Previously, TRUNCATE command through a parent table checked the
permissions on not only the parent table but also the children tables
inherited from it. This was a bug and inherited queries should perform
access permission checks on the parent table only. This commit fixes
that bug.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Author: Amit Langote
Reviewed-by: Fujii Masao
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAHGQGwFHdSvifhJE+-GSNqUHSfbiKxaeQQ7HGcYz6SC2n_oDcg@mail.gmail.com
In examine_variable() and examine_simple_variable(), when checking the
user's table and column privileges to determine whether to grant
access to the pg_statistic data, use checkAsUser for the privilege
checks, if it's set. This will be the case if we're accessing the
table via a view, to indicate that we should perform privilege checks
as the view owner rather than the current user.
This change makes this planner check consistent with the check in the
executor, so the planner will be able to make use of statistics if the
table is accessible via the view. This fixes a performance regression
introduced by commit e2d4ef8de8, which affects queries against
non-security barrier views in the case where the user doesn't have
privileges on the underlying table, but the view owner does.
Note that it continues to provide the same safeguards controlling
access to pg_statistic for direct table access (in which case
checkAsUser won't be set) and for security barrier views, because of
the nearby checks on rte->security_barrier and rte->securityQuals.
Back-patch to all supported branches because e2d4ef8de8 was.
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Jonathan Katz and Stephen Frost.
Now that the ordering of DROP messages ought to be stable everywhere,
we should not need these kluges of hiding DETAIL output just to avoid
unstable ordering. Hiding it's not great for test coverage, so
let's undo that where possible.
In a small number of places, it's necessary to leave it in, for
example because the output might include a variable pg_temp_nnn
schema name. I also left things alone in places where the details
would depend on other regression test scripts, e.g. plpython_drop.sql.
Perhaps buildfarm experience will show this to be a bad idea,
but if so I'd like to know why.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1h6eep-0001Mw-Vd@gemulon.postgresql.org
Previously tables declared WITH OIDS, including a significant fraction
of the catalog tables, stored the oid column not as a normal column,
but as part of the tuple header.
This special column was not shown by default, which was somewhat odd,
as it's often (consider e.g. pg_class.oid) one of the more important
parts of a row. Neither pg_dump nor COPY included the contents of the
oid column by default.
The fact that the oid column was not an ordinary column necessitated a
significant amount of special case code to support oid columns. That
already was painful for the existing, but upcoming work aiming to make
table storage pluggable, would have required expanding and duplicating
that "specialness" significantly.
WITH OIDS has been deprecated since 2005 (commit ff02d0a05280e0).
Remove it.
Removing includes:
- CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE syntax for declaring the table to be
WITH OIDS has been removed (WITH (oids[ = true]) will error out)
- pg_dump does not support dumping tables declared WITH OIDS and will
issue a warning when dumping one (and ignore the oid column).
- restoring an pg_dump archive with pg_restore will warn when
restoring a table with oid contents (and ignore the oid column)
- COPY will refuse to load binary dump that includes oids.
- pg_upgrade will error out when encountering tables declared WITH
OIDS, they have to be altered to remove the oid column first.
- Functionality to access the oid of the last inserted row (like
plpgsql's RESULT_OID, spi's SPI_lastoid, ...) has been removed.
The syntax for declaring a table WITHOUT OIDS (or WITH (oids = false)
for CREATE TABLE) is still supported. While that requires a bit of
support code, it seems unnecessary to break applications / dumps that
do not use oids, and are explicit about not using them.
The biggest user of WITH OID columns was postgres' catalog. This
commit changes all 'magic' oid columns to be columns that are normally
declared and stored. To reduce unnecessary query breakage all the
newly added columns are still named 'oid', even if a table's column
naming scheme would indicate 'reloid' or such. This obviously
requires adapting a lot code, mostly replacing oid access via
HeapTupleGetOid() with access to the underlying Form_pg_*->oid column.
