is necessary e.g. for atomics portability. It's also just
generally dubious to do so in a header as widely included as c.h.
Instead add pg_attribute_format_arg, pg_attribute_printf,
pg_attribute_noreturn macros which are implemented in the compilers that
understand them. Also add pg_attribute_noreturn and pg_attribute_packed,
but don't provide fallbacks, since they can affect functionality.
This means that external code that, possibly unwittingly, relied on
__attribute__ defined to be empty on !gcc compilers may now run into
warnings or errors on those compilers. But there shouldn't be many
occurances of that and it's hard to work around...
Discussion: 54B58BA3.8040302@ohmu.fi
Author: Oskari Saarenmaa, with some minor changes by me.
This patch makes libpq check the server's hostname against DNS names listed
in the X509 subjectAltName extension field in the server certificate. This
allows the same certificate to be used for multiple domain names. If there
are no SANs in the certificate, the Common Name field is used, like before
this patch. If both are given, the Common Name is ignored. That is a bit
surprising, but that's the behavior mandated by the relevant RFCs, and it's
also what the common web browsers do.
This also adds a libpq_ngettext helper macro to allow plural messages to be
translated in libpq. Apparently this happened to be the first plural message
in libpq, so it was not needed before.
Alexey Klyukin, with some kibitzing by me.
Tom Lane