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${ noResults }
153 Commits (64f77c6a65cb6a0731e59acbfab1dd1663b1cdd3)
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
---|---|---|---|
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64f77c6a65 |
Fix security checks in selectivity estimation functions.
Commit |
1 month ago |
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ccacaf4fae |
Fix inconsistent quoting of role names in ACLs.
getid() and putid(), which parse and deparse role names within ACL input/output, applied isalnum() to see if a character within a role name requires quoting. They did this even for non-ASCII characters, which is problematic because the results would depend on encoding, locale, and perhaps even platform. So it's possible that putid() could elect not to quote some string that, later in some other environment, getid() will decide is not a valid identifier, causing dump/reload or similar failures. To fix this in a way that won't risk interoperability problems with unpatched versions, make getid() treat any non-ASCII as a legitimate identifier character (hence not requiring quotes), while making putid() treat any non-ASCII as requiring quoting. We could remove the resulting excess quoting once we feel that no unpatched servers remain in the wild, but that'll be years. A lesser problem is that getid() did the wrong thing with an input consisting of just two double quotes (""). That has to represent an empty string, but getid() read it as a single double quote instead. The case cannot arise in the normal course of events, since we don't allow empty-string role names. But let's fix it while we're here. Although we've not heard field reports of problems with non-ASCII role names, there's clearly a hazard there, so back-patch to all supported versions. Reported-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org> Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/3792884.1751492172@sss.pgh.pa.us Backpatch-through: 13 |
2 months ago |
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8cc139bec3 |
Introduce pg_shmem_allocations_numa view
Introduce new pg_shmem_alloctions_numa view with information about how shared memory is distributed across NUMA nodes. For each shared memory segment, the view returns one row for each NUMA node backing it, with the total amount of memory allocated from that node. The view may be relatively expensive, especially when executed for the first time in a backend, as it has to touch all memory pages to get reliable information about the NUMA node. This may also force allocation of the shared memory. Unlike pg_shmem_allocations, the view does not show anonymous shared memory allocations. It also does not show memory allocated using the dynamic shared memory infrastructure. Author: Jakub Wartak <jakub.wartak@enterprisedb.com> Reviewed-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> Reviewed-by: Bertrand Drouvot <bertranddrouvot.pg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Vondra <tomas@vondra.me> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAKZiRmxh6KWo0aqRqvmcoaX2jUxZYb4kGp3N%3Dq1w%2BDiH-696Xw%40mail.gmail.com |
5 months ago |
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0d6c477664 |
Extend ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES to define default privileges for large objects.
Previously, ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES did not support large objects. This meant that to grant privileges to users other than the owner, permissions had to be manually assigned each time a large object was created, which was inconvenient. This commit extends ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES to allow defining default access privileges for large objects. With this change, specified privileges will automatically apply to newly created large objects, making privilege management more efficient. As a side effect, this commit introduces the new keyword OBJECTS since it's used in the syntax of ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES. Original patch by Haruka Takatsuka, with some fixes and tests by Yugo Nagata, and rebased by Laurenz Albe. Author: Takatsuka Haruka <harukat@sraoss.co.jp> Co-authored-by: Yugo Nagata <nagata@sraoss.co.jp> Co-authored-by: Laurenz Albe <laurenz.albe@cybertec.at> Reviewed-by: Masao Fujii <masao.fujii@gmail.com> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20240424115242.236b499b2bed5b7a27f7a418@sraoss.co.jp |
5 months ago |
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60f566b4f2 |
aio: Add pg_aios view
The new view lists all IO handles that are currently in use and is mainly useful for PG developers, but may also be useful when tuning PG. Bumps catversion. Reviewed-by: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/uvrtrknj4kdytuboidbhwclo4gxhswwcpgadptsjvjqcluzmah%40brqs62irg4dt |
5 months ago |
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025e7e1eb4 |
Remove count_one_bits() in acl.c.
The only caller, select_best_grantor(), can instead use pg_popcount64(). This isn't performance-critical code, but we might as well use the centralized implementation. While at it, add some test coverage for this part of select_best_grantor(). Reviewed-by: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Z9GtL7Nm6hsYyJnF%40nathan |
6 months ago |
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98fc31d649 |
Avoid race condition between "GRANT role" and "DROP ROLE".