The bootstrap process now assigns oids for all oid columns in
genbki.pl that do not have an explicit value (starting at the largest
oid previously used), only oids assigned later by oids will be above
FirstBootstrapObjectId. As the oid column now is a normal column the
special bootstrap syntax for oids has been removed.
Oids are not automatically assigned during insertion anymore, all
backend code explicitly assigns oids with GetNewOidWithIndex(). For
the rare case that insertions into the catalog via SQL are called for
the new pg_nextoid() function can be used (which only works on catalog
tables).
The fact that oid columns on system tables are now normal columns
means that they will be included in the set of columns expanded
by * (i.e. SELECT * FROM pg_class will now include the table's oid,
previously it did not). It'd not technically be hard to hide oid
column by default, but that'd mean confusing behavior would either
have to be carried forward forever, or it'd cause breakage down the
line.
While it's not unlikely that further adjustments are needed, the
scope/invasiveness of the patch makes it worthwhile to get merge this
now. It's painful to maintain externally, too complicated to commit
after the code code freeze, and a dependency of a number of other
patches.
Catversion bump, for obvious reasons.
Author: Andres Freund, with contributions by John Naylor
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20180930034810.ywp2c7awz7opzcfr@alap3.anarazel.de
This patch fixes several related cases in which pg_shdepend entries were
never made, or were lost, for references to roles appearing in the ACLs of
schemas and/or types. While that did no immediate harm, if a referenced
role were later dropped, the drop would be allowed and would leave a
dangling reference in the object's ACL. That still wasn't a big problem
for normal database usage, but it would cause obscure failures in
subsequent dump/reload or pg_upgrade attempts, taking the form of
attempts to grant privileges to all-numeric role names. (I think I've
seen field reports matching that symptom, but can't find any right now.)
Several cases are fixed here:
1. ALTER DOMAIN SET/DROP DEFAULT would lose the dependencies for any
existing ACL entries for the domain. This case is ancient, dating
back as far as we've had pg_shdepend tracking at all.
2. If a default type privilege applies, CREATE TYPE recorded the
ACL properly but forgot to install dependency entries for it.
This dates to the addition of default privileges for types in 9.2.
3. If a default schema privilege applies, CREATE SCHEMA recorded the
ACL properly but forgot to install dependency entries for it.
This dates to the addition of default privileges for schemas in v10
(commit ab89e465c).
Another somewhat-related problem is that when creating a relation
rowtype or implicit array type, TypeCreate would apply any available
default type privileges to that type, which we don't really want
since such an object isn't supposed to have privileges of its own.
(You can't, for example, drop such privileges once they've been added
to an array type.)
ab89e465c is also to blame for a race condition in the regression tests:
privileges.sql transiently installed globally-applicable default
privileges on schemas, which sometimes got absorbed into the ACLs of
schemas created by concurrent test scripts. This should have resulted
in failures when privileges.sql tried to drop the role holding such
privileges; but thanks to the bug fixed here, it instead led to dangling
ACLs in the final state of the regression database. We'd managed not to
notice that, but it became obvious in the wake of commit da906766c, which
allowed the race condition to occur in pg_upgrade tests.
To fix, add a function recordDependencyOnNewAcl to encapsulate what
callers of get_user_default_acl need to do; while the original call
sites got that right via ad-hoc code, none of the later-added ones
have. Also change GenerateTypeDependencies to generate these
dependencies, which requires adding the typacl to its parameter list.
(That might be annoying if there are any extensions calling that
function directly; but if there are, they're most likely buggy in the
same way as the core callers were, so they need work anyway.) While
I was at it, I changed GenerateTypeDependencies to accept most of its
parameters in the form of a Form_pg_type pointer, making its parameter
list a bit less unwieldy and mistake-prone.
The test race condition is fixed just by wrapping the addition and
removal of default privileges into a single transaction, so that that
state is never visible externally. We might eventually prefer to
separate out tests of default privileges into a script that runs by
itself, but that would be a bigger change and would make the tests
run slower overall.