Concurrently dropping either the granted role or the grantee
does not stop GRANT from completing, instead resulting in a
dangling role reference in pg_auth_members. That's relatively
harmless in the short run, but inconsistent catalog entries
are not a good thing.
This patch solves the problem by adding the granted and grantee
roles as explicit shared dependencies of the pg_auth_members entry.
That's a bit indirect, but it works because the pg_shdepend code
applies the necessary locking and rechecking.
Commit
|
7 months ago |
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39e3bcae44 |
Fix an ALTER GROUP ... DROP USER error message.
This error message stated the privileges required to add a member to a group even if the user was trying to drop a member: postgres=> alter group a drop user b; ERROR: permission denied to alter role DETAIL: Only roles with the ADMIN option on role "a" may add members. Since the required privileges for both operations are the same, we can fix this by modifying the message to mention both adding and dropping members: postgres=> alter group a drop user b; ERROR: permission denied to alter role DETAIL: Only roles with the ADMIN option on role "a" may add or drop members. Author: ChangAo Chen Reviewed-by: Tom Lane Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/tencent_FAA0D00E3514AAF0BBB6322542A6094FEF05%40qq.com Backpatch-through: 16 |
8 months ago |
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5a2fed911a |
Fix improper interactions between session_authorization and role.
The SQL spec mandates that SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION implies
SET ROLE NONE. We tried to implement that within the lowest-level
functions that manipulate these settings, but that was a bad idea.
In particular, guc.c assumes that it doesn't matter in what order
it applies GUC variable updates, but that was not the case for these
two variables. This problem, compounded by some hackish attempts to
work around it, led to some security-grade issues:
* Rolling back a transaction that had done SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION
would revert to SET ROLE NONE, even if that had not been the previous
state, so that the effective user ID might now be different from what
it had been.
* The same for SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION in a function SET clause.
* If a parallel worker inspected current_setting('role'), it saw
"none" even when it should see something else.
Also, although the parallel worker startup code intended to cope
with the current role's pg_authid row having disappeared, its
implementation of that was incomplete so it would still fail.
Fix by fully separating the miscinit.c functions that assign
session_authorization from those that assign role. To implement the
spec's requirement, teach set_config_option itself to perform "SET
ROLE NONE" when it sets session_authorization. (This is undoubtedly
ugly, but the alternatives seem worse. In particular, there's no way
to do it within assign_session_authorization without incompatible
changes in the API for GUC assign hooks.) Also, improve
ParallelWorkerMain to directly set all the relevant user-ID variables
instead of relying on some of them to get set indirectly. That
allows us to survive not finding the pg_authid row during worker
startup.
In v16 and earlier, this includes back-patching
|
10 months ago |
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4eada203a5 |
Add has_largeobject_privilege function.
This function checks whether a user has specific privileges on a large object, identified by OID. The user can be provided by name, OID, or default to the current user. If the specified large object doesn't exist, the function returns NULL. It raises an error for a non-existent user name. This behavior is basically consistent with other privilege inquiry functions like has_table_privilege. Bump catalog version. Author: Yugo Nagata Reviewed-by: Fujii Masao Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20240702163444.ab586f6075e502eb84f11b1a@sranhm.sraoss.co.jp |
1 year ago |
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fefa76f70f |
Remove old RULE privilege completely.
The RULE privilege for tables was removed in v8.2, but for backward compatibility, GRANT/REVOKE and privilege functions like has_table_privilege continued to accept the RULE keyword without any effect. After discussions on pgsql-hackers, it was agreed that this compatibility is no longer needed. Since it's been long enough since the deprecation, we've decided to fully remove support for RULE privilege, so GRANT/REVOKE and privilege functions will no longer accept it. Author: Fujii Masao Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/976a3581-6939-457f-b947-fc3dc836c083@oss.nttdata.com |
1 year ago |
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d898665bf7 |
Extend pg_get_acl() to handle sub-object IDs
This patch modifies the pg_get_acl() function to accept a third argument called "objsubid", bringing it on par with similar functions in this area like pg_describe_object(). This enables the retrieval of ACLs for relation attributes when scanning dependencies. Bump catalog version. Author: Joel Jacobson Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/f2539bff-64be-47f0-9f0b-df85d3cc0432@app.fastmail.com |
1 year ago |
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4564f1cebd |
Add pg_get_acl() to get the ACL for a database object
This function returns the ACL for a database object, specified by catalog OID and object OID. This is useful to be able to retrieve the ACL associated to an object specified with a (class_id,objid) couple, similarly to the other functions for object identification, when joined with pg_depend or pg_shdepend. Original idea by Álvaro Herrera. Bump catalog version. Author: Joel Jacobson Reviewed-by: Isaac Morland, Michael Paquier, Ranier Vilela Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/80b16434-b9b1-4c3d-8f28-569f21c2c102@app.fastmail.com |
1 year ago |
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ecb0fd3372 |
Reintroduce MAINTAIN privilege and pg_maintain predefined role.