Back-patch relevant parts to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/15719.1541725287@sss.pgh.pa.us
We created a temp table, then switched to a new session, leaving
the old session to clean up its temp objects in background. If that
took long enough, the eventual attempt to drop the user that owns
the temp table could fail, as exhibited today by sidewinder.
Fix by dropping the temp table explicitly when we're done with it.
It's been like this for quite some time, so back-patch to all
supported branches.
Report: https://buildfarm.postgresql.org/cgi-bin/show_log.pl?nm=sidewinder&dt=2018-10-16%2014%3A45%3A00
The variants of these functions that take numeric inputs (OIDs or
column numbers) are supposed to return NULL rather than failing
on bad input; this rule reduces problems with snapshot skew when
queries apply the functions to all rows of a catalog.
has_column_privilege() had careless handling of the case where the
table OID didn't exist. You might get something like this:
select has_column_privilege(9999,'nosuchcol','select');
ERROR: column "nosuchcol" of relation "(null)" does not exist
or you might get a crash, depending on the platform's printf's response
to a null string pointer.
In addition, while applying the column-number variant to a dropped
column returned NULL as desired, applying the column-name variant
did not:
select has_column_privilege('mytable','........pg.dropped.2........','select');
ERROR: column "........pg.dropped.2........" of relation "mytable" does not exist
It seems better to make this case return NULL as well.
Also, the OID-accepting variants of has_foreign_data_wrapper_privilege,
has_server_privilege, and has_tablespace_privilege didn't follow the
principle of returning NULL for nonexistent OIDs. Superusers got TRUE,
everybody else got an error.
Per investigation of Jaime Casanova's report of a new crash in HEAD.
These behaviors have been like this for a long time, so back-patch to
all supported branches.
Patch by me; thanks to Stephen Frost for discussion and review
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAJGNTeP=-6Gyqq5TN9OvYEydi7Fv1oGyYj650LGTnW44oAzYCg@mail.gmail.com
This reverts commits d204ef6377,
83454e3c2b and a few more commits thereafter
(complete list at the end) related to MERGE feature.
While the feature was fully functional, with sufficient test coverage and
necessary documentation, it was felt that some parts of the executor and
parse-analyzer can use a different design and it wasn't possible to do that in
the available time. So it was decided to revert the patch for PG11 and retry
again in the future.
Thanks again to all reviewers and bug reporters.
List of commits reverted, in reverse chronological order:
f1464c5380 Improve parse representation for MERGE
ddb4158579 MERGE syntax diagram correction
530e69e59b Allow cpluspluscheck to pass by renaming variable
01b88b4df5 MERGE minor errata
3af7b2b0d4 MERGE fix variable warning in non-assert builds
a5d86181ec MERGE INSERT allows only one VALUES clause
4b2d44031f MERGE post-commit review
4923550c20 Tab completion for MERGE
aa3faa3c7a WITH support in MERGE
83454e3c2b New files for MERGE
d204ef6377 MERGE SQL Command following SQL:2016
Author: Pavan Deolasee
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
MERGE performs actions that modify rows in the target table
using a source table or query. MERGE provides a single SQL
statement that can conditionally INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE rows
a task that would other require multiple PL statements.
e.g.
MERGE INTO target AS t
USING source AS s
ON t.tid = s.sid
WHEN MATCHED AND t.balance > s.delta THEN
UPDATE SET balance = t.balance - s.delta
WHEN MATCHED THEN
DELETE
WHEN NOT MATCHED AND s.delta > 0 THEN
INSERT VALUES (s.sid, s.delta)
WHEN NOT MATCHED THEN
DO NOTHING;
MERGE works with regular and partitioned tables, including
column and row security enforcement, as well as support for
row, statement and transition triggers.
MERGE is optimized for OLTP and is parameterizable, though
also useful for large scale ETL/ELT. MERGE is not intended
to be used in preference to existing single SQL commands
for INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE since there is some overhead.
MERGE can be used statically from PL/pgSQL.
MERGE does not yet support inheritance, write rules,
RETURNING clauses, updatable views or foreign tables.
MERGE follows SQL Standard per the most recent SQL:2016.
Includes full tests and documentation, including full
isolation tests to demonstrate the concurrent behavior.
This version written from scratch in 2017 by Simon Riggs,
using docs and tests originally written in 2009. Later work
from Pavan Deolasee has been both complex and deep, leaving
the lead author credit now in his hands.
Extensive discussion of concurrency from Peter Geoghegan,
with thanks for the time and effort contributed.
Various issues reported via sqlsmith by Andreas Seltenreich
Authors: Pavan Deolasee, Simon Riggs
Reviewer: Peter Geoghegan, Amit Langote, Tomas Vondra, Simon Riggs
Discussion:
https://postgr.es/m/CANP8+jKitBSrB7oTgT9CY2i1ObfOt36z0XMraQc+Xrz8QB0nXA@mail.gmail.comhttps://postgr.es/m/CAH2-WzkJdBuxj9PO=2QaO9-3h3xGbQPZ34kJH=HukRekwM-GZg@mail.gmail.com
Many of the objects we create during the regression tests are put in the
public schema, so that using the same names in different regression tests
creates a hazard of test failures if any two such scripts run concurrently.
This patch cleans up a bunch of latent hazards of that sort, as well as two
live hazards.
The current situation in this regard is far worse than it was a year or two
back, because practically all of the partitioning-related test cases have
reused table names with enthusiasm. I despaired of cleaning up that mess
within the five most-affected tests (create_table, alter_table, insert,
update, inherit); fortunately those don't run concurrently.
Other than partitioning problems, most of the issues boil down to using
names like "foo", "bar", "tmp", etc, without thought for the fact that
other test scripts might use similar names concurrently. I've made an
effort to make all such names more specific.
One of the live hazards was that commit 7421f4b8 caused with.sql to
create a table named "test", conflicting with a similarly-named table
in alter_table.sql; this was exposed in the buildfarm recently.
The other one was that join.sql and transactions.sql both create tables
named "foo" and "bar"; but join.sql's uses of those names date back
only to December or so.
Since commit 7421f4b8 was back-patched to v10, back-patch a minimal
fix for that problem. The rest of this is just future-proofing.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/4627.1521070268@sss.pgh.pa.us
Since these names are global, using the same ones in different regression
tests creates a hazard of test failures if any two such scripts run
concurrently. Let's establish a policy of not doing that. In the cases
where a conflict existed, I chose to rename both sides: in principle one
script or the other could've been left in possession of the common name,
but that seems to just invite more trouble of the same sort.
There are a number of places where scripts are using names that seem
unduly generic, but in the absence of actual conflicts I left them alone.
In addition, fix insert.sql's use of "someone_else" as a role name.
That's a flat out violation of longstanding project policy, so back-patch
that change to v10 where the usage appeared. The rest of this is just
future-proofing, as no two of these scripts are actually run concurrently
in the existing parallel_schedule.
Conflicts of schema-qualified names also exist, but will be dealt with
separately.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/4627.1521070268@sss.pgh.pa.us
This adds a new object type "procedure" that is similar to a function
but does not have a return type and is invoked by the new CALL statement
instead of SELECT or similar. This implementation is aligned with the
SQL standard and compatible with or similar to other SQL implementations.
This commit adds new commands CALL, CREATE/ALTER/DROP PROCEDURE, as well
as ALTER/DROP ROUTINE that can refer to either a function or a
procedure (or an aggregate function, as an extension to SQL). There is
also support for procedures in various utility commands such as COMMENT
and GRANT, as well as support in pg_dump and psql. Support for defining
procedures is available in all the languages supplied by the core
distribution.