Roles with MAINTAIN on a relation may run VACUUM, ANALYZE, REINDEX, REFRESH MATERIALIZE VIEW, CLUSTER, and LOCK TABLE on the relation. Roles with privileges of pg_maintain may run those same commands on all relations. This was previously committed for v16, but it was reverted in commit |
2 years ago |
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2af07e2f74 |
Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations.
While executing maintenance operations (ANALYZE, CLUSTER, REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW, REINDEX, or VACUUM), set search_path to 'pg_catalog, pg_temp' to prevent inconsistent behavior. Functions that are used for functional indexes, in index expressions, or in materialized views and depend on a different search path must be declared with CREATE FUNCTION ... SET search_path='...'. This change was previously committed as |
2 years ago |
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3a9b18b309 |
Ban role pg_signal_backend from more superuser backend types.
Documentation says it cannot signal "a backend owned by a superuser". On the contrary, it could signal background workers, including the logical replication launcher. It could signal autovacuum workers and the autovacuum launcher. Block all that. Signaling autovacuum workers and those two launchers doesn't stall progress beyond what one could achieve other ways. If a cluster uses a non-core extension with a background worker that does not auto-restart, this could create a denial of service with respect to that background worker. A background worker with bugs in its code for responding to terminations or cancellations could experience those bugs at a time the pg_signal_backend member chooses. Back-patch to v11 (all supported versions). Reviewed by Jelte Fennema-Nio. Reported by Hemanth Sandrana and Mahendrakar Srinivasarao. Security: CVE-2023-5870 |
2 years ago |
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151c22deee |
Revert MAINTAIN privilege and pg_maintain predefined role.
This reverts the following commits: |
2 years ago |
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4dbdb82513 |
Fix cache lookup hazards introduced by ff9618e82a .
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2 years ago |
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2fcc7ee7af |
Revert "Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations."
This reverts commit
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2 years ago |
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05e1737351 |
Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations.
While executing maintenance operations (ANALYZE, CLUSTER, REFRESH
MATERIALIZED VIEW, REINDEX, or VACUUM), set search_path to
'pg_catalog, pg_temp' to prevent inconsistent behavior.
Functions that are used for functional indexes, in index expressions,
or in materialized views and depend on a different search path must be
declared with CREATE FUNCTION ... SET search_path='...'.
This change addresses a security risk introduced in commit
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2 years ago |
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de4d456b40 |
Improve several permission-related error messages.
Mainly move some detail from errmsg to errdetail, remove explicit mention of superuser where appropriate, since that is implied in most permission checks, and make messages more uniform. Author: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com> Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20230316234701.GA903298@nathanxps13 |
3 years ago |
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b8da37b3ad |
Rework pg_input_error_message(), now renamed pg_input_error_info()
pg_input_error_info() is now a SQL function able to return a row with more than just the error message generated for incorrect data type inputs when these are able to handle soft failures, returning more contents of ErrorData, as of: - The error message (same as before). - The error detail, if set. - The error hint, if set. - SQL error code. All the regression tests that relied on pg_input_error_message() are updated to reflect the effects of the rename. Per discussion with Tom Lane and Andrew Dunstan. Author: Nathan Bossart Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/139a68e1-bd1f-a9a7-b5fe-0be9845c6311@dunslane.net |
3 years ago |
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c44f6334ca |
Simplify permissions for LOCK TABLE.
The prior behavior was confusing and hard to document. For instance, if you had UPDATE privileges, you could lock a table in any lock mode except ACCESS SHARE mode. Now, if granted a privilege to lock at a given mode, one also has privileges to lock at a less-conflicting mode. MAINTAIN, UPDATE, DELETE, and TRUNCATE privileges allow any lock mode. INSERT privileges allow ROW EXCLUSIVE (or below). SELECT privileges allow ACCESS SHARE. Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9550c76535404a83156252b25a11babb4792ea1e.camel%40j-davis.com |
3 years ago |
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47f3f97fcd |
Convert a few more datatype input functions to report errors softly.