While this commit is mainly syntax sugar around existing functionality,
future features will rely on having procedures as a separate object
type.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
While it's generally unwise to give permissions on these functions to
anyone but a superuser, we've been moving away from hard-wired permission
checks inside functions in favor of using the SQL permission system to
control access. Bring lo_import() and lo_export() into compliance with
that approach.
In particular, this removes the manual configuration option
ALLOW_DANGEROUS_LO_FUNCTIONS. That dates back to 1999 (commit 4cd4a54c8);
it's unlikely anyone has used it in many years. Moreover, if you really
want such behavior, now you can get it with GRANT ... TO PUBLIC instead.
Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAB7nPqRHmNOYbETnc_2EjsuzSM00Z+BWKv9sy6tnvSd5gWT_JA@mail.gmail.com
The update path of an INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE requires SELECT
permission on the columns of the arbiter index, but it failed to check
for that in the case of an arbiter specified by constraint name.
In addition, for a table with row level security enabled, it failed to
check updated rows against the table's SELECT policies when the update
path was taken (regardless of how the arbiter index was specified).
Backpatch to 9.5 where ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE and RLS were introduced.
Security: CVE-2017-15099
lo_put() surely should require UPDATE permission, the same as lowrite(),
but it failed to check for that, as reported by Chapman Flack. Oversight
in commit c50b7c09d; backpatch to 9.4 where that was introduced.
Tom Lane and Michael Paquier
Security: CVE-2017-7548
DROP CASCADE doesn't currently promise to visit dependent objects in
a fixed order, so when the regression tests use it, we typically need
to suppress the details of which objects get dropped in order to have
predictable test output. Traditionally we've done that by setting
client_min_messages higher than NOTICE, but there's a better way:
we can "\set VERBOSITY terse" in psql. That suppresses the DETAIL
message with the object list, but we still get the basic notice telling
how many objects were dropped. So at least the test case can verify
that the expected number of objects were dropped.
The VERBOSITY method was already in use in a few places, but run
around and use it wherever it makes sense.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/10766.1501608885@sss.pgh.pa.us
Some selectivity estimation functions run user-supplied operators over
data obtained from pg_statistic without security checks, which allows
those operators to leak pg_statistic data without having privileges on
the underlying tables. Fix by checking that one of the following is
satisfied: (1) the user has table or column privileges on the table
underlying the pg_statistic data, or (2) the function implementing the
user-supplied operator is leak-proof. If neither is satisfied, planning
will proceed as if there are no statistics available.
At least one of these is satisfied in most cases in practice. The only
situations that are negatively impacted are user-defined or
not-leak-proof operators on a security-barrier view.
Reported-by: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Author: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Security: CVE-2017-7484
This replaces the old, recursive tree-walk based evaluation, with
non-recursive, opcode dispatch based, expression evaluation.
Projection is now implemented as part of expression evaluation.
This both leads to significant performance improvements, and makes
future just-in-time compilation of expressions easier.
The speed gains primarily come from:
- non-recursive implementation reduces stack usage / overhead
- simple sub-expressions are implemented with a single jump, without
function calls
- sharing some state between different sub-expressions
- reduced amount of indirect/hard to predict memory accesses by laying
out operation metadata sequentially; including the avoidance of
nearly all of the previously used linked lists
- more code has been moved to expression initialization, avoiding
constant re-checks at evaluation time
Future just-in-time compilation (JIT) has become easier, as
demonstrated by released patches intended to be merged in a later
release, for primarily two reasons: Firstly, due to a stricter split
between expression initialization and evaluation, less code has to be
handled by the JIT. Secondly, due to the non-recursive nature of the
generated "instructions", less performance-critical code-paths can
easily be shared between interpreted and compiled evaluation.
The new framework allows for significant future optimizations. E.g.:
- basic infrastructure for to later reduce the per executor-startup
overhead of expression evaluation, by caching state in prepared
statements. That'd be helpful in OLTPish scenarios where
initialization overhead is measurable.
- optimizing the generated "code". A number of proposals for potential
work has already been made.
- optimizing the interpreter. Similarly a number of proposals have
been made here too.
The move of logic into the expression initialization step leads to some
backward-incompatible changes:
- Function permission checks are now done during expression
initialization, whereas previously they were done during
execution. In edge cases this can lead to errors being raised that
previously wouldn't have been, e.g. a NULL array being coerced to a
different array type previously didn't perform checks.
- The set of domain constraints to be checked, is now evaluated once
during expression initialization, previously it was re-built
every time a domain check was evaluated. For normal queries this
doesn't change much, but e.g. for plpgsql functions, which caches
ExprStates, the old set could stick around longer. The behavior
around might still change.
Author: Andres Freund, with significant changes by Tom Lane,
changes by Heikki Linnakangas
Reviewed-By: Tom Lane, Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20161206034955.bh33paeralxbtluv@alap3.anarazel.de
Upcoming patches are revamping expression evaluation significantly. It
therefore seems prudent to try to ensure that the coverage of the
existing evaluation code is high.
This commit adds coverage for the cases that can reasonably be
tested. There's still a bunch of unreachable error messages and such,
but otherwise this achieves nearly full regression test coverage (with
the exception of the unused GetAttributeByNum/GetAttributeByName).
Author: Andres Freund
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20170310194021.ek4bs4bl2khxkmll@alap3.anarazel.de
When performing a pg_upgrade, we copy the files behind pg_largeobject
and pg_largeobject_metadata, allowing us to avoid having to dump out and
reload the actual data for large objects and their ACLs.
Unfortunately, that isn't all of the information which can be associated
with large objects. Currently, we also support COMMENTs and SECURITY
LABELs with large objects and these were being silently dropped during a
pg_upgrade as pg_dump would skip everything having to do with a large
object and pg_upgrade only copied the tables mentioned to the new
cluster.
As the file copies happen after the catalog dump and reload, we can't
simply include the COMMENTs and SECURITY LABELs in pg_dump's binary-mode
output but we also have to include the actual large object definition as
well. With the definition, comments, and security labels in the pg_dump
output and the file copies performed by pg_upgrade, all of the data and
metadata associated with large objects is able to be successfully pulled
forward across a pg_upgrade.
In 9.6 and master, we can simply adjust the dump bitmask to indicate
which components we don't want. In 9.5 and earlier, we have to put
explciit checks in in dumpBlob() and dumpBlobs() to not include the ACL
or the data when in binary-upgrade mode.
Adjustments made to the privileges regression test to allow another test
(large_object.sql) to be added which explicitly leaves a large object
with a comment in place to provide coverage of that case with
pg_upgrade.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20170221162655.GE9812@tamriel.snowman.net
To ensure that "make installcheck" can be used safely against an existing
installation, we need to be careful about what global object names
(database, role, and tablespace names) we use; otherwise we might
accidentally clobber important objects. There's been a weak consensus that
test databases should have names including "regression", and that test role
names should start with "regress_", but we didn't have any particular rule
about tablespace names; and neither of the other rules was followed with
any consistency either.
This commit moves us a long way towards having a hard-and-fast rule that
regression test databases must have names including "regression", and that
test role and tablespace names must start with "regress_". It's not
completely there because I did not touch some test cases in rolenames.sql
that test creation of special role names like "session_user". That will
require some rethinking of exactly what we want to test, whereas the intent
of this patch is just to hit all the cases in which the needed renamings
are cosmetic.
There is no enforcement mechanism in this patch either, but if we don't
add one we can expect that the tests will soon be violating the convention
again. Again, that's not such a cosmetic change and it will require
discussion. (But I did use a quick-hack enforcement patch to find these
cases.)