Convert assorted internal-ish datatypes, namely aclitemin, int2vectorin, oidin, oidvectorin, pg_lsn_in, pg_snapshot_in, and tidin to the new style. (Some others you might expect to find in this group, such as cidin and xidin, need no changes because they never throw errors at all. That seems a little cheesy ... but it is not in the charter of this patch series to add new error conditions.) Amul Sul, minor mods by me Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAAJ_b97KeDWUdpTKGOaFYPv0OicjOu6EW+QYWj-Ywrgj_aEy1g@mail.gmail.com |
3 years ago |
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60684dd834 |
Add grantable MAINTAIN privilege and pg_maintain role.
Allows VACUUM, ANALYZE, REINDEX, REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW, CLUSTER,
and LOCK TABLE.
Effectively reverts
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3 years ago |
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4441fc704d |
Provide non-superuser predefined roles for vacuum and analyze
This provides two new predefined roles: pg_vacuum_all_tables and pg_analyze_all_tables. Roles which have been granted these roles can perform vacuum or analyse respectively on any or all tables as if they were a superuser. This removes the need to grant superuser privilege to roles just so they can perform vacuum and/or analyze. Nathan Bossart Reviewed by: Bharath Rupireddy, Kyotaro Horiguchi, Stephen Frost, Robert Haas, Mark Dilger, Tom Lane, Corey Huinker, David G. Johnston, Michael Paquier. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220722203735.GB3996698@nathanxps13 |
3 years ago |
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b5d6382496 |
Provide per-table permissions for vacuum and analyze.
Currently a table can only be vacuumed or analyzed by its owner or a superuser. This can now be extended to any user by means of an appropriate GRANT. Nathan Bossart Reviewed by: Bharath Rupireddy, Kyotaro Horiguchi, Stephen Frost, Robert Haas, Mark Dilger, Tom Lane, Corey Huinker, David G. Johnston, Michael Paquier. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220722203735.GB3996698@nathanxps13 |
3 years ago |
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b62303794e |
Fix sloppy cleanup of roles in privileges.sql.
Commit
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3 years ago |
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3d14e171e9 |
Add a SET option to the GRANT command.
Similar to how the INHERIT option controls whether or not the permissions of the granted role are automatically available to the grantee, the new SET permission controls whether or not the grantee may use the SET ROLE command to assume the privileges of the granted role. In addition, the new SET permission controls whether or not it is possible to transfer ownership of objects to the target role or to create new objects owned by the target role using commands such as CREATE DATABASE .. OWNER. We could alternatively have made this controlled by the INHERIT option, or allow it when either option is given. An advantage of this approach is that if you are granted a predefined role with INHERIT TRUE, SET FALSE, you can't go and create objects owned by that role. The underlying theory here is that the ability to create objects as a target role is not a privilege per se, and thus does not depend on whether you inherit the target role's privileges. However, it's surely something you could do anyway if you could SET ROLE to the target role, and thus making it contingent on whether you have that ability is reasonable. Design review by Nathan Bossat, Wolfgang Walther, Jeff Davis, Peter Eisentraut, and Stephen Frost. Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmob+zDSRS6JXYrgq0NWdzCXuTNzT5eK54Dn2hhgt17nm8A@mail.gmail.com |
3 years ago |
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0101f770a0 |
Fix a bug in roles_is_member_of.
Commit
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3 years ago |
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e3ce2de09d |
Allow grant-level control of role inheritance behavior.
The GRANT statement can now specify WITH INHERIT TRUE or WITH INHERIT FALSE to control whether the member inherits the granted role's permissions. For symmetry, you can now likewise write WITH ADMIN TRUE or WITH ADMIN FALSE to turn ADMIN OPTION on or off. If a GRANT does not specify WITH INHERIT, the behavior based on whether the member role is marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT. This means that if all roles are marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT before any role grants are performed, the behavior is identical to what we had before; otherwise, it's different, because ALTER ROLE [NO]INHERIT now only changes the default behavior of future grants, and has no effect on existing ones. Patch by me. Reviewed and testing by Nathan Bossart and Tushar Ahuja, with design-level comments from various others. Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmoa5Sf4PiWrfxA=sGzDKg0Ojo3dADw=wAHOhR9dggV=RmQ@mail.gmail.com |
3 years ago |
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ce6b672e44 |
Make role grant system more consistent with other privileges.