Discussion: <16638.1468620817@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Test the interactions with permissions and LOCK TABLE. Specifically
ROW EXCLUSIVE, ACCESS SHARE, and ACCESS EXCLUSIVE modes against
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, and TRUNCATE permissions. Discussed
by Stephen Frost and Michael Paquier, patch by the latter. Backpatch
to 9.5 where matching behavior was first committed.
The newly added ON CONFLICT clause allows to specify an alternative to
raising a unique or exclusion constraint violation error when inserting.
ON CONFLICT refers to constraints that can either be specified using a
inference clause (by specifying the columns of a unique constraint) or
by naming a unique or exclusion constraint. DO NOTHING avoids the
constraint violation, without touching the pre-existing row. DO UPDATE
SET ... [WHERE ...] updates the pre-existing tuple, and has access to
both the tuple proposed for insertion and the existing tuple; the
optional WHERE clause can be used to prevent an update from being
executed. The UPDATE SET and WHERE clauses have access to the tuple
proposed for insertion using the "magic" EXCLUDED alias, and to the
pre-existing tuple using the table name or its alias.
This feature is often referred to as upsert.
This is implemented using a new infrastructure called "speculative
insertion". It is an optimistic variant of regular insertion that first
does a pre-check for existing tuples and then attempts an insert. If a
violating tuple was inserted concurrently, the speculatively inserted
tuple is deleted and a new attempt is made. If the pre-check finds a
matching tuple the alternative DO NOTHING or DO UPDATE action is taken.
If the insertion succeeds without detecting a conflict, the tuple is
deemed inserted.
To handle the possible ambiguity between the excluded alias and a table
named excluded, and for convenience with long relation names, INSERT
INTO now can alias its target table.
Bumps catversion as stored rules change.
Author: Peter Geoghegan, with significant contributions from Heikki
Linnakangas and Andres Freund. Testing infrastructure by Jeff Janes.
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas, Andres Freund, Robert Haas, Simon Riggs,
Dean Rasheed, Stephen Frost and many others.
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
Granting a role without ADMIN OPTION is supposed to prevent the grantee
from adding or removing members from the granted role. Issuing SET ROLE
before the GRANT bypassed that, because the role itself had an implicit
right to add or remove members. Plug that hole by recognizing that
implicit right only when the session user matches the current role.
Additionally, do not recognize it during a security-restricted operation
or during execution of a SECURITY DEFINER function. The restriction on
SECURITY DEFINER is not security-critical. However, it seems best for a
user testing his own SECURITY DEFINER function to see the same behavior
others will see. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions).
The SQL standards do not conflate roles and users as PostgreSQL does;
only SQL roles have members, and only SQL users initiate sessions. An
application using PostgreSQL users and roles as SQL users and roles will
never attempt to grant membership in the role that is the session user,
so the implicit right to add or remove members will never arise.
The security impact was mostly that a role member could revoke access
from others, contrary to the wishes of his own grantor. Unapproved role
member additions are less notable, because the member can still largely
achieve that by creating a view or a SECURITY DEFINER function.
Reviewed by Andres Freund and Tom Lane. Reported, independently, by
Jonas Sundman and Noah Misch.
Security: CVE-2014-0060
This reverts the code changes in 50c137487c,
which turned out to induce crashes and not completely fix the problem
anyway. That commit only considered single subqueries that were excluded
by constraint-exclusion logic, but actually the problem also exists for
subqueries that are appendrel members (ie part of a UNION ALL list). In
such cases we can't add a dummy subpath to the appendrel's AppendPath list
without defeating the logic that recognizes when an appendrel is completely
excluded. Instead, fix the problem by having setrefs.c scan the rangetable
an extra time looking for subqueries that didn't get into the plan tree.
(This approach depends on the 9.2 change that made set_subquery_pathlist
generate dummy paths for excluded single subqueries, so that the exclusion
behavior is the same for single subqueries and appendrel members.)
Note: it turns out that the appendrel form of the missed-permissions-checks
bug exists as far back as 8.4. However, since the practical effect of that
bug seems pretty minimal, consensus is to not attempt to fix it in the back
branches, at least not yet. Possibly we could back-port this patch once
it's gotten a reasonable amount of testing in HEAD. For the moment I'm
just going to revert the previous patch in 9.2.
A view defined as "select <something> where false" had the curious property
that the system wouldn't check whether users had the privileges necessary
to select from it. More generally, permissions checks could be skipped
for tables referenced in sub-selects or views that were proven empty by
constraint exclusion (although some quick testing suggests this seldom
happens in cases of practical interest). This happened because the planner
failed to include rangetable entries for such tables in the finished plan.
This was noticed in connection with erroneous handling of materialized
views, but actually the issue is quite unrelated to matviews. Therefore,
revert commit 200ba1667b in favor of a more
direct test for the real problem.
Back-patch to 9.2 where the bug was introduced (by commit
7741dd6590).
If we revoke a grant option from some role X, but X still holds the option
via another grant, we should not recursively revoke the privilege from
role(s) Y that X had granted it to. This was supposedly fixed as one
aspect of commit 4b2dafcc0b, but I must not
have tested it, because in fact that code never worked: it forgot to shift
the grant-option bits back over when masking the bits being revoked.
Per bug #6728 from Daniel German. Back-patch to all active branches,
since this has been wrong since 8.0.
This adds support for the more or less SQL-conforming USAGE privilege
on types and domains. The intent is to be able restrict which users
can create dependencies on types, which restricts the way in which
owners can alter types.
reviewed by Yeb Havinga
the privileges that will be applied to subsequently-created objects.
Such adjustments are always per owning role, and can be restricted to objects
created in particular schemas too. A notable benefit is that users can
override the traditional default privilege settings, eg, the PUBLIC EXECUTE
privilege traditionally granted by default for functions.
Petr Jelinek
Add family of functions that did not exist earlier,
mainly due to historical omission. Original patch by
Abhijit Menon-Sen, with review and modifications by
Joe Conway. catversion.h bumped.
attribute numbering. Also, a parent whole-row reference should not require
select privilege on child columns that aren't inherited from the parent.
Problem diagnosed by KaiGai Kohei, though this isn't exactly his patch.
has_column_privilege and has_any_column_privilege SQL functions; fix the
information_schema views that are supposed to pay attention to column
privileges; adjust pg_stats to show stats for any column you have select
privilege on; and fix COPY to allow copying a subset of columns if the user
has suitable per-column privileges for all the columns.
To improve efficiency of some of the information_schema views, extend the
has_xxx_privilege functions to allow inquiring about the OR of a set of
privileges in just one call. This is just exposing capability that already
existed in the underlying aclcheck routines.
In passing, make the information_schema views report the owner's own
privileges as being grantable, since Postgres assumes this even when the grant
option bit is not set in the ACL. This is a longstanding oversight.
Also, make the new has_xxx_privilege functions for foreign data objects follow
the same coding conventions used by the older ones.
Stephen Frost and Tom Lane
can create or modify rules for the table. Do setRuleCheckAsUser() while
loading rules into the relcache, rather than when defining a rule. This
ensures that permission checks for tables referenced in a rule are done with
respect to the current owner of the rule's table, whereas formerly ALTER TABLE
OWNER would fail to update the permission checking for associated rules.
Removal of separate RULE privilege is needed to prevent various scenarios
in which a grantee of RULE privilege could effectively have any privilege
of the table owner. For backwards compatibility, GRANT/REVOKE RULE is still
accepted, but it doesn't do anything. Per discussion here:
http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2006-04/msg01138.php
code to forcibly drop regressuser[1-4] and regressgroup[1-2]. Instead,
let the privileges.sql test do that for itself (this is made easy by
the recent addition of DROP ROLE IF EXISTS). Per a recent patch proposed
by Joachim Wieland --- the rest of his patch is superseded by the
rewrite into C, but this is a good idea we should adopt.
Fujii Masao