Previously, membership of role A in role B could be recorded in the catalog tables only once. This meant that a new grant of role A to role B would overwrite the previous grant. For other object types, a new grant of permission on an object - in this case role A - exists along side the existing grant provided that the grantor is different. Either grant can be revoked independently of the other, and permissions remain so long as at least one grant remains. Make role grants work similarly. Previously, when granting membership in a role, the superuser could specify any role whatsoever as the grantor, but for other object types, the grantor of record must be either the owner of the object, or a role that currently has privileges to perform a similar GRANT. Implement the same scheme for role grants, treating the bootstrap superuser as the role owner since roles do not have owners. This means that attempting to revoke a grant, or admin option on a grant, can now fail if there are dependent privileges, and that CASCADE can be used to revoke these. It also means that you can't grant ADMIN OPTION on a role back to a user who granted it directly or indirectly to you, similar to how you can't give WITH GRANT OPTION on a privilege back to a role which granted it directly or indirectly to you. Previously, only the superuser could specify GRANTED BY with a user other than the current user. Relax that rule to allow the grantor to be any role whose privileges the current user posseses. This doesn't improve compatibility with what we do for other object types, where support for GRANTED BY is entirely vestigial, but it makes this feature more usable and seems to make sense to change at the same time we're changing related behaviors. Along the way, fix "ALTER GROUP group_name ADD USER user_name" to require the same privileges as "GRANT group_name TO user_name". Previously, CREATEROLE privileges were sufficient for either, but only the former form was permissible with ADMIN OPTION on the role. Now, either CREATEROLE or ADMIN OPTION on the role suffices for either spelling. Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost. Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaFr-RZeQ+WoQ5nKPv97oT9+aDgK_a5+qWHSgbDsMp1Vg@mail.gmail.com |
3 years ago |
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6566133c5f |
Ensure that pg_auth_members.grantor is always valid.
Previously, "GRANT foo TO bar" or "GRANT foo TO bar GRANTED BY baz" would record the OID of the grantor in pg_auth_members.grantor, but that role could later be dropped without modifying or removing the pg_auth_members record. That's not great, because we typically try to avoid dangling references in catalog data. Now, a role grant depends on the grantor, and the grantor can't be dropped without removing the grant or changing the grantor. "DROP OWNED BY" will remove the grant, just as it does for other kinds of privileges. "REASSIGN OWNED BY" will not, again just like what we do in other cases involving privileges. pg_auth_members now has an OID column, because that is needed in order for dependencies to work. It also now has an index on the grantor column, because otherwise dropping a role would require a sequential scan of the entire table to see whether the role's OID is in use as a grantor. That probably wouldn't be too large a problem in practice, but it seems better to have an index just in case. A follow-on patch is planned with the goal of more thoroughly rationalizing the behavior of role grants. This patch is just trying to do enough to make sure that the data we store in the catalogs is at some basic level valid. Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaFr-RZeQ+WoQ5nKPv97oT9+aDgK_a5+qWHSgbDsMp1Vg@mail.gmail.com |
3 years ago |
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b762bbde30 |
Allow makeaclitem() to accept multiple privilege names.
Interpret its privileges argument as a comma-separated list of privilege names, as in has_table_privilege and other functions. This is actually net less code, since the support routine to parse that already exists, and we can drop convert_priv_string() which had no other use-case. Robins Tharakan Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e5a05dc54ba64408b3dd260171c1abaf@EX13D05UWC001.ant.amazon.com |
3 years ago |
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0abc1a059e |
In REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW, set user ID before running user code.
It intended to, but did not, achieve this. Adopt the new standard of setting user ID just after locking the relation. Back-patch to v10 (all supported versions). Reviewed by Simon Riggs. Reported by Alvaro Herrera. Security: CVE-2022-1552 |
3 years ago |
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a117cebd63 |
Make relation-enumerating operations be security-restricted operations.
When a feature enumerates relations and runs functions associated with all found relations, the feature's user shall not need to trust every user having permission to create objects. BRIN-specific functionality in autovacuum neglected to account for this, as did pg_amcheck and CLUSTER. An attacker having permission to create non-temp objects in at least one schema could execute arbitrary SQL functions under the identity of the bootstrap superuser. CREATE INDEX (not a relation-enumerating operation) and REINDEX protected themselves too late. This change extends to the non-enumerating amcheck interface. Back-patch to v10 (all supported versions). Sergey Shinderuk, reviewed (in earlier versions) by Alexander Lakhin. Reported by Alexander Lakhin. Security: CVE-2022-1552 |
3 years ago |
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79de9842ab |
Remove the ability of a role to administer itself.
Commit |
4 years ago |
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7103ebb7aa
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Add support for MERGE SQL command
MERGE performs actions that modify rows in the target table using a source table or query. MERGE provides a single SQL statement that can conditionally INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE rows -- a task that would otherwise require multiple PL statements. For example, MERGE INTO target AS t USING source AS s ON t.tid = s.sid WHEN MATCHED AND t.balance > s.delta THEN UPDATE SET balance = t.balance - s.delta WHEN MATCHED THEN DELETE WHEN NOT MATCHED AND s.delta > 0 THEN INSERT VALUES (s.sid, s.delta) WHEN NOT MATCHED THEN DO NOTHING; MERGE works with regular tables, partitioned tables and inheritance hierarchies, including column and row security enforcement, as well as support for row and statement triggers and transition tables therein. MERGE is optimized for OLTP and is parameterizable, though also useful for large scale ETL/ELT. MERGE is not intended to be used in preference to existing single SQL commands for INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE since there is some overhead. MERGE can be used from PL/pgSQL. MERGE does not support targetting updatable views or foreign tables, and RETURNING clauses are not allowed either. These limitations are likely fixable with sufficient effort. Rewrite rules are also not supported, but it's not clear that we'd want to support them. Author: Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> Author: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org> Author: Amit Langote <amitlangote09@gmail.com> Author: Simon Riggs <simon.riggs@enterprisedb.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@enterprisedb.com> Reviewed-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> (earlier versions) Reviewed-by: Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie> (earlier versions) Reviewed-by: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> (earlier versions) Reviewed-by: Japin Li <japinli@hotmail.com> Reviewed-by: Justin Pryzby <pryzby@telsasoft.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@enterprisedb.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihong Yu <zyu@yugabyte.com> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CANP8+jKitBSrB7oTgT9CY2i1ObfOt36z0XMraQc+Xrz8QB0nXA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAH2-WzkJdBuxj9PO=2QaO9-3h3xGbQPZ34kJH=HukRekwM-GZg@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201231134736.GA25392@alvherre.pgsql |
4 years ago |
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e68570e388 |
Revert b2a459edf "Fix GRANTED BY support in REVOKE ROLE statements"
The reverted commit attempted to fix SQL specification compliance for
the cases which
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4 years ago |
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4597fd78d6 |
Add test for REVOKE ADMIN OPTION
The REVOKE ADMIN OPTION FOR <role_name> syntax didn't have ample test coverage. Fix by adding coverage in the privileges test suite. Author: Mark Dilger <mark.dilger@enterprisedb.com> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/333B0203-D19B-4335-AE64-90EB0FAF46F0@enterprisedb.com |
4 years ago |
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b2a459edfe |
Fix GRANTED BY support in REVOKE ROLE statements
Commit
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4 years ago |
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77ea4f9439 |
Grant memory views to pg_read_all_stats.
Grant privileges on views pg_backend_memory_contexts and pg_shmem_allocations to the role pg_read_all_stats. Also grant on the underlying functions that those views depend on. Author: Bharath Rupireddy <bharath.rupireddyforpostgres@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart <bossartn@amazon.com> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALj2ACWAZo3Ar_EVsn2Zf9irG+hYK3cmh1KWhZS_Od45nd01RA@mail.gmail.com |
4 years ago |
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e135743ef0 |
Reduce runtime of privileges.sql test under CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS.
Several queries in the privileges regression test cause the planner to apply the plpgsql function "leak()" to every element of the histogram for atest12.b. Since commit |
4 years ago |
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c5b7ba4e67 |
Postpone some stuff out of ExecInitModifyTable.
Arrange to do some things on-demand, rather than immediately during
executor startup, because there's a fair chance of never having to do
them at all:
* Don't open result relations' indexes until needed.
* Don't initialize partition tuple routing, nor the child-to-root
tuple conversion map, until needed.
This wins in UPDATEs on partitioned tables when only some of the
partitions will actually receive updates; with larger partition
counts the savings is quite noticeable. Also, we can remove some
sketchy heuristics in ExecInitModifyTable about whether to set up
tuple routing.
Also, remove execPartition.c's private hash table tracking which
partitions were already opened by the ModifyTable node. Instead
use the hash added to ModifyTable itself by commit
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4 years ago |
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6c3ffd697e |
Add pg_read_all_data and pg_write_all_data roles
A commonly requested use-case is to have a role who can run an unfettered pg_dump without having to explicitly GRANT that user access to all tables, schemas, et al, without that role being a superuser. This address that by adding a "pg_read_all_data" role which implicitly gives any member of this role SELECT rights on all tables, views and sequences, and USAGE rights on all schemas. As there may be cases where it's also useful to have a role who has write access to all objects, pg_write_all_data is also introduced and gives users implicit INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE rights on all tables, views and sequences. These roles can not be logged into directly but instead should be GRANT'd to a role which is able to log in. As noted in the documentation, if RLS is being used then an administrator may (or may not) wish to set BYPASSRLS on the login role which these predefined roles are GRANT'd to. Reviewed-by: Georgios Kokolatos Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200828003023.GU29590@tamriel.snowman.net |
5 years ago |
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b12bd4869b |
Fix has_column_privilege function corner case
According to the comments, when an invalid or dropped column oid is passed to has_column_privilege(), the intention has always been to return NULL. However, when the caller had table level privilege the invalid/missing column was never discovered, because table permissions were checked first. Fix that by introducing extended versions of pg_attribute_acl(check|mask) and pg_class_acl(check|mask) which take a new argument, is_missing. When is_missing is NULL, the old behavior is preserved. But when is_missing is passed by the caller, no ERROR is thrown for dropped or missing columns/relations, and is_missing is flipped to true. This in turn allows has_column_privilege to check for column privileges first, providing the desired semantics. Not backpatched since it is a user visible behavioral change with no previous complaints, and the fix is a bit on the invasive side. Author: Joe Conway Reviewed-By: Tom Lane Reported by: Ian Barwick Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/flat/9b5f4311-157b-4164-7fe7-077b4fe8ed84%40joeconway.com |
5 years ago |
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a14a0118a1 |
Add "pg_database_owner" default role.
Membership consists, implicitly, of the current database owner. Expect use in template databases. Once pg_database_owner has rights within a template, each owner of a database instantiated from that template will exercise those rights. Reviewed by John Naylor. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201228043148.GA1053024@rfd.leadboat.com |
5 years ago |
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c028faf2a6 |
Fix mishandling of column-level SELECT privileges for join aliases.
scanNSItemForColumn, expandNSItemAttrs, and ExpandSingleTable would
pass the wrong RTE to markVarForSelectPriv when dealing with a join
ParseNamespaceItem: they'd pass the join RTE, when what we need to
mark is the base table that the join column came from. The end
result was to not fill the base table's selectedCols bitmap correctly,
resulting in an understatement of the set of columns that are read
by the query. The executor would still insist on there being at
least one selectable column; but with a correctly crafted query,
a user having SELECT privilege on just one column of a table would
nonetheless be allowed to read all its columns.
To fix, make markRTEForSelectPriv fetch the correct RTE for itself,
ignoring the possibly-mismatched RTE passed by the caller. Later,
we'll get rid of some now-unused RTE arguments, but that risks
API breaks so we won't do it in released branches.
This problem was introduced by commit
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5 years ago |
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6214e2b228 |
Fix permission checks on constraint violation errors on partitions.
If a cross-partition UPDATE violates a constraint on the target partition,
and the columns in the new partition are in different physical order than
in the parent, the error message can reveal columns that the user does not
have SELECT permission on. A similar bug was fixed earlier in commit
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5 years ago |
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6aaaa76bb4 |
Allow GRANTED BY clause in normal GRANT and REVOKE statements
The SQL standard allows a GRANTED BY clause on GRANT and REVOKE (privilege) statements that can specify CURRENT_USER or CURRENT_ROLE. In PostgreSQL, both of these are the default behavior. Since we already have all the parsing support for this for the GRANT (role) statement, we might as well add basic support for this for the privilege variant as well. This allows us to check off SQL feature T332. In the future, perhaps more interesting things could be done with this, too. Reviewed-by: Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com> Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/f2feac44-b4c5-f38f-3699-2851d6a76dc9@2ndquadrant.com |
5 years ago